Global Judicial Transparency Norms: A Peek Behind the Robes in a Whole New World — A Look at Global “Democratizing” Trends in Judicial Opinion-Issuing Practices by Entrikin, J. Lyn
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 
Volume 18 Issue 1 
2019 
Global Judicial Transparency Norms: A Peek Behind the Robes in 
a Whole New World — A Look at Global “Democratizing” Trends in 
Judicial Opinion-Issuing Practices 
J. Lyn Entrikin 
William H. Bowen School of Law, University of Arkansas Little Rock 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Civil Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, Common 
Law Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Judges 
Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Legal History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
J. Lyn Entrikin, Global Judicial Transparency Norms: A Peek Behind the Robes in a Whole New World — A 
Look at Global “Democratizing” Trends in Judicial Opinion-Issuing Practices, 18 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. 
REV. 55 (2019), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Global Studies Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  55 
GLOBAL JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY NORMS: A 
PEEK BEHIND 
THE ROBES IN A WHOLE NEW WORLD— 
A LOOK AT GLOBAL “DEMOCRATIZING” 
TRENDS IN JUDICIAL OPINION-ISSUING 
PRACTICES 
 
J. LYN ENTRIKIN* 
The emergence of global judicial relations is rooted in the 
pluralism of multiple legal systems, but driven by the 
expression of a deeper common identity. Dialogue is prized 
over uniformity; debate and reasoned divergence over 
adherence. So it must be, because global legal authority, except 
in [limited] areas . . . does not exist. A global community of 
courts . . . is a more realistic and desirable goal. 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global 
Community of Courts,  44 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 191, 219 (2003). 
ABSTRACT 
Global developments over the last two decades have debunked the 
traditional understanding that separate opinions are idiosyncratic of 
courts in nations following the common law tradition. History reflects that 
judicial opinion-issuing practices have evolved around the world, 
adapting to the increasing globalization of legal systems. And recent 
research confirms that most international and supranational tribunals, 
even those headquartered in continental Europe, expressly permit 
individual judges to issue separate opinions, although in some courts 
various internal norms and customs operate to discourage the practice. In 
addition, the majority of European national constitutional courts now 
permit individual judges to publish separate opinions, and judicial 
members of many “ordinary” supreme courts may do so as well. 
The United States Supreme Court is known globally for its justices’ 
regular practice of issuing separate opinions, and some international 
scholars hold up the Court as a shining example of the common law 
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tradition of transparency. Yet even in the United States, few if any formal 
norms govern the Supreme Court’s opinion-issuing practices, which have 
also evolved quite significantly, if incrementally, over time. Without any 
formal constraints whatsoever, a time might come when a bare majority of 
the Court could choose secrecy over transparency in the blink of an eye. 
Yet the many United States scholars who have long championed the 
dissenting opinion, and who urge that tradition on other sovereigns, 
generally overlook the absence of formal norms that protect federal 
courts’ judicial opinion-issuing practices against change. 
A few scholars have advanced preliminary theories that seek to explain 
institutional variations in opinion-issuing practices, but those theories are 
narrow in scope and warrant considerably more testing and refinement. A 
predictive model has little value unless it can be generalized beyond a 
small group of international and supranational courts. While theoretical 
models hold promise, more scholarly work is warranted to better 
conceptualize the competing “judicial values” that influence the practices 
of national and subnational multi-member courts. Scholarly research is 
also needed to identify the reasons for individual judicial choices about 
disclosing votes and publishing separate opinions. 
The remarkable contemporary global interest in the opinion-issuing 
practices of national, supranational, and international tribunals reflects 
our expanding vision of the rule of law and each sovereign’s role in that 
new world order. In our increasingly global, interconnected legal 
community, should judicial tribunals speak with one institutional voice? 
Or should a cacophony of individual judges communicate judgments, each 
writing seriatim? The polarized views of many scholars who advocate for 
and against separate opinions disregard legitimate differences in the 
underlying norms and values that inform judicial practices. There is no 
clear, “one-size-fits-all” answer. Much more comparative scholarly work 
remains to be done. But the global trend is clearly in favor of 
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When a multi-member collegial court renders a decision, does it speak 
as a single institutional entity, or as a group of individual judicial 
officers?1 How and why do global courts vary in the institutional style of 
issuing opinions? Why do some courts write lengthy opinions giving 
detailed rationales, while others write short, cursory opinions with little 
explanation?2 What are the policy reasons for global variations in judicial 
opinion-issuing practices and other measures of transparency? What 
norms and values do global courts appear to share, and what are the points 
of difference? How are these global practices evolving, and why? Finally, 
what do judicial opinion-issuing practices and transparency norms reflect 
about each court’s institutional role in its own legal culture and its global 
 
 
1  William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 432 (1986). 
The Court is something of a paradox—it is at once the whole and its constituent parts. The 
very words "the Court" mean simultaneously the entity and its members. Generally, critics of 
dissent advocate the primacy of the unit over its members and argue that the Court is most 
"legitimate," most true to its intended role, when it speaks with a single voice. Individual 
justices are urged to yield their views to the paramount need for unity. It is true that unanimity 
underscores the gravity of a constitutional imperative . . . . But, unanimity is not in itself a 
judicial virtue. 
Id.; see Claire L'Heureux-Dube, The Dissenting Opinion: Voice of the Future?, 38 OSGOODE HALL L. 
J. 495, 495-96 (2000) (“Courts . . . may speak in unison or in a plurality of voices: the tradition of 
dissent in the courts of common law countries has long allowed for a certain measure of polyphony in 
the voices of the law.”); Arthur J. Jacobson, Publishing Dissent, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1607, 1632 
(2005) (“Rather than oracles of law bearing legal truth to a feckless mass, common law judges are 
participants with citizens in an ongoing struggle over plural visions of justice. . . . The principle of 
[judicial] decision is and is seen to be no different than the principle of decision in the political 
branches of government.”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. 
REV. 802, 803 (1982) (distinguishing “criticism of the Court as an institution from criticism of the 
foibles of particular Justices”); Adrian Vermuele, The Judiciary is a They, Not an It: Interpretive 
Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 555 (2005) (discussing the 
“fallacy of division,” which attributes the interpretive basis for collective decisions to a group’s 
individual members; “[j]udges vote on cases within a collective judicial bureaucracy that, at appellate 
levels, always sits on merits cases in multi-judge panels.”); id. at 584 (concluding that arguments and 
reasoning that assume the feasibility of judicial coordination on a particular interpretive approach 
“commit the fallacy of division”). 
2  One author has described two distinct styles of judicial opinions that co-exist in European 
countries. The more traditional of the two, characteristic of courts in France and Italy, issues relatively 
short, terse, syllogistic decisions in a predictable pattern that focuses on citing relevant legal 
authorities. The other, followed by courts in Germany and Spain, more closely resembles the 
traditional practice of courts in common law countries: more comprehensive opinions in what might be 
called an almost “literary” and “more openly argumentative” style. ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING 
WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE 145 (2000). 










influence on other tribunals?3 These are the questions this article aims to 
address.  
The article’s focus is on global variations in the transparency of 
judicial deliberation processes and outcomes, including voting patterns4 
and opinions (sometimes known as “judgments” in European parlance) 
that reflect the results of judicial decision-making. First, the article offers 
some historical background on United States courts, generally understood 
globally as among the most transparent of judicial systems.5 Second, the 
article explores the wide range of global norms that govern how courts 
communicate decision-making outcomes, including voting records, 
consensus or majority opinions, and separate opinions.6 Third, the article 
considers some of the value-based policy justifications for the many 
 
 
3 See, e.g., ELAINE MAK, JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING IN A GLOBALISED WORLD: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CHANGING PRACTICES OF WESTERN HIGHEST COURTS 2 (2013) 
(noting the trend in favor of “’judicial internationalisation,’ meaning the increased interaction between 
judges from different jurisdictions around the world”); see also Henrik Litleré Bentsen, Court 
Leadership, Agenda Transformation, and Judicial Dissent: A European Case of a “Mysterious Demise 
of Consensual Norms,” 6 J.L. & CTS. 189, 210 (2018) (observing that as courts’ and judges’ political 
role has expanded, and they exercise broader “discretion to decide . . . the constitutional and individual 
rights of European citizens, [t]he conditions have thus been set for increased disagreement over 
precedent, legal development, and the proper role of courts and justices in democracies throughout 
[Europe]”) (citation omitted). 
4 Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 814–15 (noting that deciding cases by majority vote influences 
a court’s capacity to yield “consistent, principled decisions,” and explaining that “voting systems are 
subject to many problems”). Judge Easterbrook posits, for example, that “[m]ajority voting plus stare 
decisis is . . . a formula under which the Court may produce any outcome favored by any number of 
Justices, however small, even though a majority of Justices would reject that rule if they could [vote 
individually] on the basis of first principles.” Id. at 819. Two Canadian scholars have recently 
published the results of an empirical study of the many variables that influence judicial voting in 
constitutional courts. Benjamin Alarie & Andrew James Green, Quantitative Analysis of Judicial 
Voting (Dec. 19, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3090789. They conclude 
by noting the need for more comparative work on the issue. Id. at 4, 33-34. 
5  See, e.g., Benjamin Bricker, Breaking the Principle of Secrecy: An Examination of Judicial 
Dissent in the European Constitutional Courts, 39 L. & POL’Y 170, 172 (2017) (noting that United 
States courts have been the locus of most contemporary research on dissenting practices, but 
“relatively little is known about the practice of dissent in other environments”); Jacobson, supra note 
1, at 1630 (referring to “American exceptionalism in the practice of dissent [that] has . . . enormous 
jurisprudential and political implications”); Katalin Kelemen, Dissenting Opinions in Constitutional 
Courts, 14 GERMAN L.J. 1345, 1345 (2013) (noting extensive literature on dissenting practices in the 
United States and the lack of comprehensive empirical research on European practices).  
6  Many variations in global court opinion-issuing practices are no doubt attributable to legal 
history, cultural tradition, and religious influences. For a helpful overview of the world’s primary legal 
systems and how they differ, see G. ALAN TARR, JUDICIAL PROCESS AND JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING 3-
8 & tbl. 1.1 (6th ed. 2012).  For a more philosophical perspective on legal systems as a feature of 
modern legal education, see H. Patrick Glenn, Doin’ the Transsystemic: Legal Systems and Legal 
Traditions, 50 MCGILL L.J. 863, 893 (2005) (“[T]he concept of a legal system is . . . a particular 
exemplification of tradition. [T]raditionality is to be found in almost all legal systems . . . . In a larger 
sense, . . . a legal system is a tradition and can be only understood, like a film, as part of a larger 
story.”). See generally LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD:  A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL 












differences in global courts’ opinion-issuing norms and practices. The 
discussion underscores the need for further theoretical and conceptual 
research that distinguishes between norms, values, and contextual factors 
to better understand how these interdependent variables influence 
dissenting practices and other transparency outcomes.7 Finally, the article 
concludes with some observations about the trend favoring transparency in 
the judicial decision-making process, in particular transparency’s 
“democratizing” influence on the global community of courts.  
For purposes of this article, the term “global” court includes both 
national and “supranational” tribunals: national supreme (“apex”8) courts 
with “diffuse” appellate jurisdiction;9 national constitutional courts with 
specialized jurisdiction; national courts of cassation, with more traditional 
appellate jurisdiction but excluding constitutional issues; supranational 
tribunals with jurisdiction over national courts of signatories to the 
relevant convention or treaty; and international tribunals, which apply 
international law. All are multi-member tribunals (sometimes known as 
“collegial” courts10) with clearly defined institutional jurisdiction. In every 
instance, judgments are issued on behalf of the court, and those decisions 
 
 
7 For jurisdictions that publicize voting records and judges’ separate opinions, the reasons why 
dissenting rates vary over time (a fascinating topic in its own right) is beyond the scope of this article. 
Dissenting (or concurring) rates often ebb and flow over time for a particular court (or group of 
courts). Several authors have recently published studies testing hypotheses for variations in dissenting 
rates in multi-member courts in a single jurisdiction. E.g., Bentsen, supra note 3 (empirical analysis of 
Norway Supreme Court’s dissenting and concurring rates from 1987 to 2014); Lee Epstein, William 
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101 (2011) (empirical analysis of dissenting rates in U.S. Supreme 
Court and federal appellate courts in selected years spanning several decades).   
Bentsen’s review of the current literature yielded three primary hypotheses that explain a court’s 
changing dissent rates over time: “(1) the idiosyncrasies and leadership of the chief justice; (2) changes 
in the demographic and ideological composition of the court, including changes to the procedures for 
appointing justices; and (3) the development of stricter docket control followed by the treatment of 
more principled and contentious legal issues.” Bentsen, supra note 3, at 191. 
8  Bricker, supra note 5, at 172 (referring to European apex courts). 
9 “[A] diffuse rule of jurisdiction over constitutional matters and judicial review . . . means 
that all courts within the system have the power to strike down legislation that is found to violate the 
Constitution.” Ori Aronson, Inferiorizing Judicial Review: Popular Constitutionalism in Trial Courts, 
43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 971, 986 (2010). In the United States, the diffuse structure of constitutional 
review means that lower courts have the authority to strike down state and federal legislation, a 
decision that stands unless a higher court reviews that decision and reverses. Id. at 986-87.  
10  E.g., Dimitri Landa & Jeffrey R. Lax, Legal Doctrine on Collegial Courts, 71 J. POL. 946, 
946 (2009) (using the term “collegial” to refer to multimember courts; observing that traditional 
theories of adjudication are incomplete with respect to “the collegial nature of most appellate courts”); 
see also Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 832 (reasoning that while consistency might be expected from 
individual judges, it is unrealistic and utopian to call for unity and consistency from a multi-member 
court). 










represent the outcome of internal group deliberations.     
The details about each court’s internal deliberation process are 
generally unknowable unless a court publishes its internal operating 
procedures, or a member of a particular tribunal publishes anecdotes from 
personal experience.11 As a general rule, each tribunal’s deliberations 
occur in secret, a norm that is shared across jurisdictions despite the many 
other variations in transparency addressed in this article.12   
II. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE: 
ORIGINS OF PUBLISHED COURT OPINIONS (INCLUDING DISSENTS) 
The author’s interest in comparing the various ways global tribunals 
communicate decisions began while studying the historical variations in 
United States appellate court practices, both state and federal.13 In the 
early years of the republic, Supreme Court opinions resolving substantive 
legal disputes were issued orally and seriatim from the bench, consistent 
with the practice of English common law courts of the time.14 Each justice, 
 
 
11 E.g., L’Heureux-Dube, supra note 1, at 500-01 (describing Canada Supreme Court’s internal 
deliberation process); see also Dieter Grimm, Some Remarks on the Use of Dissenting Opinions in 
Continental Europe, in GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: JUDICIAL DISSENT (2008) (relating personal 
experiences as a former member of the German Constitutional Court), http://www.irpa.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/3_Come-ha-avuto-origine-il-dissent-nelle-corti-inglesi-e-americane-e-come-
si-evoluto-nella-prassi-della-Corte-suprema-e-nella-corte-tedesca_2008-I-1-73.pdf; see generally 
GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: JUDICIAL DISSENT (2008) [hereinafter JUDICIAL DISSENT], 
http://www.irpa.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/3_Come-ha-avuto-origine-il-dissent-nelle-corti-
inglesi-e-americane-e-come-si-evoluto-nella-prassi-della-Corte-suprema-e-nella-corte-tedesca_2008-I-
1-73.pdf; Freda M. Steel, The Role of Dissents in Appellate Judging, 67 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (2017) 
(writing from personal experience as judge on the Manitoba Court of Appeal). 
12  See, e.g., Bricker, supra note 5, at 170 (referring to the “tradition of secrecy” among 
European courts); Niels F. van Manen, The Secret of the Court in the Netherlands, 24 SEATTLE UNIV. 
L. REV. 569, 570-71 & n.6 (2000) (describing Netherlands’ “formal-legal ‘secret of the court,’” the 
violation of which is a criminal offense). One Spanish political science scholar has observed that the 
principle of deliberative secrecy is particularly sacrosanct among European courts:  
European courts meet in closed sessions and no record of the deliberation is made public. 
Even where dissenting opinions are permitted, the deliberative moment remains an essentially 
secret affair. In that respect – but in that respect alone – to say that European courts are “black 
boxes” . . . is not entirely inaccurate. Any account of judicial decision-making in terms of 
collegial interactions and internal strategies is bound to remain speculative. 
Arthur Dyevre, Unifying the Field of Comparative Judicial Politics: Towards a General Theory of 
Judicial Behaviour, 2 EUR. POL. SCI. REV. 297, 303 (2010) (citation omitted), 
http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf2/dyevrejudicialbehaviour.pdf. 
13  See J. Lyn Entrikin, Disrespectful Dissent: Justice Scalia's Regrettable Legacy of Incivility, 
18 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 201, 202 (2017). 
14  E.g., Karl M. Zobell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial 
Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186, 191-92 (1959); see Andrew Lynch, Introduction—What Makes 
a Dissent ‘Great’?, in GREAT AUSTRALIAN DISSENTS at 1, 2 (Andrew Lynch ed., 2016) (”The precise 
origins of the practice of judicial dissent are unclear.”). But see Chris Young, The History of Judicial 
Dissent in England: What Relevance Does It Have for Modern Common Law Legal Systems?, 32 
AUSTL. B. REV. 96, 110 (2009). Young argues that English judges have always had the opportunity to 












one by one, announced an individual opinion on the matter, and when 
published, all were reported together along with the name of each author, 
followed by a brief order reflecting the Court’s collective judgment.15 The 
Court did not issue what we now know as majority and minority opinions 
until the first decade of the nineteenth century, and even then published 
separate opinions were highly unusual.16   
The earliest decisions of the Court were not published in “official” 
reports.17 In fact, they were not necessarily even written opinions.18 As 
 
 
indecision [in the absence of unanimity or consensus].” Id.  While judicial decision-making during the 
Middle Ages sought consensus and unanimity, id. at 100, 104-05, by the end of the sixteenth century 
majority decisions were accepted as the price for securing a final decision, id. at 105 (citing VI SIR J. 
BAKER, OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 51 (2003)).   
15  E.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 220-85 (1796), 
http://cdn.loc.gov/service/ll/usrep/usrep003/usrep003199/usrep003199.pdf (original image, Library of 
Congress). 
16  See Zobell, supra note 14, at 195 (citing the first substantial separate opinion in the Supreme 
Court, a concurrence authored by Justice William Johnson in Huidekoper’s Lessee v. Douglass, 7 U.S. 
(3 Cranch) 1, 72 (1805) (including a lengthy footnote reprinting seriatim opinions of lower courts 
addressing the same issue)), 
http://cdn.loc.gov/service/ll/usrep/usrep007/usrep007001/usrep007001.pdf (original image, Library of 
Congress); e.g., Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 405-09 (1792), 
http://cdn.loc.gov/service/ll/usrep/usrep002/usrep002402b/usrep002402b.pdf (original image, Library 
of Congress); see also M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of 
Dissent, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 283, 316-17 (2008). For a recent article addressing the value of 
concurring opinions in particular, see Thomas B. Bennett, Barry Friedman, Andrew D. Martin & 
Susan Navarro Smelcer, Divide and Concur: Separate Opinions & Legal Change, 103 CORNELL L. 
REV. 817, 877 (2018).  
American scholars who favor the practice of issuing separate judicial opinions seldom 
acknowledge the single feature that virtually all global courts appear to have in common: a norm of 
secrecy as to the court’s internal deliberations. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Whether or 
not a jurisdiction’s judges are authorized to issue separate opinions, and whether or not a particular 
court is authorized to disclose the individual members’ votes, virtually all collegial courts expect and 
require secrecy regarding internal deliberations. See, e.g., ROSA RAFFAELLI, DISSENTING OPINIONS IN 
THE SUPREME COURTS OF THE MEMBER STATES 8 (2012) (distinguishing secrecy of deliberations from 
norms allowing separate opinions). This feature is particularly salient for supranational and 
international tribunals whose judges, while presumably “independent,” are expected to represent the 
interests of their respective home countries. See id. at 10 (positing that prohibiting separate opinions in 
international courts could protect individual judges’ independence, while allowing separate opinions 
could facilitate perceptions that individual judges represent interests of appointing nations).    
17  While the early Supreme Court followed the English common law courts’ practice of issuing 
opinions seriatim from the bench, England had no established practice of publishing judicial opinions 
until much later. England published no “official” reports between 1537, when the last of the 
Yearbooks was published (of questionable accuracy themselves), and 1865. During the centuries in 
between, various private reporters published judicial opinions with varying degrees of credibility and 
accuracy. See Van Vechten Veeder, The English Reports, 1292-1865, 15 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1901). 
Veeder decried the state of published English precedent before the mid-eighteenth century: “It is 
curious that while adherence to judicial precedent was unfailingly recognized [in England,] the 
preservation of such precedents should have been for centuries in so precarious a state; it is 
nevertheless a fact that the thoroughly reliable reporters prior to Lord Mansfield's time may be counted 










mentioned earlier, the justices announced their opinions orally from the 
bench. Supreme Court opinions appeared in “reports,” as we know them 
today, only because private reporters attended Court on their own initiative 
and took notes based on each justice’s oral delivery of the opinions. 
Formally speaking, the Court “handed down” its decisions in the late 
eighteenth century consistent with the official records maintained by the 
Court’s clerk.19 Not until 1817 was the Court authorized for the first time 
to appoint its own official “reporter,”20 whose duty it was to report the 
 
 
upon the fingers of one hand.” Id. at 2. 
18  See, e.g., Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24, 26 (1859) (“The practice of giving the reasons in 
writing for judgments, has grown into use in modern times. Formerly, the reasons, if any were given, 
were generally stated orally by the Judges, and taken down by the Reporters in short hand.” (citing 1 
BLACKSTONE 71)).  “[T]he idea of preserving a written record of the Court’s opinions  was not a 
foregone conclusion at the time of the Nation’s founding. During the colonial period, the 
decisions of American courts were rarely published at all. In practice, lawyers relied  on English 
reports or personal notebooks of local decisions.” Ryan Schwier, William T. Otto: The U.S. 
Supreme Court’s First “Anonymous” Reporter , 1875-1883 (May 28, 2015), IND. LEGAL 
ARCHIVE J., http://www.indianalegalarchive.com/journal/otto. 
19  The Judiciary Act of 1789 expressly authorized appointment of the Supreme Court clerk, 
who was directed “seasonably to record the decrees, judgments and determinations of the court of 
which he is clerk.” Pub. L. 1-20, 1 Stat. 73, § 7 (1789). The Act made no other provision for reporting 
the Court’s decisions. The first clerk was John Tucker of Boston, appointed February 3, 1790. See 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) xv (1803).   
In an order dated August 8, 1791, Chief Justice John Jay announced that the Court would 
“consider the practice of the courts of the king’s bench, and of chancery, in England, as affording 
outlines for the practice of the court; and that [the Court] will, from time to time, make such alterations 
therein as circumstances may render necessary.” SUP. CT. R. 7, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 413-14 (1792); see 
also 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) xvi (1803) (reprinting Rule 7); California v. S. Pac. Co., 157 U.S. 229, 248-49 
(1894) (summarizing evolution of “original general rule 7, adopted August 8, 1791”); ROBERT DESTY, 
A MANUAL OF PRACTICE IN THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 246 (2d. ed. 1876) (citing history of 
the rule, by then renumbered to Sup. Ct. R. 3). Not until 1834 did the Court adopt a rule providing that 
justices’ opinions were to be “filed” with the clerk (presumably in writing) immediately after they 
were announced from the bench. Gerald T. Dunne, Early Court Reporters: Proprietors—Sometimes 
Predators, in SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY YEARBOOK 61, 62 (William F. Swindler ed., 
1976) (citing 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) vii (1834)); see Alfons J. Beitzinger, Chief Justice Taney and the 
Publication of Court Opinions, 7 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 32, 33 (1958) (referring to a Court rule that 
required justices’ written opinions to “follow immediately upon oral delivery”); Peter Martin, 
Reconfiguring Law Reports and the Concept of Precedent for a Digital Age, 53 VILLANOVA L. REV. 1, 
10 (2008) (noting that an 1834 order “marked the end of the [Court’s] practice of rendering oral 
opinions and regularized the flow of written decisions to the reporter”) (citing ERWIN C. SURRENCY, A 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW PUBLISHING 64 (1990)).  
20  SUP. CT. R. 41 (duty of Reporter of Decisions to prepare opinions for publication); Richard J. 
Lazarus, The (Non)finality of Supreme Court Opinions, 128 HARV. L. REV. 540, 548 (2014) (citing An 
Act to Provide for Reports of the Decisions of the Supreme Court, ch. 63, 3 Stat. 376 (1817)); see 
TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME 
COURT LAW CLERK 38-39 (2006). In its current form Rule 41 provides,  
Opinions of the Court will be released by the Clerk immediately upon their announcement 
from the bench, or as the Court otherwise directs. Thereafter, the Clerk will cause the 
opinions to be issued in slip form, and the Reporter of Decisions will prepare them for 
publication in the preliminary prints and bound volumes of the United States Reports. 
SUP. CT. R. 41. The most recent version of the Supreme Court Rules took effect November 13, 2017. 












Court’s decisions in written form within six months after they were 
delivered.21 Until then, reporters were private members of the bar who 
literally took independent notes of the justices’ orally announced decisions 
and published them for profit.22 Occasionally individual justices provided 
private reporters access to the justices’ own notes of decision, which were 
incorporated into the unofficial reports of the Court’s decisions at the sole 
discretion of the reporters themselves.23   
Most American scholars simply assume that opinions issued by the 
 
 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf.   
21  ALFRED CONKLING, A TREATISE ON THE ORGANIZATION, JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE OF 
THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 10 (4th ed. 1864) (citing An Act to Provide for Reports of 
Decisions of the Supreme Court, Pub. L. 14-63, 3 Stat. 376 (1817) (requiring reporter to publish 
decisions “within six months after such decisions shall be made”)). The first “official” reporter of 
decisions was Henry Wheaton, who served in that capacity from 1817 to 1827 after he was unofficially 
appointed in 1816. CATHERINE L. FISK, WORKING KNOWLEDGE:  EMPLOYEE INNOVATION AND THE 
RISE OF CORPORATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1800-1930, at 64 (2009).   
Notably, the practice of reporting published opinions was not well entrenched until decades later. 
The Court’s initial statutory authority for appointment of an official reporter was temporary; it did not 
become permanent until 1842. CONKLING, supra, at 10 (citing Pub. L. 27-264, 5 Stat. 545 (1842) 
(requiring reporter, as condition of receiving compensation, to publish decisions “within six months 
after the said decisions shall be made”)). Before then, a series of enactments had extended the Court’s 
authority to appoint a reporter for only three years at a time. E.g., An Act to Provide for Reports of 
Decisions of the Supreme Court, Pub. L. 19-18, 4 Stat. 205 (Sess. II, 1827), 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes-at-large/19th-congress/session-2/c19s2ch18.pdf (requiring 
reporter to publish decisions “within six months after such decisions shall be made,” § 1, and 
providing that the Act would remain in force “for three years, and no longer,” § 3). Apparently, the 
Court’s increasing caseload imposed significant time pressures on the official reporter’s ability to carry 
out the statutory duties of the office. In 1911, Congress enacted legislation expressly requiring the 
Court’s reporter to “cause the decisions of the Supreme Court to be printed and published within eight 
months after they are made.” Pub. L. 61-475, § 225, 36 Stat. 1087, 1153 (1911) (codified as amended 
at 28 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018)). In 1948, the statute was amended to eliminate the time limit entirely, 
instead providing that Supreme Court decisions must be “printed, bound, and distributed in the 
preliminary prints and bound volumes of the United States Reports as soon as practicable after 
rendition.” 28 U.S.C. § 411(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 673(c) (2018) (“The reporter shall, under the 
direction of the Court or the Chief Justice, prepare the decisions of the Court for publication in bound 
volumes and advance copies in pamphlet installments.”). Not until 1922 did Congress provide full 
financial support for the reporter’s salary, support staff, and expenses, including government 
publication of the Reports. See Pub. L. 67-267, 42 Stat. 816 (1922). 
22  Lazarus, supra note 20, at 547 (noting that the Court’s early reporters “were essentially self-
appointed” and were not government officials). Henry Wheaton unsuccessfully sued his successors 
alleging copyright infringement after they had prepared condensed versions of Wheaton’s reporters. 
The Supreme Court held, in its first copyright decision, that Wheaton had no common law copyright 
and could proceed only if he had complied with the conditions of the Copyright Act. See Wheaton v. 
Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 668 (1834). While two justices dissented, the author of the Court’s 
principal opinion took it upon himself to add the following: “It may be proper to remark that the 
[C]ourt are unanimously of opinion, that no reporter has or can have any copyright in the written 
opinions delivered by this [C]ourt; and that the judges thereof cannot confer on any reporter any such 
right.” Id.  
23  See Lazarus, supra note 20, at 547-48.  










United States Supreme Court have always been published. But in the early 
years, private reporters had total discretion whether to publish orally-
delivered Supreme Court decisions.24 A reporter’s discretion included 
deciding which opinions to eliminate entirely from publication.25 
“Reporting” opinions was a proprietary enterprise, and for the Court’s first 
quarter-century, the copyright was presumed to belong to the private 
reporter, whose sole remuneration amounted to royalties from sales of 
published reports carrying the reporter’s name.26   
Even after 1817, when Congress first authorized the Court to appoint 
an official reporter, the Justices themselves generally did not issue written 
decisions. After announcing decisions orally, justices would provide the 
reporter with the notes they had used to announce their decisions from the 
bench; it was up to the reporter to craft a written decision consistent with 
the Court’s oral pronouncements.27 
State appellate courts in the United States preceded the Supreme Court 
in requiring justices to produce written opinions, and states also issued the 
earliest volumes of published reports. Considerable scholarly debate has 
focused on whether Connecticut28 or Pennsylvania29 was the first state to 
 
 
24  Id. at 548. Moreover, before 1970, in-chambers opinions authored by individual justices on 
such matters as applications for bail, stays, and injunctions (on which justices rule alone as assigned 
circuit representatives), were not included in the official United States Reports. See Bennett Boskey & 
Eugene Gressman, The 1970 Changes in the Supreme Court’s Rules, 49 F.R.D. 679, 695 (1970); Ira 
Brad Matetsky, The History of Publication of U.S. Supreme Court Justices' In-Chambers Opinions, 6 
J. OF L. 19, 31 (2016); see also James A. Thomson, Inside the Supreme Court: A Sanctum Sanctorum? 
The Unpublished Opinions of the Rehnquist Court, 66 MISS. L. J. 177, 207 (1996) (book review; 
noting that papers of justices are sometimes published privately, but only after they leave the Court). 
Prior to 1970, one-justice opinions in those matters were published exclusively by private reporters. 
On a related issue pertaining to written opinions, the Court has been criticized for its practice of 
revising opinions after their official release but before “official” publication in the United States 
Reports.  E.g., Lazarus, supra note 20, at 623-24 (criticizing Court’s practices allowing opinion 
revisions after issuance and calling for improvements). But cf. Frank D. Wagner, The Role of the 
Supreme Court Reporter in History, 26 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 9, 10-14 (Mar. 2001) (explaining in detail the 
Court’s internal editorial process that occurs from the date a slip opinion is issued until its “official” 
publication in the United States Reports), 
http://supremecourthistory.org/pub_journal_2001_vol_1.html. 
25  Lazarus, supra note 20, at 548. 
26  Schwier, supra note 18; see Lazarus, supra note 20, at 548 (“With no government salary, the 
Reporter's sole source of income for this work derived from the sale of published volumes.”).   
27  See Dunne, supra note 19, at 62 & n.10; Wagner, supra note 24, at 15; see also Peter M. 
Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187, 1223 (2007).  
28  KURT X. METZMEIER, WRITING THE LEGAL RECORD: LAW REPORTERS IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY KENTUCKY 5 (2017) (citing Kirby as having already “shown the path” by publishing the 
“first volume of printed decisions of an American court” in 1789); WILLIAM D. POPKIN, EVOLUTION 
OF THE JUDICIAL OPINION: INSTITUTIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL STYLES 184 (2007) (crediting 
Connecticut’s Ephraim Kirby for publishing the first volume of unofficial state court reports in 1789). 
29  A volume of Pennsylvania admiralty opinions was published in early 1789. Dunne, supra 












publish reports of judicial opinions.30 Most scholars give the nod to 
Connecticut, which issued its first volume of published reports in 1789, a 
few years after the state legislature had enacted a statute requiring the 
Supreme Court of Errors to issue written opinions, each signed by at least 
one of its justices.31   
Unofficial reports of the United States Supreme Court were first 
published in 1790 by Alexander James Dallas, whose first volume 
ironically included only decisions issued by  Pennsylvania courts dating 
back as early as 1754.32 His second, third, and fourth volumes included 
Pennsylvania cases and a few Federal Circuit opinions, as well as Supreme 
Court opinions.33 Dallas was the first of several private reporters appointed 
by the Supreme Court. The first ninety volumes of the United States 
Reports spanning the years 1790 to 1875 were “nominative reporters,” 
meaning that they carried the names of the various reporters who had 
prepared them for publication.34   
In the twenty-first century, most Americans take for granted that 
appellate court opinions on the merits are virtually always issued in 
 
 
30  Richard A. Danner, More than Decisions: Reviews of American Law Reports in the Pre-West 
Era 3-4 & n.14 (Duke Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2015-27, 2015), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2622299) (citing EPHRAIM KIRBY, REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT (1789) and several other sources reflecting the 
scholarly debate); see also Daniel R. Coquillette, First Flower-the Earliest American Law Reports and 
the Extraordinary Josiah Quincy Jr. (1744-1775), 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 2 n.3 (1996) (citing 
Francis Hopkinson's JUDGMENTS IN ADMIRALTY IN PENNSYLVANIA (1789) and various sources 
disputing whether Pennsylvania or Connecticut was first); Dunne, supra note 19, at 62 n.10 (citing 
WALLACE, THE COMMON LAW REPORTERS 471 n.2 (4th ed. 1882)). 
31  See ACTS AND LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT IN AMERICA 268 (New London, 
Timothy Green 1784). 
Be it further Enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That it shall be the Duty of the Judges of the 
Superior Court, in all Matters of Law by them decided, . . . each one to give his Opinion 
seriatim, with the Reasons thereof, and the same reduce to Writing and subscribe; to be kept 
on File, that the Case may be fully reported, and if removed by Writ of Error, be carried Up 
with greater Advantage; and thereby a Foundation be laid for a more perfect and permanent 
System of common Law in this State. And it shall be the Duty of the Supreme Court of Error, 
to cause the Reasons of their Judgments to be committed to Writing, and signed by one of the 
Judges, and to be lodged in the Office of the Clerk of the Superior Court. 
Id.  
32  See 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) (1790); Wagner, supra note 24, at 14-15; see also Clarence Thomas & 
Frank Wagner, Role of the Supreme Court Reporter, C-SPAN (Nov. 16, 2000), https://www.c-
span.org/video/?160586-1/role-supreme-court-reporter (video describing reporter’s role and 
functions). 
33  See 2 U.S. (2 Dall.); 3 U.S. (3 Dall.); 4 U.S. (4 Dall.).  
34  Schwier,  supra note 18;  see About this Collection ,  LIB R AR Y OF CON GRE SS ,  
https://www.loc.gov/collections/united-states-reports/about-this-collection/ (last  visi ted Aug. 29, 
2018).  










writing,35 and that they regularly include separate opinions authored by 
individual judges.36 And these days, a unanimous opinion of the United 
States Supreme Court is so unusual as to be remarkable. State appellate 
and federal circuit appellate judges issue separate opinions less frequently, 
but the practice is certainly not uncommon, and individual judges’ votes 
are typically disclosed to the public.37 The practice of issuing a majority 
opinion together with separate opinions authored by individual judges has 
 
 
35  See William H. Carpenter, Courts of Last Resort, 19 YALE L. J. 280, 290 (1910) (“The 
decisions of courts of last resort must, at least, according to our American notions, be in written form. 
This is done for the double purpose of insuring accuracy – for writing is a great aid to exactness – and 
also that the world may know the rule of law declared and applied.”). But as noted earlier, United 
States Supreme Court justices, unlike some of their state counterparts, were not expected to file written 
opinions until 1834, when the Court itself first adopted an internal rule requiring opinions to be filed 
with the Clerk of the Court promptly after they were announced. See 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) vii (1834); see 
also Max Radin, The Requirement of Written Opinions, 18 CAL. L. REV. 486 (1930) (critiquing Cal. 
Const. art. VI, § 2 and several other state constitutional or statutory provisions requiring written 
appellate decisions, including reasons).  
36  See, e.g., EDWARD MCWHINNEY, SUPREME COURTS & JUDICIAL LAW-MAKING: 
CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNALS & CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 37 (1986) (“The dissenting opinion has 
occupied a place of honour, in American jurisprudence, since the era of Holmes and Brandeis when 
their dissents . . . became, in effect, appeals to the future . . . .”); Edward Dumbauld, Dissenting 
Opinions in International Adjudication, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 929 (1942) (“To the Anglo-American 
lawyer, dissenting opinions are a familiar feature of the judicial process.”); id. at 935 (“[I]t is very 
natural that we find dissenting opinions in English and American law, where the doctrine of stare 
decisis is in force.”); see also Brennan, supra note 1, at 438 (“The right to dissent is one of the great 
and cherished freedoms that we enjoy by reason of the excellent accident of our American births.”)   
Other nations with a common law judicial tradition have a similar perspective on the value of 
dissenting opinions. See, e.g., Michael D. Kirby, Judicial Dissent – Common Law and Civil Law 
Traditions, 123 L.Q. REV. 379, 379 (2006) (noting the degree of transparency characteristic of 
common law courts in disclosing disagreement); Julia Laffranque, Dissenting Opinion and Judicial 
Independence, 8 JURIDICA INT’L L. REV. 162, 164 (2003) (“In common law countries, the dissenting 
opinion became quickly a completely normal part of the decision-making process.”), 
https://www.juridicainternational.eu/public/pdf/ji_2003_1_162.pdf; Joe McIntyre, In Defence of 
Judicial Dissent, 37 ADELAIDE L. REV. 431, 431 (2016) (explaining that the practice of issuing 
dissenting opinions is generally taken for granted in common law judicial systems). 
37  The exception to this general rule is per curiam opinions, which courts occasionally issue to 
avoid disclosing the identity of the author. Even then, on rare occasions judges have appended separate 
opinions, which indirectly allow a careful reader to identify judges who voted with the majority. E.g., 
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam, with one concurring opinion by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, articulating “additional grounds that require us to 
reverse”; and four individual dissenting opinions authored by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer). By process of elimination (but not because they were identified by name), the reader can of 
course conclude that Justices O’Connor and Kennedy alone supported the reasoning articulated in the 
per curiam opinion. The reason why neither claimed authorship remains a mystery. See Ed Telfeyan, 
Recalling Bush v. Gore and Anthony Kennedy’s Role in It, MEALS FROM THE MARKETPLACE (Apr. 26, 
2012), http://mealsfromthemarketplace.com/2012/04/recalling-bush-v-gore-and-anthony-
kennedy%E2%80%99s-role-in-it/ (speculating that Justice Kennedy wrote the per curiam opinion but 
did not want to be identified as the swing vote). Some have speculated that the Court’s per curiam 
opinion was “actually written largely behind the scenes by [Justice Sandra Day] O'Connor and Justice 
Anthony Kennedy.” Michael Kirkland, Under the U.S. Supreme Court: O’Connor Regrets Bush v. 













become well entrenched in American appellate courts, both state and 
federal.38 The practicing bar and the legal academy no longer question the 
propriety of individual judges issuing separate judicial opinions, 
sometimes with lengthy written explanations appended, which are 
published along with the majority decision.39  
But it was not always that way. Chief Justice John Marshall famously 
abandoned the Court’s early practice of issuing seriatim opinions in favor 
of issuing a single opinion “of the Court” under his own name.40 The Chief 
Justice’s stronghold on Court communications would soon yield to 
occasional dissent, first by Justice Washington in 1805 and later by 
others.41  Separate opinions gradually became increasingly common in the 
Marshall Court and later the Taney Court, although their authors generally 
delivered them reluctantly – almost apologetically, emphasizing the 
significance of the issue before the Court.42 As the stain of slavery could 
no longer be suppressed and the Civil War drew near, the nation’s deep 
social, political, and economic divides were mirrored in the justices’ nine 
seriatim opinions in Dred Scott v. Sandford.43   
At the end of the nineteenth century and continuing for two more 
decades, a significant controversy arose among the bench and even the 
general public regarding the practice of issuing separate concurring or 
dissenting opinions accompanying the Court’s “majority” opinion.44 A few 
 
 
38  General acceptance of judicial dissents extends to most every nation with a common law 
heritage. See John Alder, Dissents in Courts of Last Resort: Tragic Choices?, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 221, 221 (2000) (“The dissenting judgment is usually taken for granted as an integral feature of 
the common law.”); Lynch, supra note 14, at 1 (“The delivery of dissenting opinions is such a familiar 
phenomenon of appellate court decision-making in common law systems as to often go unremarked.”). 
But cf. RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 7 (“There is no sharp distinction between ‘common law’ and 
‘civil law’ countries: in many ‘civil law’ countries, dissents may be published, while in some ‘common 
law’ countries they are either limited or forbidden.”); Kirby, supra note 36, at 381 (acknowledging 
recent trends in civil law countries favoring individual judges’ right to dissent).   
39  An underexplored related issue pertains to separate opinions issued by members of United 
States administrative tribunals, which have far-reaching, varied jurisdiction in the United States. See 
Sharon B. Jacobs, Administrative Dissents, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 541, 617 (2017) (“This 
preliminary assessment of administrative dissents and concurrences demonstrates that commission 
decision-making is more fractured than the standard account would indicate.”).   
40  Henderson, supra note 16, at 313. 
41  See John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme Court 
1790-1945, 77 WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 137, 146-47 & n.55 (1999).    
42  See id.  
43  60 U.S. 393 (1857). Each justice issued a separate opinion in the case.  
44  See Hunter Smith, Personal and Official Authority: Turn-of-the-Century Lawyers and the 
Dissenting Opinion, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 507, 508-09 (2012) (summarizing the thirty-year debate 
regarding the publication of dissenting opinions in courts of last resort); see, e.g., V.H. Roberts, 
Dissenting Opinions, 39 AM. L. REV. 23, 23-24 (1905) (defending dissenting opinions against 










states even barred their appellate courts from issuing dissenting opinions 
for a time.45 For example, two years after the United States Supreme Court 
decided Plessy v. Ferguson,46 upholding the separate-but-equal doctrine, 
Louisiana amended its state constitution to deny its justices authority to 
publish dissenting opinions.47 Pennsylvania limited publication of separate 
opinions by statute for several decades.48 On occasion, state appellate 
courts have even refused to publish a fellow justice’s separate opinion.49 
American scholars continue to debate the merits and the demerits of 
issuing dissenting opinions,50 but in United States appellate courts, the 
practice of issuing separate judicial opinions is almost certainly here to 
stay. 
While the United States Supreme Court is known worldwide for its 
longstanding practice of issuing separate judicial opinions, the Court did 
 
 
numerous severe criticisms by a leading member of the bar); see also Robert G. Flanders, The Utility 
of Separate Judicial Opinions in Appellate Courts of Last Resort: Why Dissents are Valuable, 4 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 401, 403-05 (1999) (summarizing opposition to dissenting opinions by 
leading American jurists and scholars, including Judge Learned Hand). 
45  E.g., LA. CONST. of 1898, art. 92 (repealed 1921).  
 Article 92. Publication of Decisions of the Supreme Court. 
The decisions of the Supreme Court shall be reported under the direction of the court; the 
publication thereof shall be let out by contract to the lowest bidder . . . .  
 Concurring and dissenting opinions shall not be published.  The General Assembly shall 
annually appropriate the sum of two thousand dollars, as salary of stenographers to be 
appointed by the court. and for the use of the Justices thereof. 
Id.; see Alder, supra note 38, at 238 (noting that Louisiana banned dissents between 1898 and 1921); 
Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and 
Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1311 n.138 (2001) (noting that the 
Louisiana Constitution prohibited publication of dissenting opinions from 1898 to 1921); see also infra 
note 48 and accompanying text.   
 46 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
47  See Alder, supra note 38, at 238 (noting that Louisiana, which follows the civil law tradition, 
banned dissents between 1898 and 1921).  
48  Alex. Simpson, Jr., Dissenting Opinions, 71 U. PENN. L. REV. 205, 207-08 (1923) (quoting 
the various statutes). In 1845, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted the State Reporter Act, which 
required justices to issue opinions in writing and to decide whether they warranted publication, with an 
express proviso that “no minority opinions of the said court shall be published by said reporter.” Act of 
Apr. 11, 1845, No. 250, 1845 Pa. Laws 374, § 2 (1845) (repealed 1951). In 1868, the Legislature 
enacted a statute expressly authorizing the reporter to publish “minority opinions of the said court," but 
only on constitutional questions. Id. at 208; Act of Mar. 3, 1868, No. 12, 1868 Pa. Laws 46 (repeated 
1951); see also Joel Fishman, History of the Court Reporter in the Appellate Courts of Pennsylvania, 7 
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 1, 4-6 (1997). 
49  E.g., Musmanno v. Eldredge, 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 535 (Pa. Com. Pl.), aff'd, 114 A.2d 511 (Pa. 
1955); see Michael A. Musmanno, Dissenting Opinions, 60 DICK. L. REV. 139, 150 (1956); see also 
Fishman, supra note 48, at 17-34 (describing the Musmanno saga in detail). 
50  Alder, supra note 38, at 239 (referring to the “American schizophrenia towards the practice 
of dissent,” and observing that “[a]crimonious dissent is a more common feature of US 
jurisprudence”). Compare, e.g., Jacobson, supra note 1, at 1635-36 (“A judiciary that publishes 
dissents and concurrences serves as the exemplar of justice.”); with, e.g., Post, supra note 45, at 1348 













not consistently disclose the individual justices’ voting records to public 
view for nearly a century and a half after the nation’s founding. In the 
Court’s early years, the reason may have been expediency in rendering 
decisions when the justices were required to “ride the circuit.”51 But 
beginning in the early nineteenth century and continuing off and on until 
at least the 1930s, the Court was challenged for issuing important 
decisions with only a bare majority of the justices’ votes.52 In the early 
part of the nineteenth century, judgments were sometimes rendered even 
when a majority of the Court’s justices did not vote in favor of the 
outcome.53   
 
 
51  See Robert Eugene Cushman, Constitutional Decisions by a Bare Majority of the Court, 19 
MICH. L. REV. 771, 795-96 (1921) (describing legislative initiatives in the early 1800s that would have 
required a supermajority vote of the Supreme Court to invalidate a statute). Similar bills were 
introduced after the Civil War. Id. In 1867, a bill was introduced that would have required all decisions 
of the Court on constitutional questions to be unanimous. Id. at 795-96 n.60. Another introduced the 
following year would have required a two-thirds majority vote to invalidate an act of Congress. Id. 
Bills curtailing the Court’s power to decide constitutional issues were also introduced in the 1920s. 
See, e.g., George E. Sloan, The Supreme Court and Five-to-Four Decisions, 23 CENT. L.J. 404, 404 
(1923) (criticizing legislation proposed by Senator Borah from Idaho that would have required at least 
seven of the Court’s nine justices to concur before invalidating an act of Congress); Thomas J. Norton, 
Supreme Court's Five to Four Decisions, 9 A.B.A. J. 417, 417 (1923) (criticizing two proposals then 
pending in Congress; one would have forbidden the Court from holding a federal statute 
unconstitutional unless at least seven justices agreed; the other would have amended the Constitution 
to provide that if a federal statute were held unconstitutional, Congress would have authority to reenact 
it with a two-thirds majority vote of each chamber).   
52  “It is natural for people to feel, and there is not the slightest question that many people do 
feel, that a five-to-four decision [by the Supreme Court] is not a permanent or satisfactory disposition 
of a constitutional question. The margin is too close.” Cushman, supra note 51, at 799; Note, 
Judgments of the Supreme Court Rendered by a Majority of One, 24 GEO. L.J. 984, 985-87 (1936) 
(reviewing several legislative initiatives designed to prevent the Court from invalidating legislation 
with a bare majority of votes). For a more contemporary view of bare majority votes on the Supreme 
Court, see Jeremy Waldron, Five to Four: Why Do Bare Majorities Rule on Courts?, 123 YALE L.J. 
1692, 1697 (2014) (imagining a supermajority rule for judicial review, but without mentioning the 
authorities cited above or any of the legislative proposals repeatedly introduced in Congress over many 
decades). Waldron also posited (without citing published authority) that “[i]n [civil law judicial] 
systems, judges do not appear to vote.  Presumably there is often dissensus in their private 
deliberations, and maybe [majority decision-making] (or something like it) is used behind closed doors 
to determine what will be the consensus position.” Id. at 1697. For another perspective proposing a 
supermajority voting requirement, see Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviving 
Consensus and Deference on the Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REV. 893 (2003). 
53  United States statutes currently provide for nine justices, including the Chief Justice. A 
quorum, however, consists of only six justices. 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (“The Supreme Court of the 
United States shall consist of a Chief Justice of the United States and eight associate justices, any six 
of whom shall constitute a quorum.”). If the Court were to decide cases strictly based on majority rule, 
in theory it could decide a case with only four votes concurring, if three of the nine justices were either 
absent or disqualified from considering the matter. A majority of a six-justice quorum would require a 
minimum of four votes to decide a case. In practice, the Court rarely considers cases with a bare 
quorum, but it has decided some very important cases with as few as six justices participating. E.g., 










In 1834, for example, the Court heard arguments in consolidated cases 
challenging the constitutionality of two state statutes. Two of the Court’s 
seven members were not present for the arguments.54 Chief Justice John 
Marshall set the two cases over for re-argument the following term with an 
unusual announcement:  
The practice of this court is, not (except in cases of absolute 
necessity) to deliver any judgment in cases where constitutional 
questions are involved, unless four judges concur in opinion, thus 
making the decision that of a majority of the whole court.55 
The fact that this newly announced rule of the Court was a revelation 
dictating re-argument to obtain a majority vote suggests that on at least 
some occasions, the Court had felt a necessity—or at least considered it 
appropriate—to issue judgments with fewer than a majority of the justices 
concurring. And in cases not involving constitutional questions, apparently 
it would continue to do so. But because the Court’s reports traditionally 
failed to reflect how each justice voted in a case, it was impossible to 
know from the published record which of the justices participated and of 
those who did, whose votes had prevailed.56 
Before 1947, when the Court, under then-Chief Justice Stone’s 
leadership, adopted a number of internal administrative innovations, the 
official United States Reports identified only the justice who had authored 
the Court’s opinion (unless issued per curiam) and any published separate 
opinion, the author of which has always been identified by name. The 
other justices’ votes were not disclosed unless they specifically asked to be 
 
 
Chevron v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (6-0 opinion; Marshall, Rehnquist, & 
O’Connor, JJ., not participating in the decision).   
54  Briscoe v. Commwealth’s Bank, 33 U.S. 118, 122 (1834). 
55  Id. (Marshall, C.J.). In the United States, the terms “decision,” “judgment,” and “opinion” 
have distinct meanings. See, e.g., Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 587 (1933) (noting that the terms 
“opinion" and "decision," “while often loosely used interchangeably, are not equivalents. The court's 
decision of a case is its judgment thereon. Its opinion is a statement of the reasons on which the 
judgment rests.”). To the contrary, other nations sometimes use the term “judgment” to include a 
judge’s separate opinion. See, e.g., Alder, supra note 38, at 221 (English legal scholar; referring to 
“dissenting judgment . . . as an integral feature of the common law” (emphasis added)); id. at 234 
(referring to “dissenting judgments” (emphasis added)); id. at 235 (referring to “separate judgments” 
(emphasis added)); Andrew Lynch, Dissent: The Rewards and Risks of Judicial Disagreement in the 
High Court of Australia, 27 MELB. U. L. REV. 724, 735 (2003) (Australian legal scholar; referring to 
“dissenting and concurring judgments” (emphasis added)); see also KELEMEN, infra note 74, at 79 
(Hungarian legal scholar; explaining that “[i]n continental European languages ‘opinion’ or its 
equivalent is not used with reference to judgments,” while in common law countries the distinction 
between a court’s judgment and its opinion is highly relevant in light of the binding nature of 
precedent); Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not A Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
123, 126 (1999) (American legal scholar; distinguishing between “judgment” and “opinion” as used in 
United States). 












identified with the opinion of the Court or with any separate opinion 
authored by another justice.57 A justice who disagreed with the majority 
opinion had the option of issuing a dissenting opinion explaining the 
reasons for not voting with the majority, or declaring publicly that the 
justice joined another’s separate opinion. No other mechanism existed for 
registering a justice’s disagreement.58 Thus, a justice could (and apparently 
often did) “silently acquiesce” in the majority opinion without publicly 
disclosing the justice’s individual opposition to the Court’s decision.59 
Even now, the Court’s opinions do not always identify the author. A per 
curiam opinion60 is occasionally issued to convey a united front and to 
avoid identifying the author of the opinion by name.61    
 
 
57  G. Edward White, The Internal Powers of the Chief Justice: The Nineteenth-Century Legacy, 
154 U. PA. L. REV. 1463, 1503–04 (2006). 
[I]t was still possible, as late as the 1930s, for a Justice to have dissented from an opinion of 
the Court but not [to have] recorded that dissent. As late as the 1940s, the official United 
States Reports only identified the author of the “opinion of the Court” and those Justices who 
either filed concurring or dissenting opinions or who had themselves identified as either 
concurring in the majority result or dissenting. The current practice of listing the votes of all 
the Justices who participated in a case in the headnote to that case in the United States 
Reports did not begin until 1947. With the adoption of that protocol, silent acquiescence 
became a rare phenomenon. 
Id.; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court, 100 CORNELL L. 
REV. 769, 797 (2015) (crediting White for this observation). But cf. Wagner, supra note 24, at 20 
(explaining that the syllabus, prepared by the Reporter, did not identify justices by name as joining the 
majority or any separate opinion until 1970, and then only at the behest of the media).  
58  See Post, supra note 45, at 1327 (explaining that unless justices gave “some expression” to 
individual views, “their function is reduced to registering a vote which is not even published” (quoting 
Harlan Fiske Stone, Memorandum to James McReynolds (Apr. 3, 1930)).  
59  E.g., Post, supra note 45, at 1340-46 (referring to the “norm of acquiescence” as opposed to 
a norm of consensus; quoting numerous illustrations drawn from justices’ private papers); G. Edward 
White, Toward A Historical Understanding of Supreme Court Decision-Making, 91 DENVER U. L. 
REV. ONLINE 201, 206 (2014) (explaining that early justices used the term “silent acquiescence” to 
mean that an “opinion of the Court” did not necessarily mean the opinion was unanimous or even 
reflected the conclusions of a majority); White, supra note 57, at 1481 (“The norm 
of silent acquiescence had been a technique by which Justices suppressed their differences, conveying 
the impression that the Court was a unified body. An understood corollary to silent acquiescence was 
that once a Justice produced an opinion of the Court, and read it to his colleagues, they would not fuss 
publicly about its language.”). One scholar has noted that the practice continues today in the somewhat 
modified form of “silent concurrences,” meaning that Justices request to be identified individually as 
concurring with the result, without filing a separate opinion. See Greg Goelzhauser, Silent 
Concurrences, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 351, 352 (2016) (citing Justice Alito’s one-line concurrence in 
Los Angeles County Flood Control District v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 568 U.S. 78, 
84 (2013) (Alito, J., concurring) (“Justice Alito concurs in the judgment.”)).  
60  Richard Lowell Nygaard, The Maligned Per Curiam: A Fresh Look at an Old Colleague, 5 
SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING  41, 47-48 (1994-1995) (making the case for anonymous opinions, arguing 
that anonymity has been historically successful as a means to achieve unanimity).   
61  See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).   










Another important but less-well-known factor in the transparency of 
federal court opinions remains a point of major controversy among legal 
scholars in the United States. Federal intermediate appellate courts, and 
many state intermediate appellate courts, exercise authority to decide 
which opinions are “published” and which are not, a decision typically 
made by the three-judge panel before releasing its slip opinion.62 If the 
panel designates its opinion “for publication,” it carries precedential value 
and is later “published” in the West Federal Reporter.63 But if the panel 
designates an opinion “not for publication,” it has no binding precedential 
value, except to the extent a later panel of the same court, or another court, 
might elect to treat the opinion as persuasive authority.64 Opinions so 
 
 
62  The designation “not for publication” is somewhat misleading, if unintentionally so, because 
even those opinions often appear in commercial legal research databases. And since 2003, all opinions 
issued by the federal courts, whether designated for “publication” or not, must be made available 
online in text-searchable format. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-347, § 205(a)(5), 116 Stat. 
2899, 2913 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3501) (providing that each court’s website must 
include “[a]ccess to the substance of all written opinions issued by the court, regardless of whether 
such opinions are to be published in the official court reporter, in a text searchable format”). But 
compliance with the Act remains problematic, especially among federal district courts. See, e.g., 
Statement of Professor Jonathan L. Zittrain Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the 
Internet of the Comm. on the Judiciary (Feb. 14, 2017), http://etseq.law.harvard.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/Zittrain-statement.pdf (recommending amendments to E-Government Act of 
2002). See generally Peter W. Martin, District Court Opinions that Remain Hidden Despite a 
Longstanding Congressional Mandate of Transparency – The Result of Judicial Autonomy and 
Systemic Indifference, LAWARXIV (Sept. 10, 2017), https://osf.io/preprints/lawarxiv/bpmxe. 
63  Except opinions of the United States Supreme Court, which are published in the official 
United States Reports, federal court opinions are not published in print form by the federal 
government. Since the 1880s, designated opinions issued by other federal courts have been published 
by West Publishing Company. Like federal circuit judges, district court judges have broad discretion 
to decide whether an opinion warrants publication in the Federal Supplement, the unofficial West 
reporter for district court opinions. Karen Swenson, Federal District Court Judges and the Decision to 
Publish, 25 JUST. SYS. J. 121, 121-22 (2004); see Allan D. Vestal, A Survey of Federal District Court 
Opinions: West Publishing Company Reports, 20 SW. L.J. 63, 74-77 (1966) (explaining how federal 
district court opinions are selected for publication).   
64  For opinions issued by a federal appellate court and designated “not for publication” before 
January 1, 2007, a lawyer who cited such an opinion in an appellate brief submitted to the issuing 
court could be disciplined for violating court rules prohibiting their citation. See J. Lyn Entrikin 
Goering, Legal Fiction of the "Unpublished" Kind: The Surreal Paradox of No-Citation Rules and the 
Ethical Duty of Candor, 1 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 27, 79 (2005); see also Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 
1155, 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) (Kozinski, J.) (threatening to discipline attorney who had cited an 
unpublished opinion in an appellate brief footnote, but ultimately declining to impose sanctions). 
Effective December 1, 2006, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure were amended to bar federal 
courts from sanctioning attorneys for citing “unpublished” federal court opinions issued on or after 
January 1, 2007.  FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a). 
Rule 32.1 . . . does not require any court to issue an unpublished opinion or forbid any court 
from doing so. It does not dictate the circumstances under which a court may choose to 
designate an opinion as “unpublished” or specify the procedure that a court must follow in 
making that determination. It says nothing about what effect a court must give to one of its 
unpublished opinions or to the unpublished opinions of another court. 
FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a) Advisory comm. cmt. No court is bound to give precedential value to an 












designated by the issuing court are never binding.65 
The implications of the federal courts’ practice of designating opinions 
for “publication” or “not for publication” are substantial in light of the 
longstanding doctrine of stare decisis in common law jurisdictions. It 
would be one thing if federal appellate courts seldom designated opinions 
“not for publication.” 66  But in every year since the practice began in the 
mid-1970s, the proportion of federal appellate court opinions designated 
“not for publication” (and therefore nonprecedential) has grown, and 
rather dramatically. In fiscal year 2017, the most recent year for which 
statistics are available, the federal appellate courts issued 36,992 opinions 
on the merits. Of that number, the great majority — 86.9% — were 
designated “not for publication.”67   
It is indeed remarkable that in a nation that purports to follow the 
common law tradition of stare decisis, more than eighty-five percent of the 
appeals terminated on the merits in federal appellate courts are 
nonprecedential as a matter of law, solely at the issuing panel’s discretion. 
As we have seen, federal and state courts in the United States generally 
subscribe to modern norms of transparency by reporting judges’ votes, 
issuing written judicial opinions, “publishing” court opinions (more or 
less), and allowing judges to file and publish separate opinions. But those 
formal and informal norms have evolved significantly over time from 
what they once were. Even in the United States, the courts have not always 
operated as transparently with respect to opinion-issuing practices as some 
international observers might assume.    
The United States Supreme Court’s practice of regularly issuing 
separate opinions is just that — the Court’s own practice, developed over 
 
 
Gibbs v. United States, 865 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1133 n.3 (M.D. Fla. 2012), aff'd, 517 F. App'x 664 (11th 
Cir. 2013); see Amy E. Sloan, If You Can't Beat ‘Em, Join ‘Em: A Pragmatic Approach to 
Nonprecedential Opinions in the Federal Appellate Courts, 86 NEB. L. REV. 895, 901 (2008).   
 65 See, e.g., Elizabeth Earle Beske, Rethinking the Nonprecedential Opinion, 65 UCLA L. REV. 
808, 816 (2018). “As of 2017, every circuit has rules permitting litigants to cite to unpublished 
opinions, but these rules specifically disclaim unpublished opinions' precedential effect.” Id.  
66  Some, but not all, of the federal circuit opinions designated “not for publication” are 
published in West’s Federal Appendix. But a private publisher’s decision to include an opinion in that 
reporter (or in a commercial database like Westlaw or Lexis) has no effect on the precedential or 
persuasive value a court elects to give it.  
67  See Table B-12. U.S. Courts of Appeals—Type of Opinion or Order Filed in Cases 
Terminated on the Merits, by Circuit, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2017, U.S. 
COURTS: CASELOAD STATISTICS DATA TABLES, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b12_0930.2017.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 
2018). The figures exclude data for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has 
limited subject-matter jurisdiction. Id.  










time by custom and tradition. Article III of the United States Constitution 
does not address how the Court is to decide cases, issue judgments, or 
even render opinions. Statutes provide little more guidance, although the 
Supreme Court’s official reporter is directed to “prepare the decisions of 
the Court for publication”68 and to publish the Court’s decisions in the 
United States Reports “as soon as practicable after rendition.”69 The 
Court’s own rules provide little more in the way of formal norms 
governing the issuance of its opinions. 70 No external norms constrain the 
Court’s method of communicating decisions.71 Nothing requires 
unanimity, consensus, or even majority decision-making. Nothing requires 
the Court’s opinions even to include the reasoning for the judgments, let 
alone permit or require publication of separate opinions along with the 
opinion of the Court. 
The Court’s well-known practices of publicizing the votes of individual 
justices, and publishing separate opinions along with the Court’s judgment 
and decision, are largely the result of the Court’s own initiative. Those 
practices have changed quite dramatically since the Court issued its 
earliest decisions in 1790.72   
 
 
68  28 U.S.C. § 673(a) (2018). 
69  28 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018); see supra note 21.  
70  See SUP. CT. R. 41 (2017), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf. 
Rule 41. Opinions of the Court. 
Opinions of the Court will be released by the Clerk immediately upon their announcement 
from the bench, or as the Court otherwise directs. Thereafter, the Clerk will cause the 
opinions to be issued in slip form, and the Reporter of Decisions will prepare them for 
publication in the preliminary prints and bound volumes of the United States Reports. 
Id.; see supra note 20. The Rules are silent on the issuance of separate opinions by individual justices. 
Nor do they provide for publication of those decisions. “Opinions of the Court” are generally 
understood to refer only to opinions in which a majority of the justices have joined as to the judgment 
(including plurality opinions), together with the separate opinions of concurring judges who vote with 
the majority.   
71  The sole exception is the E-Government Act of 2002, which applies to all federal courts. See 
supra note 62. It simply requires all opinions to be made available online in text-searchable format, 
whether or not designated for publication in the official reporter. See supra note 62.   
72  The Supreme Court does not publish its internal operating procedures, although most other 
federal courts do. However, the Supreme Court’s formal rules, as they have been amended over time, 
are available on the Supreme Court’s website. Historical Rules of the Supreme Court, SUP. CT. OF THE 
U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/ctrules/scannedrules.aspx (last visited Aug. 29, 2018). In 1834, 
for example, the Court issued the following order: 
Ordered, That the original opinions of the Court, delivered to the reporter, be filed in the 
office of the Clerk of the Court for preservation as soon as the volume of Reports for the 
term, at which they are delivered, shall be published.  
S. CT. R. 16, 42 U.S. (I How.) xxxv (1834). In 1835, the Court issued a more comprehensive 
order providing for prompt publication of its opinions:  
 All the opinions delivered by the Court since the commencement of the term shall be 












Even today, courts and judges in the United States have ways of 
avoiding (or at least discouraging) public scrutiny and identification of 
their views in a case if they wish to exercise the available options. But in 
most respects United States courts, as well as individual judges, err on the 
side of openness and transparency in disseminating the outcomes of 
judicial deliberations, although their internal deliberations remain cloaked 
in secrecy.73  
III. GLOBAL JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY NORMS 
Today, international interest is on the rise regarding how courts issue 
judicial opinions and other features of judicial transparency.74 Contrary to 
the conventional wisdom that courts of last resort in civil law countries 
 
 
 And all opinions hereafter delivered by the Court shall immediately, upon the delivery 
thereof, be in like manner delivered over to the Clerk to be recorded. And it shall be the duty 
of the Clerk to cause the same to be forthwith recorded, and to deliver the originals with a 
transcript of the judgment or decree of the Court thereon to the reporter, as soon as the same 
shall be recorded.  
 And all the opinions of the Court, as far as practicable, be recorded during the term, so 
that the publication of the reports may not be delayed thereby. 
S. CT. R. 17, 42 U.S. (1 How.) xxxv (1843). Other than the Court’s formal rules of practice and 
procedure, Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States (Nov. 13, 2017), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf, the Court’s internal operating 
rules are not published. However, the Supreme Court has provided the public with information about 
its internal practices in less formal ways. See, e.g., The Supreme Court: Home to America’s Highest 
Court, C-SPAN (Dec. 20, 2010), https://www.c-span.org/video/?297213-1/the-supreme-court-home-
americas-highest-court-2010-edition (video explaining Court’s practices).  
73  Unlike many other global courts, the Supreme Court has no formal norms requiring its 
internal deliberations to remain secret. But like so many other practices of federal courts in the United 
States, secret deliberations are a long-standing custom that few have ever questioned, with the possible 
exception of former President Thomas Jefferson. See Zobell, supra note 14, at 194 & n.44 (quoting 
letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie dated Dec. 25, 1820, hypothesizing that opinions were 
issued by a Supreme Court “huddled up in a conclave, perhaps by a majority of one, delivered as if 
unanimous, and with the silent acquiescence of lazy or timid associates, by a crafty chief judge, who 
sophisticates the law to his own mind, by the turn of his own reasoning”).  
74  See, e.g., KATALIN KELEMEN, JUDICIAL DISSENT IN EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS 
(2018) (explaining that most European national constitutional courts allow judges to issue dissenting 
opinions); CAROLINE WITTIG, THE OCCURRENCE OF SEPARATE OPINIONS AT THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (2016) (analyzing separate opinions issued by the German Constitutional 
Court); Bricker, supra note 5, at 173 (“[T]he single opinion for the court has begun to wane in the 
modern era.”); Kelemen, supra note 5 (comparing dissenting practices in European constitutional 
courts); Laffranque, supra note 36, at 165 (comparing practices in other countries and generally 
favoring the practice of issuing separate judicial opinions); Trevor Shiels, Multiple Judgments and the 
New Zealand Supreme Court, 14 OTAGO L. REV. 11, 16-32 (2015) (comparing practices in other 
common law nations and analyzing New Zealand Supreme Court’s dissenting practices since 2004). 










issue only unanimous opinions,75 recent studies reveal that global opinion-
issuing practices vary considerably, even among civil law nations and 
certainly among supranational and international tribunals.76 Recent 
research has confirmed a clear global trend in favor of allowing judges to 
issue separate opinions, especially (but not exclusively) members of 
European constitutional courts.77 In 2008, Yale Law School’s annual 
Seminar on Global Constitutionalism addressed judicial dissent, among 
other topics.78 In late 20I2, a justice of the High Court of Australia, then 
 
 
75  See, e.g., JOHN MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL 
SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 37 (2d ed. 1985); RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 
8, 10; Bricker, supra note 5, at 172, 186; Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, The Judicial 
Trilemma, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. 225, 239 (2017); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 
65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 134 (1990); Henderson, supra note 16, at 291 & nn.30, 32 (suggesting that 
courts in civil law countries such as “France and Germany” do not publish separate opinions); Diane P. 
Wood, When to Hold, When to Fold, and When to Reshuffle: The Art of Decisionmaking on A Multi-
Member Court, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1445, 1448 (2012) (“In most civil law countries, even the highest 
courts, acting through multi-member chambers, announce their judgments in a single, impersonal 
document.”). As recently as 2005, one American scholar glibly (but inaccurately) described the 
practice of courts in civil law nations as follows: 
 The civilian appellate panel issues only one opinion, and it is the opinion of the court. Every 
opinion is per curiam, “by the court.” The public record does not reveal dissenting or 
concurring opinions. No judge signs the opinion of the court. It is an institutional, not 
personal, opinion. 
Jacobson, supra note 1, at 1609. But see John Merryman & Rogelio Perez-Perdomo, The Civil Law 
Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Europe and Latin America 122 (3d ed. 2007) 
(acknowledging “[a] recent tendency toward noting dissents and separate concurrences, and even 
toward the publication of separate opinions,” in some civil law jurisdictions’ constitutional courts); 
Alder, supra note 38, at 237 (acknowledging that even courts in civil law nations were showing a 
tendency to publish dissents); cf. Dumbauld, supra note 36, at 945 (“Dissenting opinions appear to 
have become a well established feature of the judicial process in international practice.”). 
76  RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 8 (“[T]his [traditional] perception no longer fits reality.”). One 
former German Constitutional Court judge explained the European tradition against separate opinions 
as an outgrowth of the absolute monarchy.   
  The absolute monarchs concentrated all powers in their hand[s] including the 
judicial power. The judges were servants of the monarch and rendered decisions in his name. 
Their personal views did not matter. . . .   
  This basic understanding [of the judge’s role] survived absolutism. It was and still is 
the institution, not the person that decides. The court adjudicates, not the judge. Nothing 
depends on the individual office holder.   
Grimm, supra note 11, at I-1. In England, the King’s Privy Council historically followed this tradition 
by issuing a single opinion in the King’s name. Raffaelli, supra note 16, at 9 (“Traditionally, the role 
of judges was to declare the will of the King – and, since the King cannot but have one and only one 
will, judgments had to be, or at least to seem unanimous.” (citations omitted)). But see infra notes 93, 
437 (explaining the Privy Council’s 1966 order providing for a single dissenting opinion).  
77  RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 39; Kelemen, supra note 5, at 1345; see also Alder, supra note 
38, at 237 (“[I]t is often assumed that the publication of dissents is a peculiarity of Anglo-Saxon legal 
systems. This is not however the case.”). As early as 2000, Alder observed that national courts, even in 
civil law nations, reflected an “increasing tendency towards publishing dissents.” Id.   
78  Global Constitutionalism Seminar Sept. 25-27, YALE L. SCH.  (Sept. 10, 2008), 
https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/global-constitutionalism-seminar-sept-25-27; see also JUDICIAL 












approaching retirement, delivered a provocative speech that set off a 
rousing debate among scholars and jurists about the merits of seeking 
consensus on the High Court as opposed to issuing separate judicial 
opinions.79 At about the same time, the European Parliament, responding 
to numerous calls for the Court of Justice of the European Union to adopt 
the practice of issuing dissenting opinions,80 issued a detailed report 
studying the opinion-issuing practices of national appellate courts in the 
European Union, as well as other international tribunals.81 In March 2017, 
a major university in Milan, Italy hosted a conference on dissenting 
judicial opinions, in which scholars worldwide participated and presented 
papers.82 And in late 2017, the American Journal of International Law 
published an online symposium for scholarly critique of a novel 
descriptive framework, developed by two American scholars, 
conceptualizing the reasons why some international tribunals regularly 
issue separate opinions, while others either do not or are much less likely 
to do so.83   
 
 
observed that just because these courts now have authority to issue separate opinions does not mean 
that individual judges exercise that option. Grimm, supra note 11, at I-2. 
79  McIntyre, supra note 36, at 432. 
80  E.g., Vlad F. Perju, Reason and Authority in the European Court of Justice, 49 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 307, 309 (2009) (“The ECJ finds itself alone among supranational and international courts and one 
of only a handful of national apex courts that bans its judges from writing concurring or dissenting 
opinions.”).  
81  RAFFAELLI, supra note 16.   
82  Dissenting Opinion: International Conference, UNIVERSITA DEGLI STUDI DI MILANO, (Feb. 
16, 2017), http://www.dirittopubblico.unimi.it/ecm/home/aggiornamenti-e-archivi/tutte-le-
notizie/content/dissenting-opinion-p-international-conference-p.0000.UNIMIDIRE-53169. One of the 
keynote conference speakers was Guido Raimondi, President of the European Court of Human Rights. 
Id. 
83  Symposium on Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack, “The Judicial Trilemma,” AM. J. 
INT’L L. ONLINE (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-
international-
law/listing?q=trilemma&searchWithinIds=3CCFB3BC2DB31CE79FBA01995D5B6028%2CAE91B7
FFEA2D0AD1F516C8B33BA4A8E1. The co-authors presented an earlier version of the article, 
International Judicial Dissent: Causes and Consequences, at the 2015 Biennial Conference of the 
European Union Studies Association and at the Max Planck Institute for Procedural Law in 
Luxembourg.   
Whether or not international arbitration panel members have the authority to issue dissenting 
opinions has been widely debated in Europe, but the trend is clearly in favor of permitting them. See, 
e.g., Final Report on Dissenting and Separate Opinions, in 2 ICC INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
ARBITRATION 32 (June 1991); Patricia Jimenez Kwast, Prohibitions on Dissenting Opinions in 
International Arbitration, in WHAT'S WRONG WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW? 128, 128 (Cedric Ryngaert, 
Erik J. Molenaar & Sarah Nouwen eds., 2015) (explaining that “[t]he dominant view today is that 
dissenting opinions should not be prohibited, but this has not always been the accepted wisdom”); 
Hans-Patrick Schroeder & Tanja V. Pfitzner, Recent Trends Regarding Dissenting Opinions in 
International Commercial Arbritation, 2 Y.B. ON INT'L ARB. 133, 136 (2012) (“Today, it appears to be 










Other global developments over the last decade call for a fresh look at 
opinion-issuing practices around the world.84 Most European nations now 
permit judges to issue dissenting opinions in at least some tribunals,85 
although judges may elect not to exercise that authority.86 Yet many 
European courts still keep individual judges’ voting records secret.87 Even 
those continental courts whose judges are permitted to dissent continue to 
subscribe to a norm of secrecy with respect to internal deliberations, and 
informal consensus norms generally discourage judges from issuing 
separate opinions unless they significantly disagree with the court’s 
judgment.88 
Less than a decade ago, the United Kingdom Supreme Court was 
established effective October 1, 2009, replacing the centuries-old practice 
of issuing appellate decisions in the name of the Appellate Committee of 
the House of Lords, the upper chamber of Parliament. The newly 
established Supreme Court hears direct appeals from lower courts in 
England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland.89 Like justices of the 
United States Supreme Court, justices of the United Kingdom’s high court 
 
 
common ground that the dissenting opinion is and will be part of the practice of international 
commercial arbitration.”).  
84  The most comprehensive scholarly work on global judicial opinion-issuing practices 
published in a United States law journal remains the 1959 masterful work by Kurt H. Nadelmann, The 
Judicial Dissent: Publication v. Secrecy, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 415 (1959) [hereinafter Nadelmann 
(1959)]; see also Kurt H. Nadelmann, Non-Disclosure of Dissents in Constitutional Courts: Italy and 
West Germany, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 268 (1964) [hereinafter Nadelmann (1964)]; cf. Edward 
McWhinney, Judicial Concurrences and Dissents: A Comparative View of Opinion-Writing in Final 
Appellate Tribunals, 31 CAN. B. REV. 595 (1953). As this article demonstrates, much has changed in 
the six decades since Nadelmann’s work was published. 
85  E.g., Bricker, supra note 5, at 173 (“[T]oday most European judicial systems allow 
individual judges to write dissenting opinions in at least some courts within their respective legal 
systems.”). 
86  KELEMEN, supra note 74, at 1 (explaining that while most European national constitutional 
courts allow dissenting opinions, judges are less likely to do so than are common law judges); Grimm, 
supra note 11, at I-3 (grudgingly conceding that “a few exceptions” had been made for European 
constitutional courts, but just because judges were given that authority did not mean they exercised it); 
Kelemen, supra note 5, at 1354 (noting that dissenting is an individual’s right, not a duty, leaving 
room for strategic behavior); Shiels, supra note 74, at 19 (noting that even when judges have authority 
to issue separate opinions, “there is no doubt a complex web of institutional and inter-personal factors 
that influence when and how often they do so”).   
87  See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
88  See, e.g., Grimm, supra note 11, at I-3-I-4. In some cases, formal norms mandate secrecy of 
deliberations, which at least one supranational court has cited as the basis for declining to permit 
individual judges to issue separate opinions. E.g., Statute of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union 2010 O.J. (C 83) art. 35 (“The deliberations of the Court of Justice shall be and shall remain 
secret.”); see infra note 426 and accompanying text.   
89  The 2005 Constitutional Reform Act established the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. 
Diana Woodhouse, The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 — Defending Judicial Independence the 













may issue concurring or dissenting opinions.90 The Judicial Committee of 
the King’s Privy Council, at one time the “highest court of civil and 
criminal appeals for the British Empire,”91 continues in existence, but with 
much narrower jurisdiction than it once had.92 Since 1966, even the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which traditionally followed the 
“one-opinion” practice, permits publication of dissenting opinions.93 Like 
many other European courts, it too has long since departed from its 
traditional unanimity principle.94 
Another factor reflecting the pace of global change in judicial opinion-
issuing practices is the relatively recent decisions of some British 
Commonwealth nations to depart from the longstanding practice of 
allowing appeals to be taken from national supreme courts to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council. For example, in 2003 New Zealand 
enacted the Supreme Court Act, which ended the longstanding practice of 
allowing appeals from decisions of the New Zealand Supreme Court to the 
Judicial Committee of the King’s Privy Council.95   
 
 
90  See RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 29. The United Kingdom’s Constitutional Reform Act of 
2005 does not expressly address the issue of separate opinions, and it grants authority to the Supreme 
Court to adopt rules governing court practice and procedure. United Kingdom Constitutional Reform 
Act 2005, c.4, § 45 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/4/contents. The Supreme Court’s 
rules do not address how judgments are to be issued. Rule 28 simply provides, “A judgment may be— 
(a) delivered in open court; or (b) if the Court so directs, promulgated by the Registrar.” The Supreme 
Court Rules 2009, SI 2009/1603, r. 28 (UK), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2009/1603/article/28/made.     
91  The Judicial Committee, JUD. COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL, 
https://www.jcpc.uk/about/judicial-committe.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2018).  
92  Beginning in 2009, the Privy Council’s Judicial Committee was relocated from its chambers 
on Downing Street to shared facilities with the United Kingdom Supreme Court. Id. The Privy 
Council’s appellate jurisdiction was substantially narrowed by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. 
For example, it no longer considers “devolution appeals” pertaining to legislative and administrative 
matters from Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland. United Kingdom Constitutional Reform Act 
2005, c.4, § 40; Practice Direction 10: Devolution Jurisdiction, THE SUP. CT., 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/procedures/practice-direction-10.html (as amended Oct. 2016). For more 
details about the modernization of the United Kingdom court system and a call for further reform, see 
Graham S McBain, Modernising the English Court System - Time for a Gastric Band, 6 J. POL. & L. 
17 (2013), http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/jpl/article/viewFile/29973/17756. 
93  Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the 21st 
Century, 3 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 30, 41 (2014) (“[I]n 1966, the Judicial Committee 
(Dissenting Opinions) Order was issued, since which time the expressing of dissenting opinions has 
been permissible, and where appropriate, is now commonplace.”).   
94  See infra notes 420-23 and accompanying text.  
95  Shiels, supra note 74, at 13 & n.5 (citing Supreme Court Act 2003, s 42 (N.Z.)). A total of 
53 countries are currently voluntary members of the British Commonwealth, having subscribed to the 
Charter of the Commonwealth. Our Charter, THE COMMONWEALTH, http://thecommonwealth.org/our-
charter (last visited Sept. 12, 2018); Member Countries, THE COMMONWEALTH, 
http://thecommonwealth.org/member-countries (last visited Nov. 3, 2018) (“Fifty three countries are 










This section describes the global variations among contemporary 
judicial tribunals, both national and international, in how judicial decisions 
are issued and published, including judges’ voting records. In particular, it 
compares the formal and informal norms governing the various practices 
courts use to communicate their decisions to the bench, bar, and general 
public. This section of the article also addresses the various sources of 
law, court rules, traditions, or informal practices that govern how courts 
communicate their decisions to the parties, the practicing bar, and the 
general public. Later sections explore some of the reasons why the topic of 
dissenting opinions has generated worldwide interest. Those sections 
describe recent theoretical work on the issue, and they predict how the 
general trend favoring judicial “individuation” by identifying votes and 
issuing separate opinions might influence the role judicial tribunals play in 
an increasingly global, interconnected legal system.96  
  
 A. Global “Collegial” Courts 
Judicial systems vary greatly around the world, but every nation that 
recognizes the judicial process as a means of resolving public and private 
disputes has at least one “high court,” and many have two. In addition, 
watershed economic and political events in the twentieth century led to the 
establishment of several “supranational” and international tribunals, on the 
European continent and also elsewhere. This section provides a general 
overview of the various judicial institutions to provide background and 




members of the Commonwealth.”). Other Commonwealth nations include the United Kingdom, South 
Africa, Canada, India, Australia, and Malta. Id. (specifically listing these nations and 47 others). Many 
Commonwealth nations were formerly part of Great Britain but are now independent sovereigns. See 
Our History, THE COMMONWEALTH, http://thecommonwealth.org/our-history (last visited Nov. 3, 
2018).  
96  See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 191, 192-93 
(2003) (“It stretches too far to describe [international and domestic courts] all as part of one global 
legal system, but they certainly constitute a global community of courts.”); cf. Austen L. Parrish, 
Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815, 815-18 (2009) 
(referring to Slaughter as a member of a scholarly group espousing the “modern Internationalist” 
perspective, in contrast to other scholars who represent the “Sovereigntist” perspective: wary of 
international law and its institutions). 
97  For an overview of the International Court of Justice, see R.P. Anand, The Role of Individual 
and Dissenting Opinions in International Adjudication, 14 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 788, 794-800 (1965) 
(describing history of the court’s dissenting practices); Dumbauld, supra note 36, at 940-45 (same with 
respect to the Permanent International Court of Justice, ICJ’s predecessor). For an overview of the 












 1.  National Courts  
Several European nations have two “high courts” – a special court that 
decides exclusively constitutional issues, and a court of cassation that 
considers appeals from lower courts on other kinds of legal issues. Other 
nations have a single supreme court or court of appeals with “diffuse,” 
“decentralized,” or general jurisdiction, comparable to the United States 
Supreme Court. They typically consider appeals without regard to the 
nature of the legal issue.  A few nations have other specialized appellate 
tribunals with limited jurisdiction.    
   a. National Supreme Courts: General (“Diffuse”) Jurisdiction 
Many countries have a unitary supreme court with general or “diffuse” 
jurisdiction over both constitutional and “ordinary” matters. A single apex 
court hears all appeals, including constitutional questions. In some 
countries the Supreme Court is subdivided into “chambers,” each with its 
own specialized jurisdiction. Unlike state and federal supreme courts in 
the United States, which generally hear cases en banc, most supreme 
courts in other nations consider cases in panels of three, five, or some 
other odd number of judges, much like intermediate appellate courts 
generally do in the United States. But under specific circumstances, even 
these courts occasionally consider cases in larger chambers or en banc.   
   b. National Constitutional Courts 
Of the twenty-seven member nations of the European Union (EU), 
eighteen have established separate constitutional courts with jurisdiction 
limited to constitutional questions.98  Some consider constitutional issues 
on direct appeal or by referral from other national courts. In many nations, 
constitutional questions may be referred to the court by government 
 
 
Pollack, supra note 75, at 18-34.  For an overview of international criminal tribunals, see Kenneth S. 
Gallant, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and Jurisdiction to Prescribe in International Criminal Courts, 48 
VILL. L. REV. 763, 777 (2003); see also KENNETH S. GALLANT, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 303-51 (2009); KENNETH S. GALLANT, 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION, OR, WHOSE LAW MUST I OBEY? (forthcoming) 
(unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
98  See RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 7; Lech Garlicki, Constitutional Courts Versus Supreme 
Courts, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 44, 44-45 (2007). 










officials or, in some cases, even by individuals.99 Several nations outside 
the European Union have also established constitutional courts separate 
from ordinary supreme courts. Examples include China, Egypt, the 
Republic of Georgia, South Korea, Ecuador, Peru, Myanmar, the Russian 
Federation, Turkey, Thailand, and South Africa, among many others.100 
As a general rule, national constitutional courts have jurisdiction to 
address one or both of two distinct kinds of constitutional issues. The first 
is “abstract” or a priori review, in which the court considers the 
constitutionality of legislation (before or after enactment) without regard 
to a specific legal dispute or controversy. In effect these are advisory 
opinions, and in some cases abstract review occurs upon referral by the 
chief executive before a statute is finally enacted into law. The second is 
“concrete” or a posteriori review, which addresses the constitutionality of 
an enacted statute in the context of a specific set of facts in a legal dispute. 
The second type of constitutional review is analogous to the “case or 
controversy” prerequisite for federal court jurisdiction under Article III of 
the United States Constitution.101   
    
 
 c. National Supreme Courts (Courts of Cassation)  
The eighteen European Union member nations that have established 
constitutional courts, all established since the early twentieth century, also 
retain their predecessor supreme courts (sometimes known as courts of 
cassation or “ordinary” courts), which consider only non-constitutional 
issues.102 Other nations worldwide that have separate constitutional courts 
generally follow the same pattern. In general, “ordinary” supreme courts 
 
 
99  RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 17-29. 
100 See Venice Commission, COUNCIL OF EUR., 
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/courts/?lang=EN (listing websites for constitutional courts 
worldwide) (last visited Oct. 6, 2018). 
101 E.g., Michael C. Dorf, Abstract and Concrete Review, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3-4 (Vikram D. Amar & Mark V. Tushnet eds., 2009). Scholars have 
recognized that United States federal courts sometimes apply relaxed standing requirements in a way 
that permits a modified form of abstract constitutional review, notwithstanding the restrictions of 
Article III and the general disregard in the United States for issuing “advisory opinions.” See id. at 3-4, 
8-13. 
102 See, e.g., John Henry Merryman & Vincenzo Vigoriti, When Courts Collide: Constitution 
and Cassation in Italy, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 665, 666-68 (1966) (describing the establishment of Italy’s 
Constitutional Court in 1948 upon adoption of the post-World War II Constitution that provided for 












are required by law to refer or formally certify constitutional questions in 
pending cases to the nation’s constitutional court for resolution before 
resolving the remaining legal or factual issues on the merits.103   
   d. National Courts with Specialized Appellate Jurisdiction 
The United Kingdom has a unique configuration of appellate courts, 
partly for historical reasons but also as a result of longstanding tradition 
derived from ancient England’s political evolution from a former absolute 
monarchy.104 The United Kingdom, effective 2009, established a Supreme 
Court with general jurisdiction over both constitutional and other legal 
issues.105 The Supreme Court replaced the Appellate Committee of the 
House of Lords, a subdivision of the upper chamber of Parliament, whose 
judges historically had the final word with respect to appeals from the 
common law courts and the King’s Bench. The Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council (JCPC), once considered the highest appellate tribunal in 
the Commonwealth, has been physically and functionally integrated into 
the new Supreme Court, whose justices also sit as members of the JCPC.   
Historically, the JCPC was composed of judges who advised the 
monarchy how to resolve disputes presented to the King for decision. The 
JCPC remains the highest appellate tribunal for British colonies and 
Commonwealth nations that elect to use it for that purpose. While the two 
bodies formally merged in 2009, each has a rather unique history with 
respect to judges’ authority to issue separate opinions, as explained in 
more detail below.106   
  2. Supranational and International Tribunals   
Treaties, conventions, charters, protocols, or organic statutes generally 
delineate the jurisdiction of these multi-member courts. They include 
courts that consider whether national laws and court decisions conflict 
with the terms of a treaty, convention, or charter to which the nation is a 
signatory, as well as courts that apply international public law and trade 
 
 
103 Id. at 668-69. 
104 See generally James Daly, The Idea of Absolute Monarchy in Seventeenth-Century England, 
21 HIST. J. 227, 249 (1978) (“[W]hatever absolutism was, it was never a possibility after [the Glorious 
Revolution of] 1688.”). 
105 See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.  
106 See infra notes 435-38 and accompanying text.  










law to resolve disputes. The following discussion addresses all but the 
latter group.107 
   a.   Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU) 
The Court is an organ of the European Union, serving as a 
“supranational” tribunal.108  Some scholars have referred to it as the EU’s 
“most supreme judicial institution.”109 Its primary function is to review the 
activities of the twenty-seven member states and their institutions 
(including national courts) to ensure compliance with superseding 
European Union law.110 
   b.   European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
 
 
107 The author has somewhat arbitrarily excluded the various international trade organizations 
from this discussion, including the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Court 
of Justice of the European Free Trade Association States (EFTA), and similar multi-member trade 
tribunals. While they offer important variations in transparency norms, the trend in international 
arbitrations appears to clearly favor allowing dissenting opinions, although some tribunals require 
them to be filed anonymously. See supra note 83. Moreover, the nature of disputes resolved by 
international trade tribunals differs significantly from legal issues of a more general nature. For some 
representative examples of scholarly work in the international trade arena, see James Flett, Collective 
Intelligence and the Possibility of Dissent: Anonymous Individual Opinions in WTO Jurisprudence, 13 
J. INT'L ECON. L. 287, 287 (2010) (acknowledging increasing frequency of “[a]nonymous individual 
opinions” in WTO jurisprudence); Kwast, supra note 83, at 128 (“The dominant view today is that 
dissenting opinions should not be prohibited . . . .”); Meredith Kolsky Lewis, Dissent as Dialectic: 
Horizontal and Vertical Disagreement in WTO Dispute Settlement, 48 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 3-4 (2012) 
(calling for WTO Appellate Body to issue dissenting opinions); Schroeder & Pfitzner, supra note 83, 
at 136 (noting that dissenting opinions are now “common ground” in international commercial 
arbitration). 
108 See RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 31 (acknowledging that the Court is a “peculiar institution 
having a unique role in the context of the EU judicial system,” unlike other international courts). The 
Court was established by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Article 15, 
paragraph 1 expressly provides, “In order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of 
civil society, the Union's institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly 
as possible.” Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 15, 
Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326). Further, “[e]ach institution, body, office or agency shall ensure that 
its proceedings are transparent and shall elaborate in its own Rules of Procedure specific provisions 
regarding access to its documents . . . .” Id. But the transparency mandate expressly applies to the 
CJEU only when the court undertakes “administrative tasks.” Id. (“The Court of Justice of the 
European Union . . . shall be subject to this paragraph only when exercising their administrative 
tasks.”). For a detailed history of the CJEU, see Ditlev Tamm, The History of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union Since Its Origin, in THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE: 
ANALYSES AND PERSPECTIVES ON SIXTY YEARS OF CASE-LAW 9 (2013).  
109 Hjalte Rasmussen & Louise Nan Rasmussen, Comment on Katalin Kelemen - Activist EU 
Court Feeds on the Existing Ban on Dissenting Opinions: Lifting the Ban is Likely to Improve the 
Quality of EU Judgments, 14 GERMAN L.J. 1373, 1378 (2013).     
110 Julia Laffranque, Dissenting Opinion in the European Court of Justice – Estonia’s Possible 
Contribution to the Democratisation of the European Union Judicial System, 9 JURIDICA INT’L L. 













   The European Court of Human Rights111 decides cases initiated by 
individuals who challenge signatory nations’ laws or court decisions as 
inconsistent with the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, better known as the European Convention on 
Human Rights.112 The Convention was adopted in Rome in 1950 by the 
then-newly formed Council of Europe and its member states, taking effect 
in 1953.113 The Council’s forty-seven member nations are governed by the 
Convention and agree to abide by its guarantees protecting human 
rights.114 The Court of Human Rights was established in 1959.115  Its 
judges, one representing each member nation, are elected by the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.116  
The court hears cases alleging that the laws or acts of member nations 
violate the Convention’s terms.117 Individual applications are considered 
by chambers consisting of one to fourteen judges. Panels of seven and 
fourteen judges are reserved for hearing the most important cases. The 
Grand Chamber, the highest tribunal within the court, is composed of 
seventeen judges and at least three substitute judges.118 
   c.  International Court of Justice (ICJ)   
Known as “The Hague,” the ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the 
United Nations. It was established by the Charter of Nations at the end of 
World War II.119 Its fifteen elected members each serve a nine-year term, 
 
 
111 The Court in Brief, EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS., 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Court_in_brief_ENG.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 2018).  
112 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights].  
113 The Court in Brief, supra note 111. 
114 47 Member States, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/47-members-states 
(last visited Sept. 12, 2018). Member nations include the Russian Federation, Turkey, Greenland, 
Iceland, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and all nations on the European Continent, except Belarus and 
Kosovo. Id. More than 820 million persons are subject to the protections of the Convention.   
115 A.H. Robertson, The European Court of Human Rights, 9 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 1 (1960). 
116 Composition of the Court, EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS., 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court/judges&c= (last visited Oct. 6, 2018). 
117 See generally European Court of Human Rights, ECHR - Film on the European Court of 
Human Rights (English Version), YOUTUBE (Oct. 17, 2016) (video describing the court’s history, 
purpose, functions, and representative cases), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EPWGdhgQlgk&list=PLT-
6qb4oU5fiINe8Cp23qVZ5kNHEX747X&index=1. 
118 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, RULES OF COURT 12 (2018), 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf. 
119 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 










renewable once.120 In addition, ad hoc judges who represent a nation party 
to the litigation may be appointed if none of the court’s current members is 
from that nation. Before World War II, the court’s predecessor was the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ),121 established by the 
League of Nations in 1922 and dissolved in 1946.122 
The ICJ applies international law to resolve legal disputes submitted by 
United Nations member states, and it also issues advisory opinions on 
matters that specified United Nations agencies and organizations refer to it 
for consideration.123  
   d.  International Criminal Court (ICC)   
The International Criminal Court, also seated at The Hague in the 
Netherlands, was established under the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, drafted in 1998.124 The treaty grants the ICC 
“international legal personality”125 with jurisdiction over serious crimes, 
specifically genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 
aggression.126 Currently, 123 nations around the world are signatories or 
“States Parties” to the treaty.127 The ICC’s role is to investigate alleged 
human rights violations contrary to international law and, if warranted, 
prosecute the alleged offenders before the court.128   
The ICC includes a pre-trial division, a trial division, and an appellate 
 
 
1945, 59 Stat. 1031 [the Charter], 1055 [ICJ Statute], T.S. No. 993 [I.C.J. Statute at 25], available at 
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/statute (last visited Sept. 2, 2018).  
120 Id. art. 13, ¶ 1; see also id. arts. 3 & 4. Judges are elected by the United Nation’s General 
Assembly and Security Council. The Court, Int’l Ct. of Just., http://www.icj-cij.org/en/court (last 
visited Sept. 2, 2018). 
121 Dumbauld, supra note 36, at 938; see also Permanent Court of International Justice, INT’L 
CT. OF JUST., https://www.icj-cij.org/en/pcij (last visited Oct. 6, 2018). Notably, the Statute of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, adopted by the League of Nations in 1921, included the 
following language: “If the judgment does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of 
the judges, dissenting judges are entitled to deliver a separate opinion." Dumbauld, supra note 36, at 
942 & n.72 (citation omitted). The Rules of Court subsequently adopted in 1922 provided for attaching 
a dissenting opinion to the ICJ’s judgment at the request of the dissenting judge. Id. at 942 & n.75 
(citation omitted).   
122 Permanent Court of International Justice, supra note 121. 
123 The Court, supra note 120. See generally Basic Documents, INT’L CT. OF JUST., 
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/basic-documents (last visited Nov. 3, 2018) (providing links to Charter of 
the United Nations, Statute of the Court, Rules of Court, Practice Directions, and Other Texts).   
124 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544. 
125 Id. art. 4. 
126 Id. art 5. 
127 The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20stat
ute.aspx (last visited Sept. 2, 2018). The United States is a signatory but has not ratified the Rome 
Statute. Id. 












division.129 The court has a total of eighteen judges.130 They serve 
staggered nine-year terms without the possibility of renewal.131  
   e.  International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) 
This unique international tribunal was established by the United 
Nations in 1996 to oversee disputes arising under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.132 The Convention was designed to 
peacefully resolve disputes dealing with the resources of the sea and ocean 
space beyond the territorial boundaries of any sovereign nation, which 
belong to the world’s people by declaration.133 As of this writing, 168 
nations are parties to the convention.134   
Disputes that cannot be resolved by other means may be submitted to 
the ITLOS, to the International Court of Justice, or to an arbitration 
tribunal. The Tribunal’s twenty-one members are elected by the parties to 
the Convention by secret ballot, and members serve staggered nine-year 
terms with the possibility of one renewal term.135 The members are 
selected to serve on specialized chambers of up to eleven judges each for 
three-year terms, with one possible renewal.136 In addition to resolving 
disputes concerning the Convention’s interpretation or application, the 
 
 
129 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 34, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
38544 [hereinafter Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court]. 
130 Id. art. 36(1).  
131 Id. art. 36(9)(a). The only exception applies when a judge was initially elected to a three-year 
term. In that case, the judge is eligible for reelection to one subsequent nine-year term. Id. art. 36(9)(c). 
132 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 31363; 
History, INT’L TRIBUNAL FOR THE L. OF THE SEA, https://www.itlos.org/the-tribunal/history/ (last 
visited Sept. 2, 2018). 
133 See The Tribunal, INT’L TRIBUNAL FOR THE L. OF THE SEA, https://www.itlos.org/the-
tribunal/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2018); Oceans and the Law of the Sea, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/oceans-and-law-sea/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2018) (referring to 
General Assembly declaration that “all resources of the seabed beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction are the common heritage of mankind”). See generally The United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (A Historical Perspective) (1998), UNITED NATIONS DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFF. & 
L. OF THE SEA, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm#The%20
United%20Nations. 
134 States Parties, INT’L TRIBUNAL FOR THE L. OF THE SEA, https://www.itlos.org/en/the-
tribunal/states-parties/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2018). 
135 Members, INT’L TRIBUNAL FOR THE L. OF THE SEA, https://www.itlos.org/the-
tribunal/members/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2018). 
136 Chambers, INT’L TRIBUNAL FOR THE L. OF THE SEA, https://www.itlos.org/the-
tribunal/chambers/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2018). 










tribunal may issue advisory opinions in certain matters.137 
   f.  Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
The Organization of American States (OAS) has a long history dating 
to the late 1800s.138  Among its many other functions, OAS oversees 
enforcement of the American Convention on Human Rights,139 which was 
adopted by OAS in 1969140 and entered into force in 1978.141  Members of 
the OAS currently include all thirty-five independent nations of the 
Americas, including the United States.142 Of those, twenty-five nations 
have either ratified or complied with the Convention, and twenty have 
accepted compulsory jurisdiction.143 However, two of the ratifying nations 
have since denounced the Convention.144 
Two principal organs of the OAS divide responsibilities for enforcing 
the Convention.145   The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR), established by OAS in 1959, addresses individual petitions 
alleging human rights violations in the Americas.146 The Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (I/A CourtHR) was created in 1978 when the 
Convention took effect.147 It is an independent body responsible for 
interpreting and applying the American Convention on Human Rights.148 
 
 
137 Jurisdiction, INT’L TRIBUNAL FOR THE L. OF THE SEA, https://www.itlos.org/en/jurisdiction/ 
(last visited Sept. 2, 2018). 
138 Our History, OAS, http://www.oas.org/en/about/our_history.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).  
139 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S 17955 [hereinafter 
American Convention]. 
140 What is the IACHR?, OAS, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/what.asp (last visited Nov. 
3, 2018). 
141 Id.; see also Lynda E. Frost, The Evolution of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: 
Reflections of Present and Former Judges, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 171, 171 & n.2 (1992). 
142 Member States, OAS, http://www.oas.org/en/member_states/default.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 
2018). 
143 INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT 2017 14 (2018) [hereinafter 
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 2017], http://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/informe2017/ingles.pdf. 
144 I/A Court History, INTER-AMERICAN CT. OF HUM. RTS., 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.php/en/about-us/historia-de-la-corteidh (last visited Nov. 3, 2018). 
Venezuela denounced the Convention in 2012, and Trinidad and Tobago did the same in 1998. Id.; see 
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 2017, supra note 143, at 14.  
145 Frost, supra note 141, at 171; About the OAS: Our Structure, OAS, 
http://www.oas.org/en/about/our_structure.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).   
146 What is the IACHR?, OAS, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/what.asp (last visited Nov. 
3, 2018);  
147 Frost, supra note 141, at 172; Basic Documents in the Inter-American System: Introduction, 
OAS, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/intro.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).  
148 American Convention, supra note 139, art. 62(3) (“The jurisdiction of the Court shall 
comprise all cases concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions of this Convention 
that are submitted to it, provided that the States Parties to the case recognize or have recognized such 
jurisdiction . . . .”); Other Autonomous and/or Decentralized Organs, Agencies, Entities, and 












The Statute of the I/A CourtHR was adopted in 1979 and the Rules of 
Procedure in 1980.149 Both the Convention and the Statute include broad 
provisions governing the I/A CourtHR, while operational details are set 
out in its Rules of Procedure.150   
As noted above, the IACHR addresses petitions filed by individuals 
alleging violations of the Convention by OAS member states.151 Cases that 
the IACHR cannot resolve may be referred to the I/A CourtHR, but 
individuals do not have standing to file petitions directly with the I/A 
CourtHR.152   
The tribunal’s seven members are elected to six-year terms, renewable 
only once.153 The members convene to hear and decide cases alleging 
human rights violations, with all seven members participating in each 
decision.154 The I/A CourtHR exercises jurisdiction not only over disputes 
referred by the IACHR for its consideration, but also cases filed directly 
by member states to the Convention.155 The I/A CourtHR also has 
unusually broad authority to issue advisory opinions.156 In fact, its 
advisory jurisdiction extends to all thirty-five OAS member nations, not 
just those that have ratified the Convention or that voluntarily comply.157  
   g.  African Court on Human and People’s Rights 
The court came into existence in January 2004 with the fifteenth 
African nation’s ratification of the protocol to the African Charter for 
establishing an African court of human rights.158 The court’s first decision 
was rendered in 2009.159 As of 2017, thirty African nations had ratified the 
 
 
149 Frost, supra note 141, at 172.  
150 Id. (citing Thomas Buergenthal, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 
231, 231 (1982)); see INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, RULES OF PROCEDURE, 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/sitios/reglamento/nov_2009_ing.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2018). 
151 I/A Court History, supra note 144.  
152 Frost, supra note 141, at 172. 
153 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 2017, supra note 143, at 13. 
154 Frost, supra note 141, at 173-74. 
155 Id. at 173; see American Convention, supra note 139, art. 48.  
156 Frost, supra note 141, at 173-75; see American Convention, supra note 139, art. 64.  
157 Frost, supra note 141, at 174-75. 
158 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights, AFRICAN UNION (June 27, 2014), https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-amendments-
protocol-statute-african-court-justice-and-human-rights. 
159 INT’L FED’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PRACTICAL GUIDE: THE AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND 
PEOPLE’S RIGHTS 5 (2010), https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/african_court_guide.pdf. 










protocol.160 The court’s jurisdiction includes interpreting the African 
Charter of Human Rights and related instruments, which are binding on 
member nations.161   
   h.  International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) 
This court was established by the United Nations Security Council in 
1993 at The Hague, Netherlands, to address and remediate war crimes that 
arose during the conflicts in the Balkan region, especially Croatia, Bosnia, 
and Herzegovina during the 1990s.162 Its mandate terminated on December 
31, 2017.163   
One of the tribunal’s divisions, the Chambers, was composed of judges 
who presided over trials prosecuting individuals charged with perpetrating 
war crimes. The Chambers had three trial divisions and one appellate 
division. Each trial chamber was composed of three permanent judges and 
up to six ad litem judges. The Appeals Chamber comprised seven 
permanent judges, five from the ICTY and two others from the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Collectively, the 
Appeals Chamber served as the appellate tribunal for both the ICTY and 
the ICTR.164 Panels of five judges from the Appeals Chamber heard and 
decided appeals.165 
i.  International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
The ICTR, like the ICTY, was established by the United Nations to 
prosecute and remediate war crimes arising from mass genocide and other 
humanitarian atrocities committed in Rwanda in 1994.166 Its mandate 
 
 
160 AFRICAN UNION, LIST OF COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE SIGNED, RATIFIED/ACCEDED TO THE 
PROTOCOL TO THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE’S RIGHTS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 
AN AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE’S RIGHTS (Jan. 16, 2017), http://en.african-
court.org/images/Basic%20Documents/Ratification_and_Deposit_of_the_Declaration_final-
jan_2017.pdf. 
161 Background to the African Court, COALITION FOR AN EFFECTIVE AFRICAN CT. ON HUM. & 
PEOPLE’S RTS., 
http://www.africancourtcoalition.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&i
d=16&Itemid=22&lang=en (last visited Sept. 2, 2018). 
162 About the ICTY, UNITED NATIONS INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 
http://www.icty.org/en/about (last visited Sept. 2, 2018).  
163 UNITED NATIONS INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 
http://www.icty.org/en/content/frontpage-intro-block (last visited Sept. 2, 2018). 
164 Chambers, UNITED NATIONS INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 
http://www.icty.org/en/sid/141 (last visited Sept. 2, 2018).  
165 Id.  












ended effective June 30, 2012.167 As noted above, appeals were decided by 
the ICTY’s Appeals Chamber.168 
 B. Global Variations in Opinion-Issuing Practices, Voting Records, 
and Anonymity  
The ongoing scholarly and juridical debates about the relative propriety 
of unanimous or separate judicial opinions generally focus on the 
advantages and disadvantages of a specific jurisdiction’s opinion-issuing 
practices.169 Proponents of individual judges’ authority to write 
independently enumerate various reasons in favor of that practice, while 
proponents of unanimity and consensus emphasize countervailing risks of 
issuing separate opinions.170 The relevant literature to date, however, has 
developed neither a comprehensive theoretical framework nor even a 
consistent vocabulary for evaluating the competing underlying values and 
policy preferences.171 And the variations in global norms governing how 
courts communicate their decisions to litigants, other constituencies, and 
the public depend largely on the fundamental values and cultural traditions 
unique to each legal system.     
On the other hand, meaningful empirical research on the reasons for 
variations in dissenting rates within a single jurisdiction requires us to 
identify objectively measurable independent variables, such as judicial 
qualifications and experience, judicial selection procedures, judicial term 
length (and renewability), and even individual judges’ political or 
ideological preferences. But objectively measurable independent variables 
useful for empirical analysis do not necessarily reflect the shared values 
and traditions of a legal system as a whole. Understanding the reasons for 
global variations in opinion-issuing practices must begin by identifying the 
values and policy preferences that drive each jurisdiction’s normative 
choices about how appellate and constitutional tribunals communicate 
 
 
https://www.state.gov/j/gcj/ictr/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2018); see also Legacy Website of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UNITED NATIONS RESIDUAL MECHANISM FOR CRIM. 
TRIBUNALS, http://unictr.irmct.org/en (last visited Sept. 12, 2018).  
167 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 166. 
168 Supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
169 See, e.g., RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 9-16; Anand, supra note 97, at 789-794, 800-804; 
Henderson, supra note 16, at 334-43; Simpson, Jr., supra note 48, at 211-17. 
170 See, e.g., RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 9-16. 
171 Dunoff and Pollack’s Judicial Trilemma model begins to identify some of those underlying 
values, but as explained elsewhere in this article, the descriptive framework they propose is 
underconceptualized.  See infra notes 539-47 and accompanying text.  










their decisions.172   
  1. National Constitutional Courts    
Of the eighteen European Union member states with constitutional 
courts, most   currently grant judges express authority to issue separate 
opinions along with the collective judgment or opinion of the court.173 
Within this group, most variations in transparency norms relate to whether 
judges are identified by name as concurring or dissenting in the court’s 
judgment; whether separate opinions may be issued anonymously; 
whether, if issued, they must include reasoning for departing from the 
court’s opinion; whether individual judges may silently acquiesce in the 
 
 
172 The somewhat daunting term “normative” is well worn, if not overused, in contemporary 
legal scholarship. See Robin West, The Contested Value of Normative Legal Scholarship, 66 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 6, 8 (2016) (“Legal scholarship, in short, is on the horns of a ‘normativity’ dilemma. To some 
critics, legal scholarship isn’t scholarship, because it’s too normative, while to another camp, it may be 
scholarship, but it isn’t legal because it’s not normative enough. For every critique, both inside and 
outside the academy, one can find its opposite, also forcefully voiced.”); cf. Brian Leiter, Intellectual 
Voyeurism in Legal Scholarship, 4 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 79, 80 (1992) (critiquing “sub-standard 
interdisciplinary work whose most striking feature is . . . ‘intellectual voyeurism’: superficial and ill-
informed treatment of serious ideas . . . in a pretentious way . . . [by which the] promising scholarly 
endeavor of interdisciplinary research becomes a forum for posturing and the misuse of knowledge”).   
In social science terminology, “norms” are simply rules of conduct shared by a cohesive social 
group. There is nothing mysterious about normative analysis. It simply means the study of rules – in 
legal scholarship, typically legal rules. Generally legal scholarship that assumes a “normative” 
position advocates what legal rules should or should not be. But that kind of analysis is in fact value-
laden. Norms are simply the rules themselves. Shared values drive normative outcomes. Norms are 
simply rules, which can be studied analytically and empirically. Shared values influence normative 
outcomes, and they can be postulated and even theorized. But values themselves cannot be measured 
or quantified. See, e.g., Davide Fassio, How to Distinguish Norms from Values, 5 PHENOMENOLOGY & 
MIND 196, 199-200 (2013) (“Gradability is a distinctive feature of values. Things can be more or less 
good, interesting or ugly. This is not the case for norms: there are no more or less permitted, forbidden 
or obligatory actions. . . . [V]alues, but not norms, admit degrees”). As Fassio explains, norms can be 
prioritized relative to one another, but that does not alter their inherently binary nature. Norms are 
what they are: one either complies with a norm or one does not. See id. 
173 KELEMEN, supra note 74, at 10 (“[T]he overwhelming majority of European constitutional 
courts provide for the publication of dissent:”); see id. at 79 ([I]n the last half-century there has been a 
clear trend to allow a special category of judges, constitutional judges, to write separately . . . .”); id. at 
182 (“In Europe, . . . there is a clear trend to allow judges, especially constitutional judges, to write 
separately.”); see also RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 30 tbl. 1 (listing European constitutional courts 
and categorizing dissenting practices of each); Bricker, supra note 5, at 173 (“In twenty-one of the 
twenty-eight current EU member states, dissenting opinions are permitted on at least some courts in 
the judicial system, though many grant this power only to high court judges . . . . [M]ost judges on the 
constitutional courts are now able to express public dissent from the majority opinion . . . .”). But see 
Chris Hanretty, Dissent in Iberia: The Ideal Points of Justices on the Spanish and Portuguese 
Constitutional Tribunals, 51 EUR. J. POL. RES. 671, 671-72, 689 n.1 (2012) (“Most Kelsenian 
constitutional courts in Western Europe are prohibited from issuing dissenting opinions . . . .” (citing 
materials relating to France and Italy as well as a “general summary” in Laffranque, supra note 36)). 
Hanretty reasoned that specialized constitutional courts in Western Europe are “more political than 
other West European courts” that lack constitutional review power or that exercise it in conjunction 












judgment; whether a judge may add an unsigned dissent or concurrence 
without articulating reasons for departing from the court’s judgment; and 
whether voting records are disclosed in full, in part, or not at all.174   
Austria Constitutional Court. The Austrian Constitution initially 
provided for constitutional judicial review by a specialized court 
beginning in 1920.175 It was the first specialized constitutional court ever 
established, and it enjoys a worldwide reputation as a pioneer of 
constitutional judicial review.176   
The constitution defines the composition of the court as including a 
President, a Vice-President, twelve other members, and six substitute 
members.177 All members are appointed by the Federal President, half on 
the recommendation of the Federal Government and the other half on the 
recommendation of the Federal Council and the National Council.178 No 
term limits apply, except that each justice’s term of office expires on 
December 31 of the year in which the incumbent reaches age seventy.179 
 
 
174 See infra Tbl. 1A. 
175 J.A.C. Grant, Judicial Review of Legislation under the Austrian Constitution of 1920, 28 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 670, 670-71 (1934). The Austrian Constitutional Court has long been considered the 
prototype of the Kelsenian theory of judicial review. See Lech Garlicki, Constitutional Courts Versus 
Supreme Courts, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 44, 44 (2007) (“The centralized Kelsenian system of judicial 
review is built on two basic assumptions. It concentrates the power of constitutional review within a 
single judicial body, typically called a constitutional court, and it situates that court outside the 
traditional structure of the judicial branch.”); Hanretty, supra note 173, at 671 (“[I]t was the 
recognition of this political role of courts that led Kelsen . . . to suggest concentrating constitutional 
review in specialised courts; and it was Kelsen’s intellectual leadership that led to the widespread 
adoption of this model in Western Europe and a number of former European colonies.”); John 
Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
1671, 1672 (2004) (crediting “Hans Kelsen, the first Chief Justice and designer of the Austrian Court,” 
as the “spiritual godfather” of European constitutional adjudication); see, e.g., Grant, supra, at 670-71 
(citing Hans Kelsen, La garantie juridictionnelle de la constitution, in ANNUAIRE DE L’INSTITUT 
INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT PUBLIC 52, 53 (1929)); Sara Lagi, Hans Kelsen and the Austrian 
Constitutional Court (1918-1929), 9 CO-HERENCIA 273 (2012), 
http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1794-
58872012000100010&lng=en&tlng=es. See generally Hans Kelsen, Judicial Review of Legislation: A 
Comparative Study of the Austrian and the American Constitution, 4 J. POL. 183 (1942). Beyond the 
European continent, the Kelsenian model of constitutional judicial review has also taken root in Latin 
American nations. Garlicki, supra, at 45.  
176 VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSHOF ÖSTERREICH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 21, 
https://www.vfgh.gv.at/downloads/VfGH_Broschuere_E.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2018). See generally 
Ronald Faber, The Austrian Constitutional Court – An Overview, 1 VIENNA J. INT’L CONST. L. 49 
(2008), www.osce.org/odihr/37171?. 
177 Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [B-VG] [Constitution]  StGBl No. 140/1920, art. 147, ¶ 1 
(Austria). 
178 Id. art. 147 ¶ 2. 
179 Id. art. 147 ¶ 6. The Austrian Constitutional Court Act of 1953 provides that a court member 
(or substitute member) may be removed upon a finding, by an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the 










The constitution assigns more detailed procedures of the court to statutory 
enactments, as well as standing orders issued by the constitutional court 
itself.180  
The Austrian Court’s quorum requirements depend on the nature of the 
proceeding.181 In general, a quorum exists if the chair and eight other 
justices are present.182 For specific kinds of matters, the chair and four 
other justices are sufficient to meet the quorum requirement, but even then 
any member may request review by eight justices.183 Generally, issues are 
resolved by majority vote, excluding the chairman, unless the vote is 
divided equally.184 However, when dismissing a limited range of matters 
pursuant to specific provisions of the federal constitutional law, the 
panel’s decision must be unanimous.185   
The constitutional court strictly honors the norm of secret 
deliberations.186 The court’s organic act expressly requires that neither 
deliberations nor votes are to be made public.187 Dissenting judges may 
have their views and reasoning for disagreement recorded, but they are 
kept secret in private registers and are open only to higher ordinary courts 
and fellow Constitutional Court justices.188 
Belgium Constitutional Court. Constitutional amendments adopted in 
2007 formally  established the Belgium court with specific jurisdiction to 
review statutes and rules for constitutionality and to prevent certain types 
of conflicts among laws. The constitution provides that the court’s 
“composition, competences and functioning” are to be determined by 
 
 
court’s justices, that the justice has become  constitutionally unqualified to serve; that the justice’s 
conduct “prove[s] unworthy of the respect and confidence required by such office or . . . grossly 
disregard[s] the obligation of official secrecy”; or that the justice becomes mentally or physically 
“incapacitated to comply with the duties of the office.” VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSHOFGESETZ 1953 
[VFGG] [CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ACT OF 1953] BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] No. 85/1953 art. 
10(1), https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Erv/ERV_1953_85/ERV_1953_85.pdf. 
180 BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] STGBL No. 140/1920, arts. 147 ¶ 6, 148 (Austria); 
see VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSHOFGESETZ 1953 [VFGG] [CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ACT OF 1953] 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] No. 85/1953 (implementing art. 148), supra note 179.  
181 See KELEMEN, supra note 74, at 22 n.33. 
182 Verfassungsgerichtshofgesetz 1953 [VfGG] [Constitutional Court Act of 1953] 
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] No. 85/1953, pt. 1, § 7(1).  
183 See id. § 7(2). 
184 See id. § 31.   
185 Id.; see id. § 19(3) subpara. (1). 
186 RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 20. 
187 Verfassungsgerichtshofgesetz 1953 [VfGG] [Constitutional Court Act of 1953] 
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] No. 85/1953, pt. 1, § 30(1) (“The deliberations and the vote are not 
public.”). 
188 RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 20 (footnote and citation omitted); cf. Bricker, supra note 5, at 












law,189 as provided by the Belgian Constitutional Court Act.190 
The organic statute provides for twelve judges, of which six are to be 
Dutch-speaking and six French-speaking.191 A judge is appointed for 
life192 by the King of Belgium from two nominees submitted by either of 
the two legislative chambers, which alternate in submitting nominees by a 
two-thirds majority vote.193 To qualify, a judge must satisfy detailed 
criteria apparently designed to result in balanced representation on the 
court with respect to qualifications, professional experience, and gender.194  
The two six-member language groups elect two presidents, one 
representing each language, who serve alternating one-year terms.195 The 
court sits in panels of seven judges, three representing each language 
group plus the president, or in the president’s absence, the most senior 
judge representing the president’s linguistic group.196 Cases may be 
submitted for consideration by the full court by either president and must 
be submitted to the full court upon request by at least two members of the 
panel.197 If a tie vote occurs in full session, the president’s vote breaks the 
tie.198 
Deliberations are conducted in secret,199 and decisions are made by 
majority vote.200 Judgments must include the “operative part” and a 
statement of the reasons for the decision, and must include the names of 
those judges who deliberated in reaching the judgment.201 But only the 
president and registrar must sign the court’s judgments.202 While the 
court’s organic act does not expressly address whether separate opinions 
 
 
189 1994 CONST. art. 142 (Belg.), translated at Basic Texts: The Constitution, CONST. CT., 
http://www.const-court.be/en/common/home.html. 
190 Loi spéciale du 6 janvier 1989 sur la Court d’arbitrage [Special Act of 6 January 1989 on the 
Constitutional Court], MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Jan. 7, 1989, 
http://www.const-court.be/en/common/home.html.  
191 Id. art. 31. 
192 Judges are subject to removal or suspension from office only on a judgment of the 
constitutional court that they “have infringed the dignity of their office or have fallen short of the 
obligations of their position.” Id. art. 49. 
193 See id. art. 32. 
194 Id. art. 34. 
195 Id. arts. 33, 54. 
196 Id. art. 55. Panels must also reflect a balance in qualifications and professional experience. 
Id.    
197 Id. art. 56.  
198 Id.  
199 Id. art. 108. 
200 Id. art. 55. 
201 Id. art. 111.  
202 Id. art. 112. 










are permissible, the Constitutional Court does not issue them.203 
Bulgaria Constitutional Court. The 1991 Bulgarian Constitution 
established a specialized constitutional court, which is among the most 
transparent of all collegial courts.204 The court is independent not only 
from the executive and legislative branches but also from the judiciary; its 
operations are governed exclusively by the constitution and the 
Constitutional Court Act.205 The court is expressly charged with 
“guarantee[ing] the supremacy of the Constitution,”206 and its 
jurisdictional scope is governed exclusively by the constitution.207 
The court has twelve justices.208 Of these, four are appointed by the 
Bulgaria National Assembly; four by the President; and four by Bulgaria’s 
two highest courts, the General Assembly of justices on the Supreme 
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Administrative Court.209 Justices are 
appointed to nine-year, nonrenewable terms.210 
Decisions of the court are reached by majority vote,211 and they must 
 
 
203 See KELEMEN, supra note 74, at 21 (suggesting the lack of dissenting opinions may be 
attributable to the constitutional court’s historical and political background, as well as “the strong 
influence of the French legal tradition in Belgian law”); Bricker, supra note 5, at 178. 
204 KONSTITUTSIA NA REPUBLIKA BALGARIA [CONSTITUTION] July 13, 1991 ch. VIII, arts. 147-
52, (Bulg.), http://www.constcourt.bg/en/LegalBasis. See generally Composition, CONST. CT. OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF BULG., http://www.constcourt.bg/en/Home/AboutCourt (last visited Sept. 4, 2018).   
205 Bulgaria Constitutional Court Act art. 1(2), State Gazette [S.G.] No. 67/16.08.1991, 
translated at Legislation, CONST. CT. OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULG., 
http://www.constcourt.bg/en/LegalBasis.  
206 Id. art. 1(1).  
207 KONSTITUTSIA NA REPUBLIKA BALGARIA, July 13, 1991 ch. VIII, art. 149; see also Bulgaria 
Constitutional Court Act arts. 12, 13. Among other responsibilities, the court’s duties include issuing 
binding interpretations of the constitution, determining the constitutionality of legislative enactments 
and presidential acts, determining whether any treaty to which Bulgaria is a signatory is consistent 
with the constitution as it stood before ratification of the treaty, and deciding whether Bulgaria’s 
domestic law is consistent with international law and with any treaty to which Bulgaria is a party. 
KONSTITUTSIA NA REPUBLIKA BALGARIA, July 13, 1991 ch. VIII, art. 149(1), (2), (4). 
208 KONSTITUTSIA NA REPUBLIKA BALGARIA, July 13, 1991 ch. VIII, art. 147(1); Bulgaria 
Constitutional Court Act art. 4(1). 
209 KONSTITUTSIA NA REPUBLIKA BALGARIA,  July 13, 1991 ch. VIII, art. 147(2); see Bulgaria 
Constitutional Court Act art. 4(1). 
210 Bulgaria Constitutional Court Act art. 4(2). Justices are subject to removal upon conviction 
of an intentional offense carrying a penalty of deprivation of liberty, upon expiration of the nine-year 
term, upon death or voluntary resignation, upon a determination that the judge is actually unable to 
discharge the duties of the office for one year or more, or if the judge accepts another public office 
deemed incompatible with serving on the court. KONSTITUTSIA NA REPUBLIKA BALGARIA 
[CONSTITUTION] July 13, 1991 ch. VIII, art. 148(1); see also Bulgaria Constitutional Court Act art. 11. 
211 KONSTITUTSIA NA REPUBLIKA BALGARIA, July 13, 1991 ch. VIII, art. 151(1); see Bulgaria 
Constitutional Court Act art. 15(2). No judge may abstain from voting in any matter. Id. art. 15(3). In 
limited circumstances, the court’s rules provide for decisions to be made by a two-thirds majority. 
Regulations on the Organization of the Activities of the Constitutional Court, State Gazette [SG] No. 













be published within fifteen days after issuance.212 In very limited 
instances, the justices must vote by secret ballot.213 
 Details concerning the court’s organization and procedures are 
otherwise determined by the Constitutional Court Act, which requires the 
court to adopt rules governing its organization and functions.214 Those 
rules require justices to “observe the confidentiality of Court sessions in 
deciding cases.”215 Decisions must include, among other things, the 
justices’ names, the court’s ruling with supporting reasons, and the 
signatures of all justices who participated.216 The rules provide expressly 
for dissenting opinions.217 Specifically, they require the chairman to 
announce the disposition of a case, including the names of justices who 
signed with a dissenting opinion.  The rapporteur218 must also read the 
reasons for the decision.219 While deliberations are confidential, decisions 
are rendered by open vote except those the constitution requires to be 
rendered by secret ballot.220 The court’s decisions, together with the 
reasoning and including any dissenting opinions, must be published within 
fifteen days after their adoption.221 
Croatia Constitutional Court. The constitutional court of the Republic 
of Croatia was designed after Germany’s constitutional court.222 
 
 
212 KONSTITUTSIA NA REPUBLIKA BALGARIA, July 13, 1991 ch. VIII, art. 151(2); Bulgaria 
Constitutional Court Act, Transitional and Concluding Provisions § 1.  
213 See Bulgaria Constitutional Court Act art. 24(3) (impeachment of president or vice-
president); art. 5(1) (decision to revoke immunity of a fellow justice); see also KONSTITUTSIA NA 
REPUBLIKA BALGARIA, July 13, 1991 ch. VIII, arts. 148(2), 149(1) item 8.   
214 KONSTITUTSIA NA REPUBLIKA BALGARIA, July 13, 1991 ch. VIII, art. 152; see Regulations, 
supra note 211. 
215 Regulations, supra note 211, art. 7(4). 
216 Id. art. 23. If a participating justice cannot sign, the chairman must “elucidate the reason.” Id. 
art. 23(3).  
217 Id. art. 32(3). “The justices who do not agree with an adopted decision or with a resolution 
with which a motion is denied review may sign them with a dissenting opinion and must set out their 
opinion in writing.” Id. The only exception is a case that requires a decision by secret ballot. Id. art. 
32(4). A justice who disagrees with the majority decision “may state in writing and attach his opinion 
to an act of the Constitutional Court.” Id. art. 32(5); see also RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 20-21. 
218 “Rapporteur” is a French term that literally translates to “reporter” in English. Many 
European courts, especially those following the civil law tradition, use the term to refer to the judge 
who is selected to “report” the court’s judgment, generally in writing. The counterpart in United States 
multi-member courts is the judge or justice designated to write the court’s principal opinion. 
219 Regulations, supra note 211, art. 28. 
220 Id. art. 32(1), (2).   
221 Id. art. 33(1).  
222 Laffranque, supra note 36, at 165. See generally History and Development of Croatian 
Constitutional Judicature, CONST. CT. OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA, https://www.usud.hr/en/history-
and-development-croatian-constitutional-judicature#5 (last visited Sept. 10, 2018).    










Constitutional review was known to Croatia beginning in 1963 under 
Soviet rule.223 The modern court was established in 1990 under the present 
constitution, which provides for eleven justices elected by parliament to 
eight-year terms (renewable once), subject to more specific provisions in 
the court’s rules of procedure.224 According to the court’s organic statute, 
decisions generally are to be made by majority vote, and the court’s 
judgment must include reasons for the decision.225  
The statute expressly provides that any judge of the constitutional court 
who disagrees with the judgment “is due to give the reasons for it in 
writing.”226 If a judge votes contrary to the majority decision, the 
dissenting judge may give the reasons for the separate opinion in writing, 
which will be published at the author’s request.227 A judge may not abstain 
from voting unless disqualified by virtue of having participated in enacting 
the law, regulation, or other act in question in the case before the court.228 
The statute expressly requires that the constitutional court’s work is open 
to the public.229 
Decisions on constitutional matters are decided by six-judge panels.230 
The court’s rules of procedure provide in detail for the announcement, 
issuance, and publication of dissenting opinions.231 Decisions must include 
the names of all judges participating in the decision, listed in alphabetical 
order.232 
Czech Republic Constitutional Court. The Czech Republic, consistent 
 
 
223 History and Development of Croatian Constitutional Judicature, supra note 222. 
224 Id. (Constitutional Judicature in the Republic of Croatia after 1990).    
225 Consolidated Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia of 
May 3, 2002, NARODNE NOVINE [Official Gazette of Croatia] No. 49/02, art. 27(1), (3) [hereinafter 
Constitutional Act], translated at Legal Basis: The Constitutional Act, CONST. CT. OF THE REPUBLIC 
OF CROATIA, 
https://www.usud.hr/sites/default/files/dokumenti/The_Constitutional_Act_on_the_Constitutional_Co
urt_of_the_Republic_of_Croatia_consolidated_text_Official_Gazette_No_49-02.pdf; see Rules of 
Procedure of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia art. 45(1) [hereinafter Rules of 
Procedure], translated at Legal Basis: Rules of Procedure, CONST. CT. OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA, 
https://www.usud.hr/sites/default/files/dokumenti/Editorially_revised_and_consolidated_text_of_the_
Rules_of_Procedure_of_the_Constitutional_Court_of_the_Republic_of_Croatia.pdf (last visited Sept. 
10, 2018). 
226 Constitutional Act, supra note 225, art. 27(4).  
227 Id. art. 27(5); see Rules of Procedure, supra note 225, arts. 51(2), 52(1) (providing that a 
judge who disagrees with the court’s opinion has the right to request publication of the reasons for 
dissenting). 
228 Constitutional Act, supra note 225, art. 27(5); see Rules of Procedure, supra note 225, art. 
53(1).  
229 Constitutional Act, supra note 225, art. 3. 
230 Rules of Procedure, supra note 225, art. 25. 
231 Id. arts. 50-53.  












with its constitution,233 enacted a statute establishing its constitutional 
court in 1993,234 soon after former Czechoslovakia was divided into the 
sovereign nations of Czech Republic and Slovakia.235  The court’s 
jurisdiction is relatively expansive.236 The constitution provides for fifteen 
justices appointed for ten-year terms.237 Justices are appointed by the 
republic’s president238 with the consent of the senate.239   
For some kinds of matters, the court sits as a whole in full session 
(“Plenum”) with a quorum requirement of ten justices.240 To decide 
matters not within the jurisdiction of the full court, of the court sits in four 
three-member panels.241 In Plenum cases, decisions are made by majority 
or supermajority vote, depending on the nature of the issue.242 A decision 
by a panel requires the presence of all three justices and is generally made 
by majority vote.243 However, certain kinds of panel decisions rejecting 
petitions must be unanimous.244 
If a judge disagrees with the decision or the reasoning of the court, 
whether sitting in full session or in panels, the organic statute grants the 
right to include a separate opinion in the record, appended to the court’s 
decision and identifying the dissenter by name.245 The court publishes 
 
 
233 Ústavni zákon č. 1/1993 Sb., Ústava České Republiky [Constitution of the Czech Republic] 
art. 83 (Czech) (“The Constitutional Court is the judicial body responsible for the protection of 
constitutionality.”), translated at About the Court: Legal Basis, CONST. CT. OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC, 
https://www.usoud.cz/fileadmin/user_upload/ustavni_soud_www/Pravni_uprava/AJ/Ustava_EN_ve_z
neni_zak_c._98-2013.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2018). 
234 Zákon o Ústavním soudu [Constitutional Court Act], Zákon č. 182/1993 Sb., translated at 
About the Court: Legal Basis, CONST. CT. OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC, 
https://www.usoud.cz/fileadmin/user_upload/ustavni_soud_www/Pravni_uprava/AJ/ZUS_EN_verze_
2018.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2018). 
235 RAFFAELI, supra note 16, at 21; see History, CONST. CT. OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC, 
https://www.usoud.cz/en/history/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2018). 
236 See Ústavni zákon č. 1/1993 Sb., Ústava České Republiky [Constitution of the Czech 
Republic], art. 87 (Czech) (enumerating issues and disputes within the court’s jurisdiction). 
237 Id. art. 84(1).  
238 Id. arts. 62(e), 84(2). 
239 Id. art. 84(2); cf. Zákon o Ústavním soudu [Constitutional Court Act], Zákon č. 182/1993 
Sb., § 6 (providing that the President must “seek the consent of the Senate,” which is deemed granted 
under specified circumstances). 
240 Ústavni zákon č. 1/1993 Sb., Ústava České Republiky [Constitution of the Czech Republic], 
§ 11 (Czech).  
241 Id. § 15.  
242 Id. § 13. 
243 Id. § 19(2). 
244 Id.; see id. § 43(2). 
245 RAFFAELI, supra note 16, at 21; see Zákon o Ústavním soudu [Constitutional Court Act], 
Zákon č. 182/1993 Sb., § 14 (“A Justice who disagrees with the decision of the Plenum or with its 
reasoning, has the right to have their dissenting opinion noted in the record of discussions and 










separate opinions in its own reporter, but they are are not included in the 
Czech Republic’s Collection of Laws; that publication includes only a 
brief notation at the foot of the court’s judgment reporting the existence of 
a dissenting opinion.246 All judgments must include reasons for the 
decision.247 
France Constitutional Council. The Constitution of 1958 established a 
special constitutional council with limited powers of constitutional 
review.248 The council has nine members, each appointed to nine-year, 
nonrenewable terms.249 The nine members’ terms are staggered so that one 
third of the council membership is replaced every three years.250 The 
French president appoints the council’s presiding member from among the 
nine appointed members.251   
Organizational, procedural, and operational details are set out in the 
council’s organic statute.252 The council considers matters in full session 
with a minimum of seven members participating.253 The implementing 
statute requires that the council’s decisions must include reasons, and they 
must be published.254 However, they do not reflect members’ votes.255 
France forbids any of its judges to issue dissenting opinions, including 
 
 
appended to the decision with his name stated.”); id. § 22 (similar provision for disagreements with 
panel decisions). 
246 RAFFAELI, supra note 16, at 21. 
247 Zákon o Ústavním soudu [Constitutional Court Act], Zákon č. 182/1993 Sb., § 54(2). 
248 See 1958 Const. tit. VII, arts. 58-61-1 (Fr.) (enumerating constitutional council functions); 
Garlicki, supra note 175, at 45 n.3. 
France is the only European country in which constitutional adjudication takes the form, 
almost exclusively, of a preventive review.  Except for the disputes related to the distribution 
of lawmaking competences between the parliament and the cabinet (FR. CONST. art. 37, sec. 
2), the Conseil Constitutionnel only has jurisdiction to review a statute before it has been 
promulgated. 
Id.; see also Nadelmann (1959), supra note 84, at 423-24 (noting “the advent of the monocratic 
Constitution of 1958” and speculating about its potential impact on French government’s balance of 
powers). 
249 1958 Const. tit. VII, art. 56 (Fr.). Council members are subject to removal prior to the end of 
the nine-year term if they carry out activities or assume another office deemed incompatible with their 
official duties, or if they become “permanently incapacitated from performing their duties.” 
Ordonnance 58-1067 du 7 novembre 1958 portant loi organique sur le Conseil constitutionnel 
[Ordinance 58-1067 of Nov. 7, 1958 Bearing on the Organic Law on the Constitutional Council], tit. 1, 
arts. 10, 11, THE CONST. COUNCIL, https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/fondements-
textuels/ordonnance-n-58-1067-du-7-novembre-1958-portant-loi-organique-sur-le-conseil-
constitutionnel.   
250 Id. tit. VII, art. 56. The President of the French Republic, the President of the National 
Assembly, and the President of the Senate each appoint three members to the council. Id.  
251 Id.; Ordonnance 58-1067, supra note 249, tit. 1, art. 1, ¶ 2.    
252 1958 Const. tit. VI, art. 63 (Fr.); see Ordonnance 58-1067, supra note 249. 
253 Ordonnance 58-1067, supra note 249, art. 14 (excepting cases of “force majeure duly 
recorded in the minutes”). 
254 Id. arts. 23-11, 26-1. 












members of the constitutional council,256 on the reasoning that individual 
judicial dissent contradicts the “principle of deliberative secrecy.”257 
Members of the constitutional council, like other French judges since 
1849,258 take a traditional oath “to maintain the secrecy of deliberations 
and of votes.”259 The strong norm of secrecy may be attributable in part to 
the political nature of judicial appointments, together with judges’ duty to 
remain independent and impartial. 260    
Germany Constitutional Court. The constitutional court in Germany, 
known as the Bundesverfassungsgericht, was first established in 1951 with 
the enactment of the Federal Constitutional Court Act.261 The court 
exercises both abstract and concrete constitutional review.262 The sixteen-
member court sits in two subdivisions known as “senates,” which have 
“precisely defined competencies” as determined by the Constitutional 
Court Act and by the plenary court sitting as a whole.263 Each senate has 
eight justices264 and is further subdivided into “chambers” of three justices 
 
 
256 Bricker, supra note 5, at 178. 
257 François Luchaire, Is the Adoption of Dissenting Opinions in France Desirable?, 8 CAHIERS 
DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 111 (2000) (Hunter Smith trans.); see Nadelmann (1959), supra note 
84, at 422-24 (describing the rather colorful and varied history of the norm of secrecy in French 
courts). 
258 Nadelmann (1959), supra note 84, at 423 (citing Law of Aug. 18, 1849, on Court 
Organization, art. 3(2)). 
259 Luchaire, supra note 257, at 111; see Marcel Waline, The Constitutional Council of the 
French Republic, 12 AM. J. COMP. L. 483, 487 (1963) (noting the political nature of the appointment 
process for council members). 
260 See Waline, supra note 259, at 487-88 (describing the strong influence of the required oath 
of secrecy with respect to council deliberations, which effectively precludes separate opinions).  
261 Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz [BVerfGG] [Act on the Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 
12, 1951, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 1473, last amended by Gesetz [G], Oct. 8, 2017, 
BGBL I at 3546, art. 2 (Ger.) [hereinafter Federal Constitutional Court Act], 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Gesetze/BVerfGG.pdf?__blob=
publicationFile&v=10; see Milestones in the History of the Federal Constitutional Court, 
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT, https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Das-
Gericht/Zeitstrahl/zeitstrahl_node.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2018); see also Video 2: History, 
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT,  
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Service/Infothek/Filme/Modul_2/modul2_node.html 
(short video explaining history and evolution of the German Constitutional Court) (last visited Sept. 3, 
2018).   
262 Peter E. Quint, Leading a Constitutional Court: Perspectives from the Federal Republic of 
Germany, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1853, 1854 (2006) (giving broad overview of the court’s history and 
functions). 
263 Court and Constitutional Organ, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT, 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Das-Gericht/Gericht-und-Verfassungsorgan/gericht-
und-verfassungsorgan_node.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2018). 
264 Structure, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT, 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Das-Gericht/Organisation/organisation_node.html (last 










each.265 Occasionally cases are considered by the full “plenary court,” 
which is mandatory if the two senates reach conflicting decisions on a 
specific legal matter.266   
Justices are elected to twelve-year, nonrenewable terms267 — half by 
the Bundestag, the German Parliament’s lower house; and half by the 
Bundesrat, the upper house.268 The relatively long but nonrenewable terms 
are designed to ensure judicial independence.269 Every justice who 
participates in a decision is listed by name in the judgment’s caption.270 
West Germany was the first continental nation to grant any of its courts 
express authority to issue dissenting opinions.271 In 1970, two decades 
after it was organized, the German Parliament amended the organic statute 
to authorize judges to issue concurring or dissenting opinions,272 but only 
when a judgment is issued by one of the two senates or the plenary 
 
 
visited Sept. 3, 2018); see also Video 1: Organisation and Daily Work, 
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT, 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Service/Infothek/Filme/Modul_1/modul1_node.html 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2018). 
265 Structure, supra note 264. Designed to manage the court’s high caseload, three-justice panels 
consider cases deemed to have “no general constitutional significance,” which comprise the great 
majority (ninety-nine percent) of the court’s work. Court and Constitutional Organ, supra note 263; 
Quint, supra note 262, at 1862. The three-member panels effectively serve as screening committees. 
Id. at 1862-63. Decisions of each three-justice chamber must be unanimous. Id. at 1862. 
266 Court and Constitutional Organ, supra note 263.  
267 Quint, supra note 262, at 1856 (citing Federal Constitutional Court Act § 4(1)). The 
controlling statute provides in part,  
(1) The term of office of the Justices shall be twelve years, though it shall not extend beyond 
retirement age.  
(2) Immediate or subsequent re-election of Justices shall not be possible. 
(3) Justices shall retire at the end of the month in which they reach the age of sixty-eight.  
Federal Constitutional Court Act § 4(1)-(3). 
268 Justices, supra note 264. 
269 See id.  
270 Geschäftsordnung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGGO] [Rules of Procedure of the 
Federal Constitutional Court], Nov. 19, 2014, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil 1 [BGBL] at 286, §§ 28(1), 
31(4) (Ger.) [hereinafter Rules of Procedure of the Federal Constitutional Court], 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Gesetze/GO_BVerfG.pdf?__bl
ob=publicationFile&v=6. 
271 Bricker, supra note 5, at 173. 
272 Federal Constitutional Court Act § 30(2). 
(2) If a Justice expressed a differing view on the decision or its reasoning during the 
deliberations, he or she may set forth this view in a separate opinion; the separate opinion 
shall be annexed to the decision.  The Senates may disclose the distribution of votes in their 
decisions. Further details shall be set out in the Rules of Procedure. 
Id.; see also Rules of Procedure of the Federal Constitutional Court § 55 (setting out further details); 
Grimm, supra note 11, at I-2. The first separate opinion was filed in January 1971. History, 
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT, https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Das-
Gericht/Zeitstrahl/zeitstrahl_node.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2018). Judgments issued by three-justice 
chambers, however, must be issued unanimously. Federal Constitutional Court Act § 93d(3) 












court.273 However, the judges’ individual votes are not disclosed, except to 
the extent individual judges elect to sign separate opinions.274  
While judges on the constitutional court have had authority to issue 
dissenting opinions for decades, they sometimes decline to do so even if 
they disagree with the majority decision.275 The senate or plenary court has 
discretion whether to announce the number of votes for and against the 
court’s judgment.276 One scholar noted that during the twelve years prior 
to 2012, only thirty-seven “explicit dissenting opinions [were] issued 
under the names of particular judges,” none of them in plenary session.277   
In any event, each judgment issued by the court must list all 
participating justices by name.278 
Hungary Constitutional Court. The specialized Hungarian 
constitutional court, established in 1990, generally follows the German 
organizational model.279 The court’s organic statute expressly allows 
justices to author separate opinions.280 If so, they are published along with 
the court’s judgment.281 The court’s justices regularly exercise their 
authority to file separate opinions.282 
The court’s procedural rules283 sets out in detail the contents, form, and 
means of disseminating decisions. In addition to the court’s holding and 
 
 
273 See KELEMEN, supra note 74, at 20; Quint, supra note 262, at 1862-63. 
274 WITTIG, supra note 74, at 4 (“[I]n Germany the judges do not reveal their individual votes. 
Thus, the only individualized information available are separate opinions as they are singed [sic] by 
their author[s].”).   
275 See Grimm, supra note 11, at I-2.   
276 Id. at I-3 
277 Hanretty, supra note 173, at 689 & n.2; see also WITTIG, supra note 74 (analysis of separate 
opinions issued by Germany’s constitutional court). 
278 Rules of Procedure of the Federal Constitutional Court § 28(1). 
279 RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 26. 
280 2011 évi CLI. törvény az Alkotmánybíróságról (Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional 
Court) § 66, translated at Act on the CC, THE CONST. CT. OF HUNG., https://hunconcourt.hu/act-on-
the-cc/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2018).   
(2) If a Member of the Constitutional Court who opposed the decision in the course of the 
voting does not agree with the decision of the Constitutional Court, he or she shall have the 
right to attach his or her dissenting opinion – along with a written reasoning – to the decision. 
(3) A Member of the Constitutional Court who agrees with the merits of the decision shall 
have the right to attach his or her reasons in the form of a concurring opinion if they differ 
from those of the majority. 
Id. Opinions may be filed individually, or a justice may join another justice’s separate opinion. 
RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 26. 
281 RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 26; see The Constitutional Court’s Rules of Procedure, THE 
CONST. CT. OF HUNG. (May 22, 2017), https://hunconcourt.hu/rules-of-procedure/ (§ 61(4)).  
282 RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 26.  
283 The Constitutional Court’s Rules of Procedure, supra note 281, §§ 58-61. 










reasoning, decisions must include, for example, whether the decision was 
made by the plenary session or by panel; whether any dissenting or 
concurring opinions were filed and if so, the names of the justices issuing 
them; the court’s reasoning for the decision; and the names and signatures 
of judges who participated in deciding the matter.284 The separate opinion 
must include reasons for disagreeing with the court’s decision,285 and 
arguments or points addressed in separate opinions must have been raised 
during the court’s deliberations to give all participants the opportunity to 
consider them.286   
Italy Constitutional Court. Italy’s Corte Constituzionale, established in 
1956,287 has fifteen justices who each serve nine-year, nonrenewable 
terms.288 Like France, Italy strongly adheres to the legal principle of 
maintaining the secrecy of judicial deliberations289 – so much so that in 
certain criminal cases a violation of that norm amounts to a criminal 
offense.290   
Judges on Italy courts are not permitted to publish separate opinions.291 
 
 
284 Id. §§ 58, 60(3).   
285 Id. § 59(4), (5); id. § 60(3). No separate opinion, however, can be longer than the majority 
decision. Id. § 59(4). 
286 Id. § 59(3). 
287 Giovanni Bognetti, Political Role of the Italian Constitutional Court, 49 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 981, 981 (1974). Amendments to Italy’s constitution in 1948 provided for constitutional judicial 
review, but the court’s organization and functions were delayed several years until the relevant organic 
statutes were in place. ITALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 17 (Claire Tame trans., 2017), 
https://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/download/pdf/The_Italian_Constitutional_Court.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 5, 2018) (“Thus, seven years after the Constitution came into force, the Court was finally 
able to function.”). 
288 Arts. 134-37 Costituzione [Cost.] [Constitution] (It.). See generally ITALIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, supra note 287. 
289 Italian Constitutional Court, supra note 287, at 49.   
To date, [separate opinions have] not been permitted in Italy, where the traditional ideal of a 
unified and impersonal judicial opinion still prevails – even if in practice the Court’s opinions 
are the product of a collaborative decision-making process in which not all judges necessarily 
agree with the majority view. Moreover, strict secrecy surrounds the Court’s deliberations, 
including differences of opinion that are voiced by judges, proposals made but rejected, and 
legal arguments not contained in the final opinion. . . .  Officially, one cannot know whether a 
decision was made unanimously or by majority vote, by how great a majority, or how 
individual judges voted. For some time there has been discussion, in both academic and 
legislative circles, and within the Court itself, about whether or not it would be appropriate to 
introduce the practice of publishing dissenting opinions, and of ways in which this could be 
done. There is disagreement about the wisdom of such an innovation. 
Id.  
290 RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 18 (citing Codice di procedura civile [C.p.c.][Civil Procedure 
Code] art. 276 (It.); Codice di procedura penale [C.p.p.] [Criminal Procedure Code] art. 125(4) (It.)); 
see C.p.p. art. 684 (criminalizing publication of “acts or documents” of criminal proceedings if 
forbidden by law); id. art. 685 (criminalizing publication of names and votes of judges who deliberate 
in criminal proceedings).  












Since 1988, when statutory amendments were enacted that eliminated 
judges’ civil liability for breaching secrecy norms, a judge may request the 
filing of a dissenting opinion with supporting reasons. However, any 
dissenting opinion is recorded under seal and is not published or otherwise 
disclosed.292  
For years, however, the Italy Constitutional Court and legal scholars 
have studied and debated the pros and cons of allowing judges to publish 
separate opinions, but the issue remains controversial.293  
Latvia Constitutional Court. The court was established in 1996294 with 
the authority to review legislation for conformity with the constitution.295 
Its seven judges are appointed to ten-year terms,296 except that a judge’s 
term ends upon reaching the age of seventy years.297   
The constitution enumerates several matters that require a decision by 
the full court with a minimum quorum of five judges, but other matters 
may be decided by three-judge panels.298 Decisions are made by majority 
vote.299 Any judge who votes against the decision of the court must 
express the reasons for the dissent in a written opinion, which is appended 
to the court’s judgment.300 The organic law enumerates the necessary 
contents of each judgment, including the composition of the court and the 
reasoning on which the court’s judgment is grounded.301 All judgments are 
published.302 
The court’s rules of procedure otherwise define the court’s structure 
 
 
292 RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 18-19 & n.53 (citing authorities); see Michele Graziadei & 
Ugo Mattei, Judicial Responsibility in Italy: A New Statute, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 103, 121-26 (1990) 
(describing “the problem of making public the dissenting views of judges” and how the 1988 statute, 
as later interpreted by the constitutional court, addressed the issue). 
293 RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 18; see ITALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, supra note 287, at 
49.  
294 History of the Court, CONST. CT. OF THE REPUBLIC OF LAT., 
http://www.satv.tiesa.gov.lv/en/history/history-of-the-court/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2018). 
295 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA June 19, 2014, art. 85, translated at Legal 
Basis, CONST. CT. OF THE REPUBLIC OF LAT. (Feb. 4, 2016), 
http://www.satv.tiesa.gov.lv/en/2016/02/04/the-constitution-of-the-republic-of-latvia/. 
296 Constitutional Court Law § 7(1), translated at Legal Basis, CONST. CT. OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
LAT. (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.satv.tiesa.gov.lv/en/2016/02/04/constitutional-court-law/; Justices, 
CONST. CT. OF THE REPUBLIC OF LAT., http://www.satv.tiesa.gov.lv/en/structure/justices-of-the-
constitutional-court/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2018).   
297 Justices, supra note 296. 
298 Constitutional Court Law § 25. 
299 Id. § 30(2).  
300 Id. § 30(6). 
301 Id. § 31. 
302 Id. § 33. 










and organization.303 Dissenting opinions must be in writing and signed by 
the author.304 All justices, however, must “keep the secret of the 
deliberations room.”305 If no dissenting opinion is expressed during 
deliberations, the judgment must make note of that fact.306 
  Lithuania Constitutional Court. When the constitutional court was 
initially established in Lithuania in 1993,307 the organic law prohibited 
publication of either the judges’ votes or any views expressed during 
deliberations.308 But in 2008, the organic statute governing the Lithuania 
constitutional court was amended to expressly allow its judges to publish 
separate opinions.309  
The court’s rules, as most recently amended, implement the organic 
statute by providing detailed procedures regarding dissenting or 
concurring opinions.310 Specifically, an individual judge’s opinion must be 
prepared as a separate document including the name and signature of the 
author, the judge’s opinion, and supporting arguments.311   
The rules clearly provide that the contents of a separate opinion cannot 
compromise the statutory norm of secret deliberations that prohibits 
 
 
303 Id. § 14; see Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court (2016), translated at Legal 
Basis, CONST. CT. OF THE REPUBLIC OF LAT. (Feb. 4, 2016), 
http://www.satv.tiesa.gov.lv/en/2016/02/04/hello-world/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2018). 
304 RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 18; see Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court § 145.  
305 Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court § 140.  
306 Id. § 144. 
307 See LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCIJA [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 25, 1992 (Lith.), 
translated at About the Court: Legal Information, THE CONST. CT. OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITH., 
http://www.lrkt.lt/lt/apie-teisma/teisine-informacija/konstitucija/125 (last visited Sept. 5, 2018). 
308 RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 25 (citing V. Staugaityte, Dissenting Opinion in the 
Constitutional Justice: Collegiality of the Courts vs Personal Independence of the Judge, 9 
JURISPRUDENCIJA 125 (2008)). 
309 Id.; Kelemen, supra note 5, at 1350; see Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucinio Teismo 
įstatymas [Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania], Feb. 6, 1993, LIETUVOS 
AIDA Nr. 24, art. 55 [hereinafter Law on the Constitutional Court], translated at About the Court: 
Legal Information, THE CONST. CT. OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITH., http://www.lrkt.lt/lt/apie-
teisma/teisine-informacija/konstitucinio-teismo-istatymas/126 (last visited Sept. 5, 2018). 
A judge of the Constitutional Court having a different opinion on an act adopted by the 
Constitutional Court shall have the right . . . to set out . . . in a reasoned opinion his or her 
dissenting opinion.  . . . A separate opinion of the judge is published on the Constitutional 
Court's website, attached to the case, and is notified to the persons participating in the case 
and mass media.  
Law on the Constitutional Court art. 55. 
310 Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucinio Teismo reglamentas [Rules of the Constitutional Court 
of the Republic of Lithuania] (as amended 2015), arts. 144-52 [hereinafter Rules of the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Lithuania], translated at About the Court: Legal Information, THE CONST. 
CT. OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITH., http://www.lrkt.lt/en/about-the-court/legal-information/the-rules-of-
the-constitutional-court/194 (last visited Nov. 3, 2018). 
311 Id. art. 146.  A dissenting opinion must clearly identify the parts of the court’s decision with 
which the judge disagrees. Id. art. 147. However, a judge may publish a separate opinion taking issue 












participating judges or employees from disclosing the votes or opinions of 
other judges.312   
Luxembourg Constitutional Court. The nation’s constitutional court 
was established in 1997, soon after the constitution was amended in 1996 
to provide for judicial review.313 The court has nine members, each 
appointed by the grand duke of Luxembourg, from three nominees 
submitted by the joint general assembly.314 
Although recent in origin, the court honors the traditional principle of 
secrecy as to both deliberations and judicial votes. Specifically, the court’s 
1997 organic law requires judicial deliberations to remain secret, and the 
principle of secrecy has been interpreted to extend to judges’ individual 
opinions, which are not published.315 The court’s decisions are reached by 
majority vote.316 
Malta Constitutional Court. Malta is somewhat unique. Although 
Malta’s constitutional court was established in 1964 with five justices, 
since 1974 it is composed of only three justices.317 Justices are appointed 
by Malta’s president with the advice of the Prime Minister.318 While 
appointees have no specified terms of office, retirement is mandatory upon 
reaching age sixty-five.319 Judges cannot be removed from office except 
upon a finding of “proved inability to perform the functions of [the] office 
(whether arising from infirmity of body or mind or any other cause) or 
 
 
312 See Law on the Constitutional Court art. 53; Rules of the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Lithuania art. 150 (“Upon writing the dissenting opinion, the judge may not violate the 
requirements of the secrecy of the room set forth in Article 53 of the Law on the Constitutional 
Court.”) Specifically, the separate opinion cannot reveal other judges’ opinions expressed during 
deliberations, the votes of other judges, or the “form of vote” by which the decision was made. Rules 
of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania art. 150; see Law on the Constitutional Court 
art. 53 (“Neither the Constitutional Court judges nor the staff member who participated in the hearing 
have the right to publish opinions expressed in the meeting room or votes cast.”). 
313 RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 19.  
314 Loi du 27 juillet 1997 portant organisation de la Cour Constitutionnelle [Law of 27 July 
1997 on the Organization of the Constitutional Court] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DU GRAND-DUCHÉ DE 
LUXEMBOURG [J.O.] A58, art. 12, [hereinafter Law of 27 July 1997], 
http://data.legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/loi/1997/07/27/n6/jo. 
315 RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 19; see Law of 27 July 1997 on the Organization of the 
Constitutional Court, art. 12 (“The deliberations of the Court are secret.”).  
316 Law of 27 July 1997 art. 12.  
317 Constitutional Court, THE JUDICIARY-MALTA, http://judiciarymalta.gov.mt/constitutional-
court (last visited Sept. 3, 2018).   
318 CONST. OF MALTA, Sept. 21, 1964, art. 96, translated at LAWS OF MALTA, 
http://justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid=8566&l=1 (last visited Sept. 
3, 2018). 
319 Id. art. 97(1). 











Although Malta generally follows the common law tradition, judges on 
any of its collegial courts, including the constitutional court, are by statute 
denied authority to publish separate opinions.321 Voting records and 
deliberations are also kept secret.322  
Poland Constitutional Tribunal. While the Polish constitutional court 
was established by constitutional amendment in 1982,323 its decisions have 
had binding effect only since 1997.324 The court is composed of fifteen 
justices, each appointed to a nine-year, nonrenewable term.325 The 
constitution provides that the court’s decisions are to be reached by 
majority vote.326   
The court’s organic statute expressly authorizes judges to issue 
separate opinions.327 Although a judgment requires the signatures of all 
participating judges, any dissenting judge may express a separate 
individual opinion. The reasoning for the separate opinion must be 
explained in writing, and any dissenting vote is reflected in the court’s 
judgment. A judge may also issue a concurring opinion that differs only 
with the court’s reasoning.328  
Portugal Constitutional Court. Portugal established a special 
constitutional court,329 known as the Tribunal Constitucionale in 1982, 
generally adopting the model of the German constitutional court.330 
 
 
320 Id. art. 97(2). 
321 RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 19 & n.59 (citing MALTA CODE OF ORG. & CIV. PROC. art. 
217). The code provides, “In a court consisting of more than one member, the decision of the majority 
shall form the judgment which shall be delivered as the judgment of the whole court.” MALTA CODE 
OF ORG. & CIV. PROC. art. 217, translated at Legislation, LAWS OF MALTA, 
http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid=8577&l=1 (last visited 
Sept. 3, 2018). 
322 RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 19. 
323 Id. at 26. 
324 See KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 2, 1997, art. 190(1) 
(Pol.), translated at About the Tribunal, TRYBUNAŁ KONSTYTUCYJNY, http://trybunal.gov.pl/en/about-
the-tribunal/legal-basis/the-constitution-of-the-republic-of-poland/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2018). 
325 Id. art. 194(1). 
326 Id. art. 190(5). 
327 RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 26 (citing Constitutional Tribunal Act of 1 August 1997).  
328 Id. (citing Constitutional Tribunal Act art. 68). The court’s website currently does not post 
English translations of either its organic statute or its regulations.  
329 CONST. OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC, as amended July 24, 2005, arts. 221-24, translated 
at Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL PORTUGAL, 
http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/conteudo/files/constituicaoingles.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 
2018); see Sofia Amaral-Garcia, Nuno M. Garoupa & Veronica Grembi, Judicial Independence and 
Party Politics in the Kelsenian Constitutional Courts: The Case of Portugal, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 381, 385 (2009).  
330 Hanretty, supra note 173, at 673-74; see TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL PORTUGAL, 
http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/en/home.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2018). See generally 












However, the Portugal court’s constitutional review power, while broad, is 
not exclusive; other courts exercise “decentralized” or diffuse judicial 
review of constitutional issues.331 The Portugal constitution provides for 
appointment of thirteen justices; ten are appointed by the legislative body, 
and the other three are chosen by the ten legislatively appointed justices.332 
Six justices must be selected from among judges of the nation’s other 
courts, with the other six selected from among “jurists.”333 Justices are 
appointed to nine-year, nonrenewable terms.334 While holding office, 
justices may not publicly engage in any political activity.335 
The constitution enumerates the court’s broad powers, which include 
both abstract and concrete constitutional review.336 Other powers may be 
assigned by statute.337 When considering abstract constitutional issues, all 
justices must participate in full session; otherwise smaller four-member 
panels known as “sections” may consider and decide matters before the 
court.338 Other organizational and procedural details are specified by the 




html/index.html#1 (last visited Sept. 5, 2018); Brief History of the Constitutional Court, TRIBUNAL 
CONSTITUCIONAL PORTUGAL, http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/en/tribunal-historiaen.html. 
331 Amaral-Garcia et al., supra note 329, at 385. “Decentralized constitutional review is 
exercised by regular [Portuguese] courts in concrete and specific cases. Decisions concerning the 
concrete unconstitutionality of laws in the context of a specific case are subject to appeal to the 
constitutional court. Those are the majority of the cases heard by the constitutional court.” Id. at 385 
n.16.  
332 See CONST. OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC art. 222(1); Amaral-Garcia et al., supra note 
329, at 386.   
333 CONST. OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC art. 222(2); see Law of the Constitutional Court, No. 
28/82, Nov. 15, 1982, art. 13, translated at Law of the Constitutional Court, TRIBUNAL 
CONSTITUCIONAL PORTUGAL, 
http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/content/files/en/lawoftheconstitutionalcourt.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 5, 1982) (eligibility requires either judicial experience or Portuguese legal education). 
334 CONST. OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC art. 222(3); Law of the Constitutional Court, No. 
28/82, art. 21(1), (2). Justices must retire at the end of the term in which they reach age seventy. Law 
of the Constitutional Court, No. 28/82, art. 21(3). They may not be removed from office during their 
terms except in cases of death or permanent physical incapacity, renunciation of office, acceptance of a 
position or commission of an act incompatible with official judicial duties, or dismissal based on a 
“disciplinary or criminal procedure.” Id.  arts. 22, 23(1). 
335 Id. art. 28. 
336 CONST. OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC art. 223(1); see id. arts. 277-83 (defining 
constitutional review authority). 
337 Id. art. 223(1)-(3). 
338 Id. art. 224(2); Law of the Constitutional Court, No. 28/82, arts. 40(1), 41. Sections are 
unspecialized. Id. art. 41(1). For decisions either in full session or sections, a majority of the members 
must participate to qualify as a quorum. Id. art. 42(1).   
339 Id. art. 224(1), (3); see Law of the Constitutional Court, No. 28/82. 










Decisions, whether in full session or by sections, are made by majority 
vote of the justices present.340 All participating justices have the right to 
“table their reasons for a dissenting vote.”341 As a practical matter, the 
court interprets this requirement to mean that if “one or more justices 
disagree with a majority decision, or when they agree with one, but on 
grounds other than those set out in the ruling, they can respectively attach 
a dissenting or a concurring opinion to the text of the decision, setting out 
and justifying their position.”342 Even if a justice declines to give reasons 
for not joining a majority decision, the court makes note of those justices 
who vote in the minority, known as voto vencido.343 The court’s governing 
statute provides for publication of all decisions, including dissenting 
opinions.344 
Romania Constitutional Court. Romania’s 1991 constitution 
established a separate constitutional court that began operations in 1992.345 
The court has nine judges, each appointed to a nine-year, nonrenewable 
term.346 As a general rule, matters are considered in full plenary session, 
and the court’s decisions are reached by majority vote.347 
In its early years, the court’s procedures followed the traditional 
models of Italy and France, and no separate opinions were permitted. Over 
time, however, they have gradually been introduced.348 Under current 
practice, consistent with the court’s organic statute,349 constitutional court 
judges may issue either dissenting or concurring opinions, and when filed 
they are published along with the court’s decision.350 The court’s 
published decisions list all participating judges, and dissenting opinions 
 
 
340 Law of the Constitutional Court, No. 28/82, art. 42(2).  
341 Id. art. 42(4); RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 27. 
342 CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF PORT., supra note 330, at 11. 
343 Hanretty, supra note 173, at 675; see RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 27 n.104; see also 
Nadelmann (1959), supra note 84, at 421 (“Portugal judges have had for a long time the right to add to 
their signature the word vencido, and this right is used regularly.”). 
344 Law of the Constitutional Court, No. 28/82, arts. 3, 115. 
345 Short History, CONST. CT. OF ROM., https://www.ccr.ro/en/Scurt-istoric (last visited Sept. 5, 
2018). 
346 Organisation of the Constitutional Court, CONST. CT. OF ROM., 
https://www.ccr.ro/Structura-Curtii-Constitutionale (last visited Sept. 5, 2018). 
347 Law No. 47/1992 on the Organisation and Operation of the Constitutional Court, OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF ROMANIA, Dec. 3 2010, pt. 1 no. 807, art. 6 [hereinafter Law No. 47/1992 on the 
Organisation and Operation of the Constitutional Court], translated at Law No. 47/1992, CONST. CT. 
OF ROM., https://www.ccr.ro/Legea-nr-471992 (last visited Sept. 5, 2018).  
348 RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 27. 
349 Law No. 47/1992 on the Organisation and Operation of the Constitutional Court art. 59(3) 
(“Judges who have given a negative vote may formulate a separate opinion. With regard to the 
reasoning of the decision, it is also possible to write a concurring opinion. The separate (dissenting) 
and, as the case may be, concurring opinion shall be published . . . together with the decision.”). 
350 RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 27 (citing Law No. 47/1992 on the Organisation and Operation 












are identified by the name of the author.351   
Slovakia Constitutional Court. The Slovakian Constitutional Court, 
founded in 1992,352 originally honed to the tradition of secret 
deliberations, and therefore judges had no authority to issue separate 
opinions.353 However, dissenting judges could register their disagreement 
in the voting record, which was kept sealed from public view.354  
As amended, the court’s organic act355 allows a judge who disagrees 
with the court’s decision to have the dissenting vote noted in the voting 
record and the opinion published.356 
Slovenia Constitutional Court. The court was initially established by 
the Slovenian constitution in 1991.357 The court’s nine judges358 generally 
reach decisions by majority vote.359   Slovenian constitutional court judges 
have a statutory right to issue separate decisions either dissenting or 
concurring in a judgment.360  
The court’s rules of procedure provide in detail for the contents of 
court decisions, the circulation and issuance of separate opinions, and the 
publication of decisions.361 Specifically, the decision must include the 
composition of the court that reached the decision,362 including “the results 
of the vote and the names of the Constitutional Court judges who voted 
 
 
351 See, e.g., Decision No. 63 of Feb. 8, 2017, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF ROMANIA, Feb. 27 2017, pt. 
1 no. 145, https://www.ccr.ro/files/products/Decision_63_2017_ENG.pdf. 
352 CONST. CT. OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC, https://www.ustavnysud.sk/en/o-ustavnom-sude-
slovenskej-republiky (last visited Sept. 5, 2018). 
353 RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 28. 
354 Id.   
355 Id. (citing Act on the Organisation of the Constitutional Court § 32). 
356 Id. 
357 CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA, Dec. 23, 1991, arts. 160-71, translated at Legal 
Basis: Constitution, REPUBLIC OF SLOVN. CONST. CT., http://www.us-rs.si/media/constitution.-.2016.-
.precisceni.dokument.dodan.70a.clen.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2018). 
358 Id. art. 163. Judges are nominated by the president and elected by the national assembly as 
provided by law. Id.  
359 Id. art. 162 (“unless otherwise provided for individual cases by the Constitution or law”). 
360 Constitutional Court Act, OFFICIAL GAZETTE RS, No. 64/07, art. 40(3), translated at Legal 
Basis: Statutes, REPUBLIC OF SLOVN. CONST. CT., http://www.us-
rs.si/media/constitutional.court.act.full.text.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2018) (“A judge who does not 
agree with a decision or with the reasoning of a decision may declare that he will write a separate 
opinion, which must be submitted within the period of time determined by the Rules of Procedure of 
the Constitutional Court.”). 
361 Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia, OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE RS, Nos. 86/07, 54/10 & 56/11, arts. 66-69, translated at Legal Basis: The Rules of 
Procedure, REPUBLIC OF SLOVN. CONST. CT., http://www.us-rs.si/media/the_rules.of.procedure_.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 5, 2018). 
362 Id. art. 66(1). 










against the decision, the names of the Constitutional Court judges who 
submitted separate opinions, and the names of the Constitutional Court 
judges who were disqualified from deciding.”363 
Spain Constitutional Court. Spain established its constitutional court in 
1975, following the general structure and organization of the German 
federal constitutional court.364 The court has twelve justices appointed to 
nine-year, nonrenewable terms.365 Four are nominated by a two-thirds vote 
of each chamber of the Spanish Parliament (for a total of eight), two by the 
General Council of the Judiciary (itself a politically appointed body), and 
two by the executive branch of government.366 The twelve justices are 
subdivided into two panels of six justices each for purposes of deciding 
the great majority of matters before the court.367 
Like the Portugal constitutional court, Spain’s court exercises both 
abstract and concrete constitutional review authority.368 The organic law 
governing the court’s organization expressly provides that individual 
justices may issue dissenting or concurring opinions, on issues that arose 
during the court’s deliberations in the case.369 Over the years, 
constitutional court justices have steadily increased the frequency of filing 
dissenting opinions.370 According to one scholar, however, “[t]he issue of 
dissenting opinions is considered to be an open wound within the 
Court.”371   
 
 
363 Id. art. 66(7). 
364 Grimm, supra note 11, at I-2; cf. Hanretty, supra note 173, at 673-74 (asserting that Spain’s 
court was established in 1978, but without citing authority).   
365 See Hanretty, supra note 173, at 674. 
366 See id.  
367 Ley Orgánica 2/1979, de 3 de octubre, del Tribunal Constitucional art. 7(1) (B.O.E. 1979, 
239) [hereinafter Organic Law 2/1979 on the Constitutional Court], translated at The Court: 
Legislation, CONST. CT. OF SPAIN, 
https://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/tribunal/normativa/Normativa/LOTC-en.pdf (last visited Sept. 
4, 2018); Enrique Guillen Lopez, Judicial Review in Spain: The Constitutional Court, 41 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 529, 538 (2008).   
368 Hanretty, supra note 173, at 674.  
369 Id. at 675; see Organic Law 2/1979 on the Constitutional Court art. 90(2). 
The President and the Judges of the Court may express their disagreement in the form of a 
dissenting opinion, in the case it was maintained in the course of the deliberations, concerning 
either the judgement or its grounds. Dissenting opinions shall be included in the ruling and, in 
the case of judgements, reasoned orders . . . or declarations, shall be published with them . . . . 
Id. The court’s Rules of Organization and Personnel no doubt provide more details, but they are not 
available in English. See Reglamento de Organización y Personal del Tribunal Constitucional (B.O.E. 
1990, 185), available at The Court: Legislation, CONST. CT. OF SPAIN, 
http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/tribunal/normativa/Normativa/ROPTC-consol.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2018).  
370 RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 24 & n.91. 
371 Lopez, supra note 367, at 539. Lopez explains,   
The argument for their inclusion in final judgments was that these dissenting votes could 












Notably, the website of Spain’s Constitutional Court specifically 
includes a section titled “Norms on transparency.”372 Among them is a 
Spanish statute, enacted in 2013, that generally provides for transparency 
in government information.373 In addition, the website posts copies of the 
court’s judgments in chronological order.374 They include the full text of 
separate opinions (“votos particular”) along with the names of each 
judicial author.375 
Table 1A provides relevant comparative information for selected 




coherence, internal consistency, and doctrinal evolution. The practice has shown that such 
hope was not groundless, but it is important to point out that it has created disputes within the 
Constitutional Court. 
Id. at 539-40 (internal footnote omitted). 
372 Norms on Transparency, CONST. CT. OF SPAIN, 
https://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/transparencia/Paginas/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 4, 
2018).  
373 Ley 19/2013, de 9 de diciembre, de transparencia, acceso a la información pública y buen 
gobierno (B.O.E. 2013, 295), translated at Law 19/2013 Dated December 9th, on Transaparency, 
Access to Public Information, and Good Governance, CONST. CT. OF SPAIN, 
http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/transparencia/normativa/Documents/Transparencia-
Ley%2019-2013-original%20ingl%C3%A9s.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2018).  
374 Rendered Judgements, CONST. CT. OF SPAIN, 
https://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/transparencia/informacion-
publica/Paginas/03_Resoluciones%20dictadas.aspx (last visited Sept. 4, 2018); see also Cronological 
[sic] List of Judgments, CONST. CT. OF SPAIN, 
https://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/jurisprudencia/Paginas/Sentencias.aspx (last visited  
Sept. 4, 2018).     
375 See id.; see also Hanretty, supra note 173, at 675 (defining the Spanish term voto particular).  










TABLE 1A – TRANSPARENCY NORMS 


































































































































































































































































Hungary 1990 Y Y Y Y Y 
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1982 Y Y Unclear Unclear Y 









1992 Y Y Y Y Y 
Slovenia 
 
1991 Y Y Y Y Y 
Spain 1975 Y Y Y Y Y 
2. National Cassation Courts 
As briefly explained above, most countries on the European continent 












their predecessor appellate courts, which traditionally resolved cases 
raising no constitutional questions.376 Many of these pre-existing courts 
continue to reflect the civil law tradition of secrecy in judicial 
deliberations.377 Therefore, judges on several cassation courts lack 
authority to issue separate opinions,378 on the theory that doing so would 
compromise the longstanding principle of secret deliberations. However, 
as the practice of issuing separate opinions has become more and more 
common among judges of constitutional courts, some nations have 
extended that option to judges on ordinary courts as well.379 
A few European nations have never recognized the principle of judicial 
review of legislation against constitutional challenges.380 The Netherlands 
is an important example.381 Its constitution expressly forbids its courts 
from engaging in constitutional judicial review.382 In effect, the 
jurisdiction of the Netherlands Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) is 
constitutionally limited to cassation matters, although parliament may 
assign the court other duties by statute.383 Given its relatively limited 
authority, the court has more in common with courts of cassation than with 
national supreme courts of diffuse jurisdiction. For that reason, the 
Netherlands high court is included in this group.    
Spain has a unique heritage that warrants special mention. Spain’s 
longstanding tradition of judicial dissent traces its history to the late 
fifteenth century, when an ordinance expressly permitted judges to write 
 
 
376 See supra text accompanying notes 102-03. 
377 See KELEMEN, supra note 74, at 78-80 (explaining the traditional “secrecy rule” on the 
European continent and identifying several historical exceptions); see also Katalin Kelemen, The Road 
from Common Law to East-Central Europe: The Case of the Dissenting Opinion, in 
LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY IN THE POST-NATIONAL AGE 118, 123 (P. Cserne & M. Könczöl eds., 
2011) (suggesting that the principle of secrecy in the civil law tradition is somewhat of a myth). 
378 KELEMEN, supra note 74, at 83 (“The majority of ordinary [court] judges are not allowed to 
disclose their disagreement.”). 
379 Id. at 79. 
380 RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 19 & n.60. 
381 Id. 
382 Gw. [Constitution] art. 120 (Neth.) (“The constitutionality of Acts of Parliament and treaties 
shall not be reviewed by the courts.”), translated in MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR & KINGDOM 
RELATIONS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS 2008, 
https://www.government.nl/binaries/government/documents/regulations/2012/10/18/the-constitution-
of-the-kingdom-of-the-netherlands-2008/the-constitution-of-the-kingdom-of-the-netherlands-2008.pdf. 
383 See id. art. 118(2) (“In the cases and within the limits laid down by Act of Parliament, the 
Supreme Court shall be responsible for annulling court judgments which infringe the law 
(cassation).”); id. art. 118(3) (“Additional duties may be assigned to the Supreme Court by Act of 
Parliament.”). 










separate opinions.384 However, dissenting opinions were not published 
with the court’s judgment but instead were recorded in a separate book.385 
If appealed, any dissenting opinion in the case was accessible only to the 
parties and to the appeals court.386 These dissenting opinions were said to 
have been “reserved for appeal” and were known as votos reservados.387 
The practice was codified in Spanish law in the early 1880s.388   
Since 1985, judges of Spain’s ordinary high court, as well as judges of 
the constitutional court, have been authorized by law to issue dissenting 
opinions, which are published together with the courts’ judgments.389 
These separate judicial opinions, known as votos particulares, have 
replaced votos reservados.390 





384 KELEMEN, supra note 74, at 80. 
385 Id. 
386 Id.  
387 Id. at 81. 
388 Id. at 81 & n.15. 
389 Id. at 81 (citation omitted). 
390 Id.  
391 Unless otherwise specified, the data in Table IB are drawn from KELEMEN, supra note 74; 
RAFFAELLI, supra note 16; Alder, supra note 38; Kelemen, supra note 5; Nadelmann (1959), supra 












TABLE 1B – TRANSPARENCY NORMS 
Selected National Cassation Courts 
       
       Court 
Dissents or Concurrences 
Permitted 























392 The Independence of the Judiciary, SUP. CT. OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA, 
http://www.vsrh.hr/EasyWeb.asp?pcpid=765 (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (explaining that all members 
of each chamber have the right to issue dissenting opinions, including the president of the chamber). 
393 In the Czech Republic, only judges of ordinary administrative courts may issue separate 
opinions. KELEMEN, supra note 74, at 82. 






















3. National Supreme Courts - Diffuse Jurisdiction 
Many nations’ supreme courts exercise general jurisdiction over all 
issues, much like the United States Supreme Court. The following courts 
illustrate this category. In brief, apex courts in common law jurisdictions 
(or those nations that were formerly part of the British Commonwealth) 
typically permit judges to issue separate opinions.394 On the other hand, 
collegial courts in nations following the civil law tradition tend to 
subscribe to the principle of maintaining the secrecy of judicial 
deliberations. Under that principle, the opinion of the multi-member court 
is anonymous, and the disclosure of dissenting viewpoints is viewed as a 
threat to institutional consensus.395   
While the above paragraph describes the general trend, practices do 
vary, and the extent to which formal norms govern opinion-issuing 
practices varies as well. The list of nations represented here is abbreviated 
in the interest of space. However, the variations reflected by these selected 
apex courts underscore the variety of relevant norms, traditions, and values 
around the world with respect to issuing judicial opinions.   
Australia. For the last century, the High Court of Australia has 
followed a long tradition of issuing dissenting opinions.396 As early as 
1904, judges of the High Court published separate opinions, even when 
the decision itself was unanimous.397 By the mid-1950s, the High Court 
judges decided virtually all major cases by issuing seriatim opinions.398 
Canada. Canadian courts can and do issue dissenting opinions, which 
have been influential in developing the law.399 Canadian Supreme Court 
justices recognize that “dissenting opinions have the potential to 
destabilize judicial institutions if judges completely ignore certain 
 
 
394 Jill Cottrell & Yash Ghai, Concurring and Dissenting in the Hong Kong Court of Final 
Appeal, in HONG KONG’S COURT OF FINAL APPEAL:  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW IN CHINA’S 
HONG KONG 283, 287 (Simon N. M. Young & Yash Ghai eds., 2013) (“Multiple judgments are the 
norm in most common law jurisdictions . . . .”); Laffranque, supra note 36, at 165.  
395 E.g., Laffranque, supra note 36, at 164. 
396 Lynch, supra note 55, at 767 (referring to “[t]he tradition of individual expression found in 
Australian courts [as] an unquestioned and largely unexamined part of [Australia’s] inheritance from 
the English legal system”); McWhinney, supra note 84, at 602-04. 
397 McWhinney, supra note 84, at 602-03. 
398 Id. at 603-04; e.g., Aust. Communist Party v. Commonwealth, 83 C.L.R. 1 (1951).  
399 See L’Heureux-Dube, supra note 1, at 499-504 (reviewing the Canadian tradition of 
dissenting opinions). Notably, dissenting opinions issued by the Canada Supreme Court have been 
influential in shaping the law of developing nations. See id. at 512 (noting that dissents have been cited 
by majority decisions of the Constitutional Court of South Africa).   










necessary constraints . . . designed to ensure the efficient and effective 
functioning of the courts.”400 Nevertheless, they issue separate opinions in 
approximately thirty percent of the court’s cases.401  
In the mid-1950s, serious consideration was given to a proposal under 
which the Canadian Supreme Court would issue a single unanimous 
opinion, consistent with the practice at the time of the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council.402 The proposal apparently went nowhere.   
China. Multi-member courts in China do not publish separate opinions 
authored by individual judges.403   
Denmark. The Denmark Supreme Court has noted dissenting votes in 
the judgment since 1937.404  Since 1958, the names of dissenting opinions 
have been included.405 
Estonia. Estonia joined the European Union on May 1, 2004. Under the 
Estonia Constitution, the Supreme Court has discretionary review over all 
appeals, including constitutional issues.406 The court has nineteen 
members organized into four chambers: Civil, Criminal, Administrative 
Law, and Constitutional Review.407   
Although Estonia generally follows the legal traditions of continental 
Europe, judges may issue separate dissenting opinions, which are 
published along with the court’s judgments.408 Estonian judges view the 
right to issue a dissenting opinion expressing the judge’s own reasoning as 
equivalent to the constitutionally protected freedom of conscience.409  
 
 
400 Id. at 504. 
401 See id. at 516 (“[O]ver the past ten years, approximately 70 per cent of the Supreme Court of 
Canada's judgments have been unanimous.”).  
402 See McWhinney, supra note 84, at 595-96 (assessing the merits of the proposal from a 
comparative perspective); see also Andrew Lynch, Is Judicial Dissent Constitutionally Protected?, 4 
MACQUARIE L.J. 81, 87 (2004) (citing Maxwell Bruce, The 1953 Mid-Winter Meeting of Council,  31 
CANADIAN B. REV. 178, 182 (1953)).  
403  Cottrell & Ghai, supra note 394, at 288. See generally Yulin Fu, The Chinese Supreme 
People’s Court in Transition, in SUPREME COURTS IN TRANSITION IN CHINA AND THE WEST: 
ADJUDICATION AT THE SERVICE OF PUBLIC GOALS 13 (Cornelus Hendrik (Remco) van Rhee & Yulin 
Fu eds., 2017).  
404 Nadelmann (1959), supra note 84, at 418. 
405 Id. 
406 THE SUPREME COURT OF ESTONIA 5-7 (2013), 
https://issuu.com/riigikohus/docs/riigikohus_brozh_eng_veeb. 
407 Id. at 12-13. 
408 Laffranque, supra note 110, at 16; see also Chris Hanretty, Judicial Disagreement Need Not 
Be Political: Dissent on the Estonian Supreme Court, 67 J. EUR.-ASIA STUD. 970 (2015), 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09668136.2015.1054260?needAccess=true (explaining 
that “judges on the [Estonian Supreme C]ourt enjoy high de jure independence, dissent frequently, and 
are integrated in the normal judicial hierarchy”; dissenting opinions reflect “disagreement about the 
proper scope of constitutional redress”). Dissenting opinions were issued by Estonian judges before 
World War II, and even during Soviet control. Laffranque, supra note 110, at 15.  
409 Laffranque, supra note 36, at 169; see CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA, June 28, 1992, 












Finland. Like its fellow Scandinavian nations, Finnish judges may 
issue dissenting opinions and their reasons.410 
Greece. Greece is unique in that its constitution expressly requires the 
publication of dissenting opinions, subject to statutes governing their 
publication.411 Applicable statutes, however, provide that dissents are 
issued anonymously, without identifying the author by name.412 
India. A former Commonwealth nation, India abandoned appeals to the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 1949 and adopted its own 
constitution in 1950.413 Soon after, the India Supreme Court issued an 
opinion addressing how it would interpret the new constitution. While the 
majority opinion delineated a positivist approach, a strong dissent argued 
in favor of a purposive, policy-based approach.414 The court has 
consistently followed the practice of issuing dissenting and concurring 
opinions.415   
Ireland. The Republic of Ireland, which shares a common law tradition 
with the rest of Great Britain, seceded from the United Kingdom in 1923. 
Today it is part of the European Union.  Ireland’s Supreme Court has 
general jurisdiction, including two kinds of constitutional review 
authority. The first is abstract review of pending legislation upon referral 
by the President. If the President refers legislation to the Court for 
constitutional review, the Court must issue a decision within sixty days.   
The Ireland Constitution expressly prohibits the Supreme Court from 
publishing separate opinions when the President requests an opinion on 
the constitutional validity of a pending bill.416   
 
 
operations of the Estonian apex court, see Julia Laffranque, The Judicial System of Estonia and 
European Union Law, 33 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 224, 227-30 (2005), 
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=ijli. 
410 KELEMEN, supra note 74, at 4 (referring to “[t]he Nordic legal tradition of publishing 
dissent”; explaining that Finnish and Scandinavian courts qualify as Nordic courts with “a long history 
of publication of judicial dissent”); Nadelmann (1959), supra note 84, at 418. 
411 RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 23-24; Cottrell & Ghai, supra note 394, at 288 (citing 1975 
SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 93(2) (Greece)). The relevant constitutional provision 
provides,   
Every court judgment must be specifically and thoroughly reasoned and must be pronounced in a 
public sitting. Publication of the dissenting opinion shall be compulsory. Law shall specify matters 
concerning the entry of any dissenting opinion into the minutes as well as the conditions and 
prerequisites for the publicity thereof.  
SYN. art. 93, ¶ 3 (emphasis added). 
412 RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 23-24 (citing Greece Law no. 184/1975, art. 35(1)).  
413 McWhinney, supra note 84, at 608. 
414 Id. at 608-09; see Gopalan v. State of Madras, 13 SUP. CT.  J. 174 (1950).  
415 See McWhinney, supra note 84, at 609. 
416 See RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 23 (citing Constitution of Ireland 1937 arts. 26, 34); Alder, 










Japan. Until 1947, Japan courts did not recognize dissenting or 
concurring opinions.417 Since then, judges of the Japan Supreme Court 
have regularly exercised their authority to issue separate opinions.418 The 
statute governing court organization provides that for any Supreme Court 
decision rendered in written form, each judge is required to express an 
opinion.419 
New Zealand. The Supreme Court considers cases in panels of five 
justices. The Supreme Court Act of 2003 requires decisions to be rendered 
by a majority vote of the panel.420 The act expressly requires only that 
decisions must be reached by majority vote.421 While no express authority 
 
 
supra note 38, at 244, 245 (citing Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 34(5)). Article 26(2)(2) of the 
Constitution pertains to any legislation referred by the President to the Supreme Court to determine 
whether all or any part is “repugnant” to the Constitution. It provides,  
The decision of the majority of the judges of the Supreme Court shall, for the purposes of this 
Article, be the decision of the Court and shall be pronounced by such one of those judges as 
the Court shall direct, and no other opinion, whether assenting or dissenting, shall be 
pronounced nor shall the existence of any such other opinion be disclosed.   
Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 26(2)(2) (as amended Feb. 2015). The Supreme Court of Ireland has 
interpreted this constitutional provision to apply only to statutes enacted after the original Ireland 
Constitution took effect in 1937, and not to older statutes. RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 23 n.82 (citing 
A.K. Koekkoek, Ireland, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF 15 EU MEMBER STATES 417, 465 (L. Prakke & 
C. Kortmann eds., 2004)).  For a historical perspective on Ireland’s varied dissenting practices, see 
McWhinney, supra note 84, at 607-08 (describing Ireland Supreme Court’s early practice of issuing a 
single opinion in constitutional cases with no recorded dissents, with one significant exception).  
Before a constitutional referendum took effect in late 2013, the Ireland Constitution also expressly 
prohibited dissenting opinions in ordinary appeals raising constitutional issues. See Constitution of 
Ireland 1937 art. 34(4)(5) (as amended Aug. 15, 2012 and rescinded 2013).  
The decision of the Supreme Court on a question as to the validity of a law having regard to 
the provisions of this Constitution shall be pronounced by such one of the judges of that 
Court as that Court shall direct, and no other opinion on such question, whether assenting or 
dissenting, shall be pronounced, nor shall the existence of any such other opinion be 
disclosed. 
Id. art. 34(4)(5); see Cottrell & Ghai, supra note 394, at 287 & n.34. See generally Nóra Ní Loinsigh, 
Judicial Dissent in Ireland: Theory, Practice and the Constraints of the Single Opinion Rule, 51 IRISH 
JURIST 123, 133-48 (2014) (discussing the influence of the former rule under Article 34 and predicting 
the impact of the surviving rule under Article 26). 
417 Kotaro Tanaka, Dissenting and Concurring Opinions (1963) (unpublished paper from Int’l 
Seminar on Const. Rev., N.Y.U. Sch. of L. (Nov. 28-Dec. 2, 1960)) (available on HeinOnline) (citing 
Japanese Court Organization Law of 1890). For a brief but recent overview of the Japanese court 
system and its historical development as an amalgam of civil law and common law practices, see 
Richard M. Lorenzo, The Judicial System of Japan, 6 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 294 (2015).  
418 Tanaka, supra note 417; see Cottrell & Ghai, supra note 394, at 288 (citing HIROSHI ITOH, 
THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES 93 (1989)); Nadelmann (1959), supra 
note 84, at 422.    
419 Nadelmann (1959), supra note 84, at 422 (citing Japan Law of 1947 on Court Organization); 
see Court Act, Act No. 59 of 1947, art. 11, http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/CACT.pdf 
(Japan) (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (“The opinion of each Justice shall be expressed in written 
judgment.”). 
420 Shiels, supra note 74, at 14 (citing Supreme Court Act 2003, § 31). 












supports the practice, New Zealand Supreme Court justices regularly issue 
separate written opinions, all of which are published.422 
Nigeria. The Nigerian Constitution provides that each appellate court 
justice “’shall express and deliver [an individual] opinion in writing or 
may state in writing that he adopts the opinion of any other justice who 
delivers a written opinion.’”423 Thus “composite” judgments are 
prohibited.424  
Norway. Norway was the first nation to develop the concept of 
constitutional review after the United States Supreme Court did so in 
1803.425 The Norway Supreme Court has a long tradition of recognizing 
judges’ authority to issue separate opinions,426 following the English 
practice.427  
Philippines. The Philippine Republic enacted an express provision in 
its Judiciary Act permitting judges to publish dissenting opinions upon 
request.428 
South Africa. The South Africa High Court considers both 
constitutional issues and other kinds of issues on appeal. Today, consistent 
with a long history as a former member of the British Commonwealth, the 
court’s judges issue separate opinions.429  
Sweden. The Sweden Supreme Court follows the practice of Norway, 
allowing judges to issue separate opinions. 430 
Switzerland. The Federal Supreme Judicial Court allows judges to issue 
dissenting opinions, which are published along with the opinion of the 
 
 
422 Id. at 27 (reporting that forty-four percent of the 209 decisions rendered between 2004 and 
2013 included separate opinions, with the balance issued unanimously). 
423 Cottrell & Ghai, supra note 394, at 287-88 (quoting NIGERIA CONST. art. 294(2)); see 
CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), art. 294(2). 
424 Cottrell & Ghai, supra note 394, at 287-88.  
425 Bentsen, supra note 3, at 195. According to one scholar, dissenting opinions were introduced 
in Norway as early as 1864. Laffranque, supra note 36, at 165. However, the long tradition of judicial 
review was not codified until 2015, when the Norway Constitution was amended. Bentsen, supra note 
3, at 195 (citing CONST. OF THE KINGDOM OF NORWAY, May 17, 1814, § 89 (“In cases brought before 
the Courts, the Courts have the power and the duty to review whether Laws and other decisions made 
by the authorities of the State are contrary to the Constitution.”)).   
426 Bentsen, supra note 3, at 190 (noting that the Norway Supreme Court’s dissent rate 
increased dramatically from 1990 (eight percent) to 1999 (twenty-nine percent); id. at 196 (analyzing 
the high court’s dissenting rates over a three-decade timeframe). 
427 Cottrell & Ghai, supra note 394, at 288. 
428 Nadelmann (1959), supra note 84, at 422 (citing The Judiciary Act of 1948, Rep. Act No. 
296, § 21 (1956) (Phil.)). 
429 WITTIG, supra note 74, at 61; see McWhinney, supra note 84, at 605-07. 
430 Laffranque, supra note 36, at 165.  










court.431 However, Swiss judges typically do not exercise the authority to 
issue separate opinions.432 At one time, dissenting opinions could be 
delivered orally, but not in writing; for that reason, dissents were not 
recorded with published judgments.433 
United Kingdom Supreme Court. Established as an independent 
institution in 2009, the Court allows judges to issue separate opinions. The 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) remains in existence, 
with jurisdiction largely limited to appeals from British Colonies and 
Commonwealth countries outside the United Kingdom.434 Justices of the 
Supreme Court also serve as members of the JCPC.   
Historically, the JCPC issued a single opinion in the form of advice to 
the King, consistent with the principle once known as Unity of 
Judgment.435 But from 1878 until 1966, the Judicial Committee was 
expressly denied authority to issue dissenting opinions.436 Beginning in 
1966, the Committee issued an Order-in-Council allowing dissenting 
 
 
431 Alder, supra note 38, at 237. 
432 Andreas Lienhard, et al., The Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland: Judicial Balancing of 
Federalism Without Judicial Review, in COURTS IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES: FEDERALISTS OR 
UNITARISTS? 404, 415(Nicholas Aroney & John Kincaid eds., 2017) (“The formal written judgments 
of the courts usually do not include dissenting opinions . . . .”). However, some academics favor the 
practice of issuing dissenting opinions, at least by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court. Id. at 415 n.46.   
433 Laffranque, supra note 36, at 165; Nadelmann (1959), supra note 84, at 416 (explaining that 
“the old Germanic tradition of deliberating and voting in public has been preserved in various Swiss 
Cantons”) (citing numerous sources in the German language); Nadelmann (1964), supra note 84, at 
270 (noting that publication of dissents is allowed in “some parts of Switzerland”).   
434 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
435 B.A. WORTLEY, JURISPRUDENCE 74 (1967); McWhinney, supra note 84, at 599; Charlotte 
Smith, An Introduction to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, PRIVY COUNCIL PAPERS, 
http://privycouncilpapers.exeter.ac.uk/the-judicial-committee/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2018); see supra 
notes 93-94 and accompanying text. The rationale was that the Privy Council judges merely advised 
the Crown on the outcome of an appeal, and therefore the advice (and the King’s order) required 
unanimity.  WORTLEY, supra, at 74; McWhinney, supra note 84, at 599-601.  
The Judicial Committee’s settled practice was that a single judgment was delivered by the 
panel, and that its deliberations were guarded by the privy councillor’s oath of secrecy. No 
councillor was permitted to publish his dissent, or to make known any information relating to 
the opinions of individual councillors. Rules to this effect were set out in an Order of Council 
dating from 26 February 1627, the effect of which was stated to have been preserved by . . . 
the Judicial Committee Act 1833. 
Charlotte Smith, Ridsdale v Clifton: Representations of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 
Ecclesiastical Appeals, 19 KING’S L.J. 551, 569 (2008) (adding that the Committee underscored the 
unity norm in a 1878 order clarifying that the privy councillor's oath of secrecy applied to councillors 
sitting in a judicial capacity); see also Allen Mendenhall, The Corrective Careers of Concurrences and 
Dissents, 8 FAULKNER L. REV. 49, 53 (2016) (explaining rationale for Privy Council’s paramount 
“appearance of unanimity”).   
436 P.A. HOWELL, THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL 1833-1876: ITS ORIGINS, 
STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT 201 & n.398 (2008) (citing PC 2/289); JUDICIAL COMM. OF THE 
PRIVY COUNCIL, ORDER IN COUNCIL (1878) (prohibiting disclosure of any difference of opinion 












members to jointly issue a single opinion expressing their views.437 Its 
current practice recognizes judicial authority to issue both concurring and 
dissenting opinions in cases within its relatively narrow jurisdiction.438 
Table 2 provides comparative information for selected national 
supreme courts with jurisdiction to consider both constitutional and other 




437 On March 4, 1966, the JCPC issued a statutory instrument that expressly permitted its judges 
to issue a single dissenting opinion. HOWELL, supra note 436, at 201 n.398; see DAVID B. SWINFEN, 
IMPERIAL APPEAL: THE DEBATE ON THE APPEAL TO THE PRIVACY COUNCIL 1833-1986, at 25 n.57 
(1987) (citing STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS pt. 1, at 1100 (1966)); id. at 222 (citing Judicial Committee 
(Dissenting Opinions) Order in Council (March 4, 1966)); WORTLEY, supra note 435, at 74 n.3 (citing 
Judicial Committee (Dissenting Opinions) Order of 4 March 1966); see supra note 93 and 
accompanying text. According to one English jurist, “[i]t was from Australia that real agitation 
emerged in relation to the single judgment issue, and the pressure eventually became too much.” Lord 
Neuberger of Abbotsbury, supra note 93, at 41; see also Cottrell & Ghai, supra note 394, at 286 
(“Australian judges who sat on the [Judicial Committee of the Privy Council] chafed against [the 
single-judgment rule]”).  
438 Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, supra note 93, at 41; see Thomas Roe, Dissenting 
Judgments 8 (June 2, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.3harecourt.com/assets/asset-
store/file/Thomas%20Roe%20dissenting%20judgments.pdf. 










TABLE 2 – TRANSPARENCY NORMS 
Selected National Supreme Courts with Diffuse (General) Jurisdiction 
Court Dissents or Concurrences 
Permitted  
Y or N 
Dissents or Concurrences 
Mandated 
Y or N 
Australia Y N 
Canada Y N 
China N N 
Denmark Y N 
Estonia Y N 
Finland Y N 
Greece Y Y 
If issued, publication is 
constitutionally mandated, but 
they are anonymous by statute 
India Y N 
Ireland Y 
Except some constitutional 
matters, in which separate 
opinions are prohibited 
N 
 
Japan Y N 
New Zealand Y N 
Nigeria Mandatory Y 
Each justice is constitutionally 
required to issue separate 
written opinions 
Norway Y N 
Phillippines Y N 
South Africa Y N 
Sweden Y N 
















  4. Supranational and International Tribunals.    
Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU). Unlike other international 
courts, judges of the European Court of Justice do not issue dissenting 
opinions.439 Neither the court’s statute nor its rules of procedure expressly 
address the issue.440 However, in practice the court has interpreted the 
statutory requirement of secret deliberations441 to preclude any public 
record reflecting individual judges’ votes. The court’s rules of procedure 
require every judge who participated in deliberations to sign the 
judgment.442 
In 2012, the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs 
requested a study of dissenting practices in national courts of member 
states, in part in response to calls from numerous scholars urging the court 
to reconsider its longstanding practice of maintaining “secrecy of 
individual opinions.”443 The study, published in 2012, made no 
recommendations on whether the court should alter its longstanding 
practice of issuing unanimous opinions without dissent.444 In practice, the 
court’s judges continue to speak with one voice in issuing judgments.445  
 
 
439 Laffranque, supra note 110, at 16. As Laffranque explains, the six founding member nations 
of the European Union all followed the continental tradition at the time of establishing the Court’s 
predecessor. Id. (listing the six founding nations). One scholar has gone so far as to suggest that the 
Court’s judges “do not want” the authority to issue dissenting opinions. Grimm, supra note 11, at I-2.  
440 See Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union 2010 O.J. (C 83); Rules of 
Procedure of the Court of Justice 2012 O.J. (L 265) art. 87.   
441 See Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union 2010 O.J. (C 83) art. 35 (“The
deliberations of the Court of Justice shall be and shall remain secret.”). The statute requires judgments 
to list the names of judges who participated in deliberations, but requires only the court’s president and 
registrar to sign each judgment. Id. arts. 36, 37. The rules of procedure, however, require each judge 
who took part in deliberations to sign the judgment, which implies that a participating judge does not 
have the option to file a separate opinion. See Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 2012 O.J. (L 
265) art. 88(2). 
442 Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 2012 O.J. (L 265) art. 88(2).  
443 RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 6, 39 (summarizing scholarly commentary); id. at 33 (“The 
recent scholarly discussion over the style of the CJEU’s judgments has added new fuel to the pre-
existing debate over individual opinions. While many scholars favour . . . the introduction of separate 
opinions, most voices against it come from the CJEU judges and former judges . . . , who fear mainly 
for the Court’s collegiality and authority.”); id. at 34-38; HENRY G. SHERMERS & DENIS F. 
WAELBROEK, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION § 1479 (6th ed. 2001). 
444 RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 39. 
445 “Decisions of the Court of Justice are taken by majority and no record is made public of any 
dissenting opinions.” Court of Justice: Presentation, CT. OF JUST. OF THE EUR. UNION, 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7024/en/#procedures (last visited Nov. 3, 2018). Full opinions 
issued by the court since 2012 are available online in multiple language translations. Case-law, CT. OF 
JUST. OF THE EUR. UNION, https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/P_106320?rec=RG&jur=C (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2018).  










International Court of Justice (ICJ) (known as “The Hague”). ICJ 
judges have authority to issue either concurring or dissenting opinions.446 
The Court’s organic statute447 sets out the rule concisely: “If the judgment 
does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the judges, 
any judge shall be entitled to deliver a separate opinion.”448 While the 
statute itself does not address the issue, the rule has been interpreted 
permissively so as not to obligate a judge who disagrees with the majority 
to file either a concurring or a dissenting opinion.449 A judge who does so 
is identified by name, but a judge who elects not to file a separate opinion 
need not be identified as disagreeing with the judgment or its rationale.450  
Deliberations, however, occur in private and must “remain secret.”451 
The court’s statute also provides that decisions are to be made by majority 
vote, and the court’s president or other presiding panel member casts the 
deciding vote in the event of a tie.452 Judgments must explain the reasons 
for the court’s decision (presumably in writing).453 Although the judgment 
must bear the names of all participating judges,454 only the president and 
the registrar must sign it, and the names of dissenting judges need not be 
recorded if they elect not to add a dissenting opinion.455  
The ICJ’s Rules of Court, as amended most recently in 2005, provide 
more details.456 The judgment must contain specific information, including 
the names of all judges who participated in the decision, and the number 
and the names of the judges who made up the majority.457 The current rule 
 
 
446 SHERMERS & WAELBROEK, supra note 443, § 1478, at 736; see Charter of the United 
Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 [the Charter], 
1055 [ICJ Statute], T.S. No. 993 [I.C.J. Statute at 25], art. 57 [hereinafter Statute of the International 
Court of Justice].   
447 Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 446. 
448 Id. art. 57. “Separate opinion” includes concurring opinions as well as dissents. Anand, 
supra note 97, at 799-800 & n.61.   
449 Anand, supra note 97, at 800.   
450 See id. (criticizing the rule, arguing that “publicity and openness have been recognized as 
essential for the authority and prestige of the Court and its decisions,” and quoting Jeremy Bentham’s 
observation, “’It is through publicity alone that justice becomes the mother of security.’” (citing 
Nadelmann (1959), supra note 84, at 430)).  
451 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 54(3).  
452 Id. art. 55.  
453 Id. art 56(1). 
454 Id. art. 56(2). 
455 The fascinating historical account explaining how the court’s rules evolved, including the 
strong opposition to the rule allowing separate opinions by some member states, has been documented 
in Anand, supra note 97. For example, Anand explained that in the early twentieth century, silent 
acquiescence and “secret dissents” became matters of some controversy that led to suggested 
amendments to Article 57. Anand, supra note 97, at 797. 
456 Rules of Court, art. 95 (Apr. 14, 1978), http://www.icj-cij.org/en/rules (last visited Aug. 31, 
2018). 












makes clear that a judge is permitted, but not required, to attach a separate 
concurring or dissenting opinion, and “a judge who wishes to record his 
concurrence or dissent without stating his reasons may do so in the form of 
a declaration.”458 It thus appears that the court’s current rules, like the 
statute, allow a judge to “silently acquiesce,” but doing so means that the 
judge is identified publicly by name as having voted with the majority.459 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The European Convention 
on Human Rights expressly permits any judge of the court to “deliver” a 
separate concurring or dissenting opinion if all or part of the judgment 
does not represent the judges’ unanimous views.460   
Decisions of the court must include reasons and a statement whether 
the judgment was unanimous or rendered by a majority.461 Other rules 
enumerate the contents of each written judgment, consistent with the 
relevant articles of the Convention.462 Each judgment must identify by 
name judges who were members of the panel deciding the case,463 as well 
as the number (but not the names) of judges making up the majority.464 In 
addition, the judgment must include, for any judge who participated in 
considering the case, a separate opinion, whether concurring or dissenting 
in the judgment.465 A judge may instead elect to make “a bare statement of 
dissent.”466 No judge has a duty to issue a separate opinion, so a judge may 
“silently acquiesce” in the judgment.467 But if a judge’s rationale differs 
from the majority decision, a bare statement of concurrence is not 
expressly permitted by the court’s rules.468  As a general rule, judges who 
 
 
458 Id. art. 95(2). 
459 The same rules apply to advisory opinions. Id. art. 107. 
460 Lech Garlicki, Note on Dissent in the European Court of Human Rights, in GLOBAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: JUDICIAL DISSENT, supra note 11, at I-8; Grimm, supra note 11, at I-2.    
461 European Court of Human Rights, Rules of Court, R. 56(1) (Aug. 1, 2018), 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf. Decisions are published in the official 
reporter in either English or French, both considered “official” languages of the Court. Id. R. 57, 78. 
But the court’s registrar has discretion to publish the decisions “in an appropriate form.” Id. R. 78. The 
registrar publishes “selected judgments and decisions” as well as any other document that the court’s 
president “considers it useful to publish.” Id.   
462 See European Convention on Human Rights arts. 28, 42, 44. 
463 European Court of Human Rights, Rules of Court  R. 74(1)(a).  
464 Id. R. 74(1)(k). 
465 Id. R. 74(2). 
466 Id. 
467 Garlicki, supra note 460, at I-8. 
468 See European Court of Human Rights, Rules of Court  R. 74(2) (“Any judge who has taken 
part in the consideration of the case by a Chamber or by the Grand Chamber shall be entitled to annex 
to the judgment either a separate opinion, concurring with or dissenting from that judgment, or a bare 
statement of dissent.”).   










issue separate opinions, whether dissenting or concurring, articulate the 
reasons for disagreeing with the judgment or the different reasoning that 
led a concurring judge to reach the same conclusion.469 
The judgment includes the number of votes in favor of each point 
addressed in the dispositive judgment, but the vote tallies are 
anonymous.470 Announcing the number of votes for and against each 
dispositive point in the judgment offers significant transparency into the 
panel’s overall rationale, but nevertheless allows a judge to record an 
anonymous vote on subparts of the judgment with which the judge does 
not agree while protecting the judicial privilege of agreeing publicly with 
the judgment as a whole.  
A current member of the court has reported that separate opinions are 
quite common, particularly when the seventeen-member Grand Chamber 
issues judgments.471 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The court’s statute governs its 
operations but delegates authority to the court itself to adopt rules of 
procedure.472 The statute provides for decisions by majority vote, with the 
court’s president casting the tie-breaking vote if necessary.473 Hearings are 
conducted in public, but the statute provides for private deliberations, 
which generally must remain secret.474 The statute also provides that the 
court’s “decisions, judgments and opinions shall be published, along with 
judges' individual votes and opinions and with such other data or 
background information that the [c]ourt may deem appropriate.”475  
The court’s rules provide considerable detail about its procedures.476 
They require each judgment to include the names of the presiding judges 
and each judge who participated in rendering the decision, as well as the 
“result of the voting.”477 Any participating judge is entitled to add a 
“separate reasoned opinion to the judgment, concurring or dissenting,” 
 
 
469 As scholars have noted, the court’s traditional practice “is very much that those dissenting 
will file an opinion setting out the reasons for their dissent. Equally, many judges clearly take the view 
that differences in reasoning which lead to the same conclusion as that of the Court in its judgment 
should also be articulated.” Robin C. A. White & Iris Boussiakou, Separate Opinions in the European 
Court of Human Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 37, 39 (2009).  
470 Garlicki, supra note 460, at I-8. 
471 Id. at I-9. 
472 Statute of the I/A Court ch. V, art. 25, Oct. 1979, OAS Res. No. 448, 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/corte/estatuto.cfm?lang=en (last visited Aug. 31, 2018). 
473 Id. art. 23. 
474 Id. art. 24(1), (2). 
475 Id. art. 24(3). 
476 See INTER-AMERICAN CT. OF HUM. RTS., RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Nov. 24, 2009), 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/sitios/reglamento/nov_2009_ing.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2018). 












which must be circulated to the other judges for consideration before the 
judgment is released. The rules specifically require that separate opinions 
“shall only refer to the issues covered in the judgment.”478 
African Court on Human and People’s Rights. The court’s rules479 
provide that any judge who has participated in the court’s deliberations, 
including deliberations on advisory opinions within its jurisdiction,480 may 
issue a separate concurring or dissenting opinion.481  
The rules provide specifically for deliberation procedures and the 
contents and form of the court’s judgments. Deliberations are 
confidential.482 Decisions are rendered by a majority of the panel of judges 
who participated in the hearing, and in the event of a tie, the presiding 
judge casts the tie-breaking vote.483 Judgments must include a statement of 
the court’s reasons; must identify the names of the judges who participated 
in deliberations; and must be signed by the judges, certified by the 
presiding judge, and read in open court after notice to the parties.484 The 
rules explicitly enumerate the contents of the judgment, which must 
include the number of judges who made up the majority.485 Final 
judgments are published by the court’s registrar.486  
Under specified circumstances, the court may be asked to issue an 
advisory opinion. If so, the opinion must be “accompanied by reasons, and 
any judge who has participated in the hearing of an advisory request shall 
be entitled to deliver a separate or dissenting opinion."487 
International Criminal Court (ICC). The Rome Statute488 sets out the 
procedures for appeal.489 The statute requires the judgment to be decided 
 
 
478 Id. art. 65(2). 
479 AFRICAN CT. ON HUM. & PEOPLE’S RTS., RULES OF COURT (2010), http://en.african-
court.org/images/Protocol-
Host%20Agrtmt/Final_Rules_of_Court_for_Publication_after_Harmonization_-
_Final__English_7_sept_1_.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2018).    
480 Id. R. 26(1)(b) (authorizing the Court to “render an advisory opinion on any legal matter 
relating to the Charter or any other relevant human rights instruments, provided that the subject of the 
opinion is not related to a matter being examined by the Commission”).   
481 Id. R. 60(5) (“Any Member of the Court who heard the case may deliver a separate or 
dissenting opinion.”).   
482 Id. R. 60(1).   
483 Id. R. 60(2), (3), (4). 
484 Id. R. 61(1), (2), (3).   
485 Id. R. 62(j).    
486 Id. R. 65; see id. R. 25(2)(i).   
487 Id. R. 73(2). 
488 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 129.  
489 Id. art. 83. 










by a majority of the participating judges, and it must include reasons for 
the decision.490 “When there is no unanimity, the judgement of the 
Appeals Chamber shall contain the views of the majority and the minority, 
but a judge may deliver a separate or dissenting opinion on a question of 
law.”491 The court’s detailed procedural and evidentiary rules cross-refer 
to this article in lieu of enumerating the contents of a judgment.492   
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The same 
Appellate Chamber heard and decided appeals for both the ICTY and the 
ICTR. Both war crimes tribunals were established by the United Nations 
(UN) Security Council, with operations subject to the UN Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence under the Mechanism for International Criminal 
Tribunals.493 Those rules specifically provide that judgments shall be 
rendered in a “reasoned opinion in writing, to which separate or dissenting 
opinions may be appended.”494 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The statute governing 
the tribunal generally provides that it may issue its own rules governing its 
functions, in particular rules of procedure.495  But the statute specifically 
sets out the required contents of each judgment.496 It must include a 
statement of reasons supporting the judgment and a list of judges by name 
who participated in the decision.497 The statute provides for majority 
voting.498   
The tribunal’s rules provide more details that ensure remarkable 
 
 
490 Id. art. 83(4).  
491 Id.  
492 INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE (2d ed. 2013), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/pids/legal-texts/rulesprocedureevidenceeng.pdf. 
493 UNITED NATIONS MECHANISM FOR INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, RULES OF PROCEDURE AND 
EVIDENCE (2016), http://www.unmict.org/sites/default/files/documents/160926-rules-rev2-en.pdf.  
494 Id. R. 144(B). 
495 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea art. 16, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 561. 
496 Id. art. 30.  
Article 30 - Judgment  
1. The judgment shall state the reasons on which it is based.  
2. It shall contain the names of the members of the Tribunal who have taken part in the 
decision.  
3. If the judgment does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the 
members of the Tribunal, any member shall be entitled to deliver a separate opinion.  
4. The judgment shall be signed by the President and by the Registrar. It shall be read in open 
court, due notice having been given to the parties to the dispute. 
Id.  
497 Id. art. 30(1), (2).  













transparency by requiring the judgment to identify each participating 
judge’s decision and rationale.499 The judgment must include not only the 
names of judges who participated in the judgment, but also the number 
and names of judges who formed the majority on each “operative 
provision” of the judgment, as well as the number and names of judges 
who voted in the minority on each one.500 Any judge may add a separate 
opinion either concurring or dissenting in the judgment. And a judge may 
choose to include a concurring or dissenting declaration with the tribunal’s 
judgment without stating reasons.501 The same rules apply to advisory 
opinions.502 
The tribunal’s website includes a resolution setting out the procedures 
by which the judges deliberate on cases, a unique disclosure that reveals 
how the judges consider the issues and try to reach consensus.503   
Table 3 compiles the available comparative information relating to 
relevant transparency norms for the selected courts, whose functions are 




499 INT’L TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, RULES OF THE TRIBUNAL (2009), [hereinafter 
RULES OF THE TRIBUNAL], 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/basic_texts/Itlos_8_E_17_03_09.pdf. 
500 Id. art. 125(1)(b), (l).  
501 Id. art. 125(2). 
502 Id. art. 135. 
503 Int’l Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Resolution on the Internal Judicial Practice of the 
Tribunal (2005), https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/basic_texts/Itlos.10.E.27.04.05.pdf. 










TABLE 3 – TRANSPARENCY NORMS 
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  5.  Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE)    
The CCJE is not a court, but rather a consultative body for the Council 












judicial independence, impartiality, and competence.504 Established in 
2000, it is composed entirely of judges.505 
In 2008, the CCJE issued a comprehensive opinion including a number 
of recommendations to ensure the quality of judicial decisions. While the 
opinion justifiably takes no position on whether a court should permit or 
preclude separate opinions, it does address their value, content, and 
dissemination.506 In particular, the Council’s recommendations provide 
that “[d]issenting opinions should be duly reasoned”507 and should be 
published along with the court’s judgment.508 The Council also calls for 
individual judicial discretion to express “complete or partial disagreement” 
with the majority decision and the reasons for disagreement, or to express 
the opinion that the judgment should have rested on alternative grounds.509  
 C. European Parliament Study of Dissenting Practices: EU Member 
States’ Constitutional and Supreme Courts  
In 2012, the European Parliament took action in response to repeated 
calls for reforming the opinion-issuing practices of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union.510 Its Committee on Legal Affairs requested a study 
 
 
504 Background and Mission, COUNCIL OF EUR. CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF EUR. JUDGES, 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/ccje/background-and-mission (last visited Aug. 31, 2018). 
505 Id.; COUNCIL OF EUR. CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF EUR. JUDGES, 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/ccje/home (last visited Aug. 31, 2018). 
506 See Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE), Opinion no.11 (2008) of the 
Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) to the attention of the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe on the quality of judicial decisions, CCJE(2008)5 (Dec. 18, 2008), 
http://www.courtexcellence.com/resources/~/media/microsites/files/icce/ccje.ashx/. 
51. In some countries judges can give a concurring or dissenting opinion. In these cases the 
dissenting opinion should be published with the majority’s opinion. Judges thus express their 
complete or partial disagreement with the decision taken by the majority of judges who gave 
the decision and the reasons for their disagreement, or maintain that the decision given by the 
court can or should be based on grounds other than those adopted. This can contribute to 
improve the content of the decision and can assist both in understanding the decision and the 
evolution of the law.  
52. Dissenting opinions should be duly reasoned, reflecting the judge’s considered 
appreciation of the facts and law. 
Id. ¶¶ 51-52. 
507 Id. ¶ 52. 
508 Id. ¶ 51. 
509 See id. 
510 E.g., Perju, supra note 80, at 308-09 (calling for change to allow Court of Justice to begin 
issuing separate opinions to “’politiciz[e]’ its judicial style”); Rasmussen & Rasmussen, supra note 
109, at 1376 (“It is arguable that only a root-and-branch reform will have any chance of uprooting the 
[Court’s] ills and ailments, the bad habits and preposterous self-satisfaction . . . .”). The European 
Parliament’s report observed that “some scholars have argued that separate opinions could actually 










of opinion-issuing practices of the highest courts of its member states. The 
report details arguments in favor and against the practice of issuing 
dissenting opinions,511 cites many of the applicable statutes and rules 
governing those practices among the courts of European Union member 
states,512 and considers the European Union Court of Justice’s 
longstanding practice of issuing consensus judgments without appending 
separate opinions authored by individual judges.513 The comprehensive 
research report and its conclusions represent a substantial contribution to 
the relevant literature on global courts’ opinion-issuing practices. Both 
have received far too little scholarly attention,514 especially considering the 
ongoing global interest in dissenting opinion practices. 
IV. POLICY-BASED VALUE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TRANSPARENCY 
NORMS 
As scholars have observed, the scholarly literature on the advantages 
and disadvantages of separate judicial opinions is rich, especially in the 
United States.515 But as some have noted, little in the way of comparative 
work has been published,516 and many of the excellent works still available 
in print or digital format are outdated.517 Importantly, Professor Katalin 
Kelemen’s recently published treatise518 begins to fill that gap, but even 
that work is limited to an analysis of European constitutional courts, a 
small group of eighteen courts that primarily share a relatively recent 
twentieth-century history.519 In large part, national constitutional courts in 
Europe are an indirect outgrowth of the various twentieth-century treaties 
 
 
serve the Court’s purposes, in particular given its need to engage in a constant dialogue with national 
courts. Others claim that dialogue can better be improved through different, already existing, means, 
and that the introduction of separate opinions might threaten the Court’s collegiality and its authority 
vis-à-vis national tribunals.”  RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 6. 
511 Id. at 9-16. 
512 Id. at 17-30. 
513 Id. at 31-39. As noted above, the court’s statute does not bar separate opinions, and in fact 
suggests that minority votes will occur by requiring decision panels composed of an odd number of 
judges. But the court’s rules of procedure require all judges who participate in deliberations to sign the 
judgment, whether or not they agree with the judgment or its reasoning. The court’s procedural rules 
effectively mandate silent acquiescence, as reflected in Table 3. See supra notes 440-42 and 
accompanying text.  
514 But cf. KELEMEN, supra note 74, at 15-16 n.44 (citing the study and acknowledging Raffaelli 
as the author).  
515 E.g., Kelemen, supra note 5, at 1345.  
516 KELEMEN, supra note 74, at 2, 7-9. 
517 See, e.g., MCWHINNEY, supra note 36; Nadelmann (1959), supra note 84. 
518 KELEMEN, supra note 74. 
519 See also Bricker, supra note 5. Bricker’s article is another recent contribution to the field but 












establishing the European Union and its predecessors.520 For that reason, 
European constitutional courts have many characteristics in common, 
including norms that generally allow for publication of separate 
opinions.521  
The global interest and scholarly commentary on judicial opinion-
issuing practices have led a few scholars to advance theoretical constructs 
in an effort to better conceptualize the interrelated values, norms, and 
factors that influence relevant institutional choices about communicating 
the results of judicial deliberations. This section provides a preliminary 
overview of a recent descriptive model and what it may offer as a basis for 
further comparative research.  
 A. The “Judicial Trilemma”:  Judicial Independence, Accountability, 
and Transparency 
Professors Dunoff and Pollack have recently advanced a novel 
theoretical framework in an effort to explain the design and operation of 
international courts, including the means they use to communicate and 
disseminate judgments and the rationale for decisions.522   
Among the authors’ underlying assumptions in formulating the model 
is that three sometimes competing values are central to judicial 
deliberations and decision-making: judicial independence, judicial 
accountability, and judicial transparency.523 They construe the concept of 
judicial transparency rather narrowly, focusing on “a more limited and 
precise aspect of transparency, namely the [public’s] ability to identify a 
particular judge’s position or vote on a particular issue before the court, or 
what we might call judicial identifiability.”524 Whether or not an individual 
judge has the freedom to issue a separate opinion identifying that judge by 
name as departing from the court’s judgment is a major criterion of the 
 
 
520 See KELEMEN, supra note 74, at 14 (noting that their relatively youthful age is “an important 
distinguishing feature of constitutional courts”); see also Finn Laursen, The Founding Treaties of the 
European Union and their Reform, in OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICS (Aug. 2016), 
http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-
9780190228637-e-151?print=pdf. 
521 See KELEMEN, supra note 74, at 10-15 (discussing features European constitutional courts 
share, which distinguish them as a group from national “supreme courts”); Kelemen, supra note 5, at 
1352-57 (same). 
522 Dunoff & Pollack, supra note 75, at 231. 
523 Id. at 232-36. 
524 Id. at 236 (first emphasis added; second emphasis in original).  










authors’ notion of transparency,525 on which they argue that “international 
courts display enormous variation.”526  
The authors may be overstating the point. Other than the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU), international courts do issue 
separate opinions, although in some cases the author remains 
anonymous.527 While the CJEU has interpreted its statutory requirement of 
secret deliberations to construct an internal norm of consensus, nothing in 
the court’s organic statute expressly or implicitly prohibits judges from 
issuing dissenting opinions.528  
The Dunoff-Pollack Judicial Trilemma model theorizes that three 
central judicial values—independence,529 accountability, and 
transparency—are inherently in tension, and that no international tribunal 







525 See id. at 236-37. In fact, Dunoff and Pollack indirectly acknowledge that their theoretical 
model was driven by their earlier analysis of the various practices of international tribunals in issuing 
separate opinions along with the courts’ judgments.  
[D]issenting opinions also provide a pathway into understanding the logic that drives the 
Judicial Trilemma.  . . . [I]ndividually signed public opinions may substantially threaten the 
reelection prospects of judges who lack life tenure.  Given this tension, many judicial systems 
have struggled to find the appropriate relationship between permitting the issuance of 
separate, often unpopular opinions, on the one hand, and the nature and structure of judicial 
terms and appointment procedures, on the other. 
Id. at 234.  
526 Id. at 263. 
527 RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 31-33; see Tbl. 3, supra.  
528 See Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union 2010 O.J. (C 83). Articles 36 and 
37 provide only that “[j]udgments shall state the reasons on which they are based[,] shall contain the 
names of the Judges who took part in the deliberations[,] shall be signed by the President and the 
Registrar[, and] shall be read in open court.” Id. arts. 36, 37. The Court’s Rules of Procedure specify 
the contents of each judgment. Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 2012 O.J. (L 265) art. 87. 
They include “the names of the President and of the Judges who took part in the deliberations,” id. art. 
87(d), and “the grounds for the decision,” id. art. 87(m). Each judgment must be “delivered in open 
court,” id. art. 88(1), and must be “signed by the President, by the Judges who took part in the 
deliberations and by the Registrar, [and] sealed and deposited at the Registry,” id. art. 88(2).  
529 On the critical role judicial independence plays in international tribunals, see Theodor 






















Fig. 1 - Dunoff & Pollack’s “Judicial Trilemma” Model 
The model predicts that international courts with high marks on judicial 
independence and accountability will reflect less transparency in their 
decision-making processes. Similarly, courts with high degrees of both 
accountability and transparency are less likely to enjoy a high degree of 
judicial independence. Finally, courts that exhibit high degrees of 
transparency in decision-making and strong independence can be predicted 
to score relatively low on measures of accountability.531 As formulated by 
the authors, the model suggests that the likelihood of designing an 
international tribunal to maximize all three fundamental judicial values is 
 
 
Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 359, 359-60 (2005).   
530 Dunoff & Pollack, supra note 75, at 239. 



















very small and perhaps unrealistic, if not impossible.532 
The authors have identified three international courts that they argue 
serve as more or less “ideal” examples of the model’s usefulness. They 
consider the Court of Justice for the European Union (CJEU), the only 
international tribunal that has never issued a separate judicial opinion, as 
scoring low on the transparency scale, apparently for that reason alone.533 
But the CJEU, they argue, scores high on measures of accountability and 
independence, consistent with the trilemma model.534 The authors identify 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as exemplifying a high degree of 
accountability and high transparency, but arguably less independence 
when considering a variety of competing factors.535  And they hypothesize 
that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), as currently 
configured, is the “ideal” example of a court with high measures on both 
transparency and independence, with concomitant low marks, as the model 
predicts, on judicial accountability.536 But the authors do not demonstrate 
how the model applies to other international tribunals. In particular, they 
neither acknowledge nor address the International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea (ITLOS), perhaps the most “transparent” of all international 
tribunals according to the authors’ narrow definition of that value.537 
Dunoff and Pollack’s Judicial Trilemma model is thought-provoking 
and offers a useful beginning point for analyzing the institutional features 
of courts designed relatively recently (beginning in the early twentieth 
century) to address cross-national economic, political, and human rights 
objectives. But the model might not explain the operation of various 
national appellate and constitutional tribunals that form the bedrock of the 
global legal system. Other scholars, for example, while acknowledging the 
authors’ contribution to the field, have already noted certain weaknesses in 
 
 
532 See id. at 238. 
533 Id. at 244 (“[T]he CJEU is a ‘low transparency’ court.”). To support this conclusion, the 
authors point to the organic statute’s silence on whether the court’s judgments must identify judges 
who voted with the majority on a particular issue. Id. They also note that the statute fails to expressly 
mention whether the judges may issue separate opinions. Id. at 245; cf. Rasmussen & Rasmussen, 
supra note 109, at 1374 (criticizing the “EU-court and EU-law’s ban against dissenting opinions, a ban 
that the vast majority of the Court’s members support and are adamant to keep on the books”). 
534 Dunoff & Pollack, supra note 75, at 243-44. 
535 See id. at 259 (“Thus, the ICJ reveals an ambiguous portrait of a third position vis-à-vis the 
Trilemma. [T]he ICJ is a high accountability, high transparency court.  Some observers argue that [the 
ICJ] is low on judicial independence.”).   
536 Id. The authors discuss at length the corollary features of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), id. at 267-82, but they reach no firm conclusion on whether the Judicial Trilemma model has 
any direct predictive value, id. at 81-82. The WTO discussion does illustrate that all three judicial 
values have an interactive effect, which invites further scholarly research on the framework, its 
features, and its explanatory and predictive value. See id. 












various aspects of the model.538  
 
 
 B. Refining and Generalizing the Judicial Trilemma Model to National 
and Subnational Courts 
The Judicial Trilemma model, as presently configured, 
underconceptualizes the values central to judicial decision-making.539 
First, Dunoff and Pollack assume that judicial independence is a 
unidimensional value. But an independent judiciary has two distinct 
aspects that to some degree reflect the tension inherent in decisions 
emanating from a multi-member court composed of judges whose votes 
weigh equally.540   
In the United States and other countries that recognize the separation of 
powers among and between the judicial, legislative, and executive 
branches, judicial independence is understood to mean institutional 
independence: the ability to carry out the court’s functions free from 
political interference from the other two branches.541 In contrast, the 
 
 
538 See Gráinne de Búrca, Introduction to Symposium on Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack, 
“The Judicial Trilemma,” 111 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 341 (2017); Mauricio Guim, The Judicial 
Trilemma visits Latin American Judicial Politics, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 354 (2017); Gleider 
Hernández, Systemic Judicial Authority: The “Fourth Corner” of “The Judicial Trilemma”?, 111 AM. 
J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 349 (2017); Jennifer Hillman, Independence at the Top of the Triangle: Best 
Resolution of the Judicial Trilemma?, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 364 (2017); Helen Keller & 
Severin Meier, Independence and Impartiality in the Judicial Trilemma, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. 
UNBOUND 344 (2017); Isabelle Van Damme, The Application of “The Judicial Trilemma” to the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 359 (2017). See generally Symposium on 
Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack, supra note 83.  
539 John Alder has observed that competing values in a democratic legal system are inherently 
“incommensurable,” or in American parlance, irreconcilable. Alder, supra note 38, at 223-24 (“[T]he 
notion that a democratic legal system, comprising as it does the interaction of innumerable competing 
wills and interests, can generate a rationally coherent scheme of values is inherently implausible.”). 
540 See RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 9, 11-12 (distinguishing external and internal aspects of 
judicial independence). 
541 Federal and state courts in the United States represent legal systems that provide checks on 
the other two branches of government. The two parallel judicial systems also operate as checks on 
each other. In one respect, the constitutional supremacy of federal law constrains the authority of state 
courts. On the other hand, state courts have the authority to interpret state constitutions expansively to 
provide more protection for human rights than does the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by federal 
courts. Thus, state legal systems are not subsidiary to the federal system, but rather the two systems 
overlap; state courts exercise considerable authority beyond the substantive reach of federal courts. See 










published scholarship analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of 
judicial dissent in other nations, as well as scholarly commentary 
theorizing the basis for global variations, generally confuses institutional 
independence with individual judicial autonomy.542  
The two aspects of independence are distinct in important ways. 
Institutional judicial independence is arguably fostered by issuing 
consensus decisions “by the Court,” as U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice 
John Marshall well understood in the early years of the nineteenth century. 
The Court’s legitimacy as a co-equal branch of the fledgling nation’s 
federal government depended on speaking with one voice.543 As a result, 
the Court became entrenched in the public’s mind as an essential 
government institution, more or less independent of Congress and the 
President.544 The practice of issuing consensus opinions “by the Court” 
was an essential step for the times in order to accomplish that mission.   
While the United States borrowed many legal traditions from England, 
institutional judicial independence was certainly not one of them. At that 
time, England knew no independent judiciary: What we now know as 
appellate judicial functions were divided between the House of Lords, the 
upper chamber of Parliament; and the King’s Privy Council, the judicial 
 
 
Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 225 (2000). State courts, for example, have the final 
word on issues of state law within the constraints of the federal Constitution. See id. at 231; see also, 
e.g., Poublon v. C.H. Robinson Co., 846 F.3d 1251, 1266–67 (9th Cir. 2017) (reasoning that on issues 
of state law, federal courts must ascertain and apply state law rather than prescribe different rules).  
542 See, e.g., John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: 
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 965 (2002) (noting confusion among the 
terms “decisional independence,” “branch independence,” “procedural independence,” “administrative 
independence,” and “personal independence”); Alex Schwartz & Melanie Janelle Murchison, Judicial 
Impartiality and Independence in Divided Societies: An Empirical Analysis of the Constitutional Court 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 50 L. & SOC'Y REV. 821, 822 (2016) (acknowledging that “judicial 
impartiality and independence are often conflated”); Peter T. Zarella & Thomas A. Bishop, Judicial 
Independence at a Crossroads, 77 CONN. B.J. 21, 24 (2003) (distinguishing individual judges’ 
decisional independence from institutional independence).  
543 “During any constitutional court’s infant years, a ban on dissents makes certain sense as a 
means of protecting its quest for authority and decisional legitimacy.” Rasmussen & Rasmussen, supra 
note 109, at 1380 (citing Arthur von Mehren, The Judicial Process: A Comparative Analysis, 5 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 197, 209 (1956)); see KELEMEN, supra note 74, at 15-16 & nn.44-46 (noting that some 
European constitutional courts barred dissenting opinions in the first decades after they were 
established but later allowed them after each court had become well established). 
544 Even in the United States, the federal judiciary does not enjoy absolute independence from 
the other two branches. Congress has the constitutional power to delineate the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court, as well as other federal courts, with few exceptions. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2.   
In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a 
state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases 
before mentioned [in § 1], the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law 
and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make. 
Id. § 2 (emphasis added). And of course, Congress holds the pursestrings on the federal treasury for all 












advisors to the monarchy. And in England, as the Founding Fathers 
recognized, the Crown and Parliament have never been entirely separate 
branches of government.  
The authority of individual judges to issue separate opinions is not a 
feature of institutional judicial independence; to the contrary, norms 
permitting separate opinions and dissenting votes reflect a high value 
placed on individual judicial independence, or perhaps more accurately 
individual autonomy, freedom of thought, and freedom of expression.545 
The ability to explain one’s own reasons for a dissenting vote on a 
collegial decision-making body reflects the values of individual autonomy 
and open government–both characteristically democratic values, but not 
necessarily values that strengthen the judiciary as an independent 
institution of government. More importantly, placing a high value on 
individual judicial independence on collegial courts implicates the rule of 
law, a value that virtually all democratic nations embrace.546    
Second, the authors assign a high value to “judicial transparency” 
without full defining what they mean. Other scholars have asserted that 
transparency and inter-branch dialog are both “vanguard values” with 
respect to the rule of law and “a polity’s democratic credentials.”547  But 
 
 
545 Cf. RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 10 (suggesting that dissenting opinions might be motivated 
by individual judges’ desire for publicity, risking the “individualization of justice that would damage 
the authority of courts”). 
546 See Robert S. Summers, Principles of the Rule of Law, NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1691, 1693 
(1999) (enumerating second-order principles of the rule of law, including “that all forms of law be 
appropriately clear and determinate in meaning”); see also POPKIN, supra note 28, at 126 (“Multiple 
[individual] judicial opinions [in a single case] that grapple with legal issues are the judicial analogue 
to a deliberative democratic legislative process, which might not only help judges reach a sound result 
but also project an image of accountable judging and participation by interested audiences.”) (citing 
Frank L. Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986)); Brennan, supra note 
1, at 437 (“We are a free and vital people because we not only allow, we encourage debate, and 
because we do not shut down communication as soon as a decision is reached.); William O. Douglas, 
The Dissent: A Safeguard of Democracy, 32 JUDICATURE 104, 106 (1948) (“When judges do not 
agree, it is a sign that they are dealing with problems on which society itself is divided. [Dissent] is the 
democratic way to express dissident views.  Judges are to be honored rather than criticized for 
following that tradition . . . .“). But see Shiels, supra note 74, at 16 (noting that multiple opinions 
issued in a single case “can create a difficult, and sometimes impossible, task of deciding what the law 
is for the future - what old-fashioned lawyers and Latin scholars would call the ratio decidendi - the 
reasons for the decision”).   
547 Rasmussen & Rasmussen, supra note 109, at 1374; id. at 1377-78. The authors go so far as 
to assert that   
a “yes” to banning dissents implies a “no” to government openness, transparency, and 
dialogue between the governors and the governed to which it lends credibility. It implies to 
absolutely forget that the latter gave the courts their mandate in the first place. A ban on 
dissents and the flowerbeds of additional secrecy-mongering that often are its companion-in-










publication of separate judicial opinions is not the only measure of a 
tribunal’s transparency.  A court can exhibit transparency in many 
different ways, not just by allowing individual judges to author and 
publish separate opinions. Norms contribute to enhanced transparency, for 
example, by requiring written opinions to fully explain the rationale for 
the court’s judgment; by requiring the court to publicize the number of 
judicial votes cast for and against the judgment; and by ensuring that the 
public has opportunities to intervene, access court records and briefs, or 
even observe court proceedings.  
 C. Magna Carta of Judges 
The Consultative Council of European Judges, established by the 
Council of Europe in 2000, adopted the so-called Magna Carta of Judges 
on November 17, 2010.548 The document represents a synthesis of the 
Council’s advisory opinions issued in its first decade pertaining to issues 
concerning judges, specifically independence, impartiality, and 
competence.549 It was prepared in response to rivalries that arose among 
political actors and judges representing member states of the European 
Union.550 
The “fundamental principles” enumerated in the Magna Carta 
expressly apply to “judges of all European and international courts.”551 
They emphasize judicial independence and impartiality as “essential 
prerequisites” to effectuate justice.552 To guarantee judicial independence, 
each member state of the European Union is directed to establish a 
Council for the Judiciary or comparable entity with authority to address 
issues of judicial status and the organization and functioning of courts.553 
Ultimately, the principles espouse the values of judicial transparency and 
accessibility.554   
 
 
arms always exert a vicious effect on the conduct of any government . . . that . . . run squarely 
counter to modern (Western) democracies’ ambition and obligation to deliver on all three 
openness-variants. . . . [The CJEU’s] policies of aloofness, self-absorption, and secrecy-
mongering remained the unscathed name of the game. 
Id. at 1375. 
548 Consultative Council of European Judges, Magna Carta of Judges (Fundamental Principles) 
(Nov. 17, 2010), https://rm.coe.int/16807482c6 [hereinafter Magna Carta of Judges]. 
549 See MAK, supra note 3, at 91.  
550 Id.  
551 Magna Carta of Judges, supra note 548, ¶ 23. 
552 Id. ¶ 2. 
553 Id. ¶ 13. 
554  Id. ¶¶ 14-17. 
Access to justice and transparency 












 D. Legal Constraints on How Courts Communicate Decisions 
Much of the scholarship to date addressing whether and how global 
courts issue separate judicial opinions has neglected to comprehensively 
address variations in the external legal constraints governing judicial 
decision-making and decision-issuing practices. In the United States, the 
now-entrenched practice of publishing the Supreme Court’s separate 
opinions along with each justice’s vote is a direct outgrowth of the Court’s 
own choices. Scholarly debate over the merits of separate judicial opinions 
has focused almost exclusively on judges’ individual decisions whether to 
dissent or not to dissent, with occasional references to the Chief Justices’ 
preferences or leadership style.555  
For example, under the leadership of Chief Justice John Marshall, the 
Court generally issued a single opinion “of the Court,” often but not 
always authored by the Chief Justice himself. Chief Justice Stone, 
however, approached the issue differently; he did not believe his role was 
to discourage individual justices from issuing separate opinions. Over the 
last two centuries, the Court’s opinion-issuing practices have changed 




15.  Judges shall take steps to ensure access to swift, efficient and affordable dispute 
resolution; they shall contribute to the promotion of alternative dispute resolution methods. 
16.  Court documents and judicial decisions shall be drafted in an accessible, simple and clear 
language. Judges shall issue reasoned decisions, pronounced in public within a reasonable 
time, based on fair and public hearing. Judges shall use appropriate case management 
methods. 
17.  The enforcement of court orders is an essential component of the right to a fair trial and 
also a guarantee of the efficiency of justice. 
Id.  
555 See, e.g., Bentsen, supra note 3, at 192 (noting consensus in the literature that a court’s 
dissent rates over time are directly influenced by the chief justice); McWhinney, supra note 84, at 617-
18 (noting the influence of the chief justice on the Court’s opinion-issuing practices). For example, 
Chief Justice Taft discouraged dissenting opinions. See Kevin J. Burns, Chief Justice as Chief 
Executive: Taft’s Judicial Statesmanship, 43 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 47, 57-58 (Mar. 2018). Chief Justice 
Hughes encouraged consensus and sought “to secure as great a degree of unanimity as was possible 
without compromising the integrity of the majority opinion.” McWhinney, supra note 84, at 618. Chief 
Justice Earl Warren is widely credited with having persuaded the other justices to reach a unanimous 
decision in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See, e.g., PAMELA C. CORLEY ET AL., THE 
PUZZLE OF UNANIMITY: CONSENSUS ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 8 (2013); Joel K. 
Goldstein, Leading the Court: Studies in Influence as Chief Justice, 40 STETSON L. REV. 717, 728-29 
(2011). 
556 Article III of the United States Constitution has never been amended. The most significant 
statutory change in the life of the Supreme Court occurred in 1925 with the enactment of the Judiciary 
Act, then known as the “Judge’s Bill,” which gave the Court considerable control over its own docket. 










statutes, court rules, or internal operating procedures (as far as the public 
knows) dictate the Court’s opinion-issuing practices, its disclosure of 
justices’ votes, or even whether a justice may “silently acquiesce” in the 
Court’s judgment while declining to explain why. 
Contrast the United States federal courts’ experience with the explicit 
legal constraints regularly imposed on European national, supranational, 
and international courts, in particular with respect to the secrecy of 
deliberations, the content of judgments, and the dissemination of judicial 
opinions. In the Republic of Ireland, the Supreme Court is expressly 
prohibited by law from issuing separate opinions in cases involving a 
priori, abstract constitutional review.557 In Greece, on the other hand, 
publication of dissenting opinions is constitutionally mandated, although 
internal court rules provide that separate opinions are recorded 
anonymously.558 In many nations, constitutional provisions on judicial 
decision-making and opinion dissemination are supplemented by statutes 
and formal court rules. In others, relevant constitutional provisions may 
not speak to the issue, but statutes and rules do. The various treaties and 
statutes establishing international tribunals commonly speak directly to 
issues relating to the secrecy of deliberations as well as opinion-issuing 
practices, although with varying degrees of specificity.559   
Any consideration of institutional judicial independence as a factor in 
predicting court behavior, or even ex ante institutional design, must 
certainly take into account the widely varying external legal constraints on 
judicial opinion-issuing practices.560 Constitutional and statutory norms 
reflect not only a polity’s choices among values, including second-order 
principles relating to the rule of law,561 but also the legal system’s customs 
and traditions.  Disregarding those formal and informal constraints and 
their influence on institutional judicial choices562 diminishes the scholarly 
 
 
Even that statutory change was initiated by the Court itself, although Congress has amended it since to 
narrow even further the Court’s original and mandatory jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251-60 (2018).  
557 Supra note 416 and accompanying text. 
558 Supra note 411 and accompanying text. 
559 See supra notes 442-503 and accompanying text. 
560 Alder opposes confining judicial dissents by “external criteria, which are themselves 
controversial” and instead believes that an individual judge should decide whether or not to dissent “as 
part of his or her burden of judgment.” Alder, supra note 38, at 245. Popkin’s treatise on the evolution 
of the judicial opinion in the United States acknowledges the possibility that a court’s “operational 
rules” may influence whether judges opt to issue separate opinions. POPKIN, supra note 28, at 129-30. 
But few if any formal norms exist for the judicial opinion-issuing practices of federal courts in the 
United States. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 402, at 84 (noting “the absence of any definitive source for 
a right to dissent in the United States Supreme Court”). But cf. Radin, supra note 35 (reviewing the 
history of formal norms constraining state courts’ judicial-opinion issuing practices).  
561 See Summers, supra note 546, at 1693. 












debate on practices that best support overarching principles that advance 
the rule of law.    
 E. Judicial Transparency as a Continuum 
Several scholars have identified transparency in general as an 
important judicial value, and the Consultative Council of European Judges 
(CCJE) agrees.563 By transparency, most mean external or institutional 
transparency—the degree of public access to the court’s decision-making 
process.564 Some commentators, including Professors Dunoff and Pollack, 
have defined it more narrowly, focusing primarily on the practice of 
issuing separate opinions by individual judges.   
As others have noted, the authority of a court’s judges to issue separate 
opinions must be distinguished from the actual practice of doing so.565 
Even if a court’s judges are authorized to issue separate written opinions, 
most jurisdictions allow the court as a whole or an individual judge to 
elect not to exercise that authority.566 Variations exist even here. For 
example, some courts’ organic statutes allow an individual judge to issue a 
separate opinion if the court’s judgment does not represent the unanimous 
decision of participating judges, while disallowing publication of a judge’s 
dissenting vote without expressing reasons for disagreeing with the court’s 
opinion. Others allow judges to issue dissenting opinions, usually but not 
always including dissenting votes without an accompanying explanation, 
but do not permit the reporter or registrar to identify the individual judicial 
author by name.   
If the primary value of separate opinions is to help develop and 
improve the law, publishing them would appear to advance those goals 
whether or not the author is identified by name. Further, scholars have 
 
 
judges of a court from an internal or external source.”).  
563 See supra notes 506-09 and accompanying text. 
564 See supra notes 540-46 and accompanying text (distinguishing between institutional judicial 
independence and individual judicial autonomy). 
565 E.g., KELEMEN, supra note 74, at 22; Grimm, supra note 11, at I-2 (“In some countries the 
judges of constitutional courts obtained the right to file separate opinions. This does not mean that the 
courts decided to publish dissenting opinions.”).  
566 See, e.g., Grimm, supra note 11, at I-3 (“The judges’ motives to file or not to file a separate 
opinion if they did not . . . fully [agree] with [the court’s] opinion are so manifold that any attempt to 
summarize them would be in vain.”); see also KELEMEN, supra note 74, at 22 & n.35 (citing 
Hungarian Constitutional Court’s practice prior to 2012, when the Constitutional Court Act was 
amended to require unanimous decisions by three-member judicial panels; before then, individual 
judges could issue separate opinions but in practice never did). 










observed that identifying the author of a separate opinion creates 
incentives for individual judges to be more concerned with their individual 
reputations for consistency and credibility rather than the public 
legitimacy of the court as an institution.567 
Judicial transparency is by no means a dichotomous variable. Rather, 
institutional transparency must be considered as a continuum or spectrum, 
with a constellation of representative features.568 At the extreme, complete 
transparency in judicial decision-making would entail public access to 
judicial deliberations—perhaps even live-streaming them for maximum 
public access—as well as identifying each individual judge by name on 
every dispositive issue addressed in the judgment.569 Deliberations would 
be open to the public, much like legislative committee hearings and floor 
debates already are in many democratic nations, including the United 
States. Each judge would be required to file a separate written opinion 
reflecting her vote on each disputed issue and explaining the reasons for 
each of those votes. And of course, each judge’s separate opinion would 
be published, identifying the author by name. The opinions might even be 
publicized on the internet and translated into several languages for easy 
access by global readers.    
At the opposite extreme of the transparency spectrum are judicial 
tribunals whose deliberations are secret and remain so, even after 
judgment is formally rendered.570 Judges subscribe to an oath of secrecy, 
subject to criminal penalties for violating the secrecy norm. Secrecy at its 
most extreme would entail judgments as binary decisions, releasing only 
the ultimate result (who wins and who loses; affirm or reverse), with no 
public voting record, no written opinion explaining the court’s rationale, 
and no record by which an individual judge can be identified as agreeing 
 
 
567 This outcome is especially apparent in jurisdictions like the United States that appoint 
Supreme Court justices for lengthy (or even life) terms subject to “good behaviour.” U.S. CONST. art. 
III, § 1. 
568 See Kelemen, supra note 5, at 1363 (outlining degrees of transparency in the final stage of 
issuing a judicial opinion).   
The first degree is to allow judges to publish their dissent. The rule is that they cannot simply 
state their disagreement but also have to give reasons for it, even if just in the form of joining 
another judge's separate opinion. The second degree of transparency is the possibility of 
additionally revealing the number of the votes in favor and against the decision. . . . Finally, 
the third degree of transparency is represented by the American (and English) practice in 
which the vote of every judge is public, whether or not they choose to write their own dissent.   
Id.  
569 See RULES OF THE TRIBUNAL art. 125(1)(b), (l); supra notes 499-500 and accompanying 
text.  
570 See, e.g., Shirin Sinnar, Procedural Experimentation and National Security in the Courts, 
106 CAL. L. REV. 991, 1029, 1040 (2018) (discussing “the FISA court, where adjudication proceeds 
in secret and generally without any representation from adverse parties” and raising concerns about the 












with or opposing the final outcome. Not even oral pronouncement of 
individual judges’ opinions or votes would be permitted, or that the 
decision was unanimous–that would reveal too much about the court’s 
internal deliberations. The judges’ votes in the matter would be recorded 
only in a secret book kept under lock and key, never to be revealed except 
perhaps to scholarly historians centuries hence.571  
Of course, no known judicial tribunal–at least in modern times–reflects 
either of these extremes. Nevertheless, bookending the hypothetical 
spectrum of transparency can help scholars identify the true values 
underlying institutional preferences about how deliberations occur, and 
how the judgments of a multi-member court should be disseminated to the 
public.  
No scholar to date has seriously challenged the nearly universal norm 
of secrecy with respect to judicial deliberations, and even the most 
vociferous critics of bans on dissenting opinions support that principle.572 
Even the United States Supreme Court, which most scholars credit as 
placing a high value on judicial transparency, tacitly subscribes to the 
secrecy norm regarding its internal deliberations. While each justice’s vote 
is now a matter of public record after the judgment is released to the 
public, even that was not a foregone conclusion before 1947, when the 
official reports first identified each of the nine justices by name as either 
joining the majority opinion, authoring a separate opinion, or joining 
another justice’s separate opinion.573  
While most scholars attribute the practice of issuing seriatim decisions 
to English tradition, the most salient but often overlooked feature of global 
judicial decision-making since the seventeenth century is in fact majority 
voting, not whether an individual judge who votes with the minority is 
permitted to write separately.574 Even that apparently universal norm has 
recently come under renewed scholarly scrutiny.575  
 
 
571 For example, Spain’s courts historically maintained a record of dissenting votes in a 
separate, secret register. KELEMEN, supra note 74, at 79; Nadelmann (1959), supra note 84, at 420-21; 
RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 24.  
572 E.g., Rasmussen & Rasmussen, supra note 109, at 1378 (“[T]his quest for openness of 
course admits that the secrecy of judicial deliberations is sacred. They should never be opened to non-
insiders’ curiosities.”).  
573 See White, supra note 57, at 1503–04. 
574 Alder, supra note 38, at 233 (citing Grindley v. Baker, 1 Bos and Pul 229, 238 (1798)); see 
Young, supra note 14, at 105 (addressing the evolution of majority decision-making as the price for 
final adjudication). 
575 E.g., Waldron, supra note 52 (questioning the validity of reaching judicial decisions by a 
bare majority); see also Th. Baty, The History of Majority Rule, 430 Q. REV. 1, 2 (Jan. 1912) 










Publicizing individual judges’ voting records is another feature of 
judicial transparency that American scholars take for granted. But some 
nations prohibit judges from disclosing their votes in a case, and some 
allow publication of separate opinions only anonymously. Until fairly 
recently, for example, only one dissenting opinion could be issued in 
conjunction with an opinion of the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council, and only then without disclosing the name of the author or the 
other justices joining the minority opinion.576 
 F. Judicial Accountability as a Continuum 
Dunoff and Pollack acknowledge that the degree of judicial 
accountability falls on a continuum.577 In the United States, federal judges 
are appointed for life, subject to “good behaviour.”578 Federal judicial 
nominees who successfully run the gauntlet of the Senate confirmation 
process are not thereafter subject to political pressure. United States 
scholars who strongly favor the judicial practice of issuing separate 
opinions generally take this uniquely American feature for granted.579   
In stark contrast, most judges on international and supranational courts 
serve limited terms, which may or may not be renewable.580 For example, 
judicial members of the Court of Justice of the European Union serve six-
year terms that may be renewed only once.581 Some national courts 
appoint judges for indefinite terms, but very few enjoy appointments for 
life subject to good behavior.582 And many state appellate courts in the 
 
 
(distinguishing majority decisions from majority rule; “[t]he origin of majority decisions . . . must be 
concealed in the mists of dawning history”). Baty questioned, however, the “acceptance of majority 
decisions as universally valid in matters of government.” Id.  
576 Alder, supra note 38, at 235. Alder refers to this compromise position as “[p]ossibly the 
worst of both worlds.” Id.  The practice has changed in recent years. See supra note 93 and 
accompanying text (explaining that the JCPC regularly issues both dissenting and concurring opinions, 
apparently without limitation).  
577 Dunoff & Pollack, supra note 75, at 235 (referring to the “continuum of judicial 
accountability”). 
578 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.    
579 See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 16, at 287 (suggesting that “dissent and unanimity norms 
are merely tools used to increase the power of the Court and law,” without acknowledging that those 
norms are almost totally within the Court’s own power with virtually no external constraints or 
political accountability). But the point is not lost on international scholars. E.g., Rasmussen & 
Rasmussen, supra note 109, at 1384 (“[A]ll imaginable links of answerability are missing from US 
judges’ work.”).    
580 Dunoff & Pollack, supra note 75, at 234. 
581 See id. at 244; Presentation, CT. OF JUST. OF THE EUR. UNION, 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7024/en/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2018).  
582 Several nations even impose mandatory retirement when a judge reaches a specified age. 
See, e.g., Resource Centre: What do Judges Do?, CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL, https://www.cjc-












United States are elected to the office for relatively short terms, often six 
years.583    
V.   “DEMOCRATIZING” JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS AT THE RISK OF 
“INDIVIDUALIZING” THE RULE OF LAW 
 [T]he practice of dissent follows the development of democracy . . . 
. [T]he majority of dissents in courts of last resort raise legitimate 
disagreement about fundamental incommensurable values. . . . In 
the case of a highest appellate court the dissent is a mechanism for . 
. . providing a public acknowledgment of democratic choice. 
John Alder, Dissents in Courts of Last Resort: Tragic Choices?, 20 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES 221, 221, 245 (2000). 
Scholars have repeatedly argued that allowing individual judges to 
publish separate opinions enhances judicial independence and 
autonomy.584 The tacit assumptions underlying the preference for 
individual expression reflect contemporary democratic values,585 in 
contrast to the traditional view of high courts as “oracles of law.”586 The 
tension between these two perspectives brings us full circle.  As an 
institution of modern liberal democracy, should a collegial court speak 
 
 
also Constitution Act, 1867, Pt. VII, § 99(2), 30 & 31 Vict., c 3 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app 
II, no 5 (Can.).. 
583 See Methods of Judicial Selection, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., 
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/index.cfm?state= (last visited Aug. 31, 
2018) (listing state-by-state details regarding judicial selection, including terms of office for elected 
judges). 
584 See, e.g., Hunter Smith, Personal and Official Authority: Turn-of-the-Century Lawyers and 
the Dissenting Opinion, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 507, 525–26 (2012) (summarizing traditional 
arguments on both sides).   
585 POPKIN, supra note 28, at 126 (suggesting that multiple judicial opinions reflect democratic 
values of diversity and deliberation); RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 14-15 (addressing transparency as a 
democratic value, reflected by court judgments issued “in the name of the people,” as opposed to 
formal institutional authority); Barbara J. Falk, The History, Paradoxes, and Utility of Dissent: From 
State to Global Action, in DISSENT! REFRACTED: HISTORIES, AESTHETICS AND CULTURES OF DISSENT 
23, 44  (Ben Dorfman ed., 2016) (“Dissent can be thought of as the highest form of political 
participation.”); Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by   Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1759-60 (2005) 
(asserting that “one of the main goals of dissent [is] improving the quality of democratic 
decisionmaking” and that to be effective, dissent must be “visible”); Kelemen, supra note 5, at 1361 
(analyzing courts’ democratic legitimacy as a function of judicial independence and transparency, 
values that are often in tension).  
586 E.g., ROGER COTTERRELL, THE POLITICS OF JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 
TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 25 (1989) (referring to Blackstone’s conception of common law judges as 
“living oracles” of the law).  










with one voice? Or do consensus-driven opinions “of the court,” without 
revealing internal dissension, suggest anti-democratic values? If modern 
democratic values emphasize transparency and individual judges’ 
autonomy over judicial legitimacy, clarity of the law, and institutional 
independence, what are the consequences for the role of global courts and 
the rule of law?587 
All these topics warrant further scholarly attention.588 The global 
community of courts is rapidly changing.589 Much of the published 
scholarship about global courts’ internal deliberations, decision-making 
processes, and external communication strategies is strikingly outdated.590 
In some cases, contemporary scholars have simply repeated assumptions 
and conclusions from earlier scholarly works without independent analysis 
and without confirming the accuracy of the assertions against current 
information.591   
Among other topics, scholars should test the utility of Dunoff and 
Pollack’s provocative Judicial Trilemma model by applying it to both 
federal and state appellate courts in the United States as well as European 
and other national courts. In addition, more comprehensive work remains 
to be done to refine the variables influencing institutional decisions on 
how courts can best communicate the outcomes of judicial deliberations. 
The various sources of law and other formal norms that constrain judicial 
opinion practices remain obscure for some parts of the world, although 
that too is changing rapidly.592 And language barriers continue to limit in-
depth comparative analysis of many salient features of global courts and 
their decision-making processes.593 We have much yet to learn, and much 
 
 
587 Kelemen, supra note 5, at 1351, 1357 (identifying distinctive features of constitutional courts 
that implicate the practice of issuing separate opinions); see also William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme 
Court: Past and Present, 59 A.B.A. J. 361, 363 (1973) (acknowledging that “the nature of 
constitutional adjudication invites, . . . if it does not require, more separate opinions than does 
adjudication of issues of law in other areas. . . . [S]ome increase in separate opinions is a natural and 
warranted result of the increase in constitutional decisions.”). 
588 See KELEMEN, supra note 74, at 2, 7-9 (noting the dearth of relevant legal scholarship in 
Europe and enumerating several obstacles to researching judicial decision-making processes, including 
the norm of secret deliberations).  
589 See generally, e.g., Carl Baudenbacher, Foreword: Globalization of the Judiciary, 38 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 397 (2003) (introducing a volume of international symposium articles addressing global 
courts, including the role of U.S. state courts in developing international law).  
590 See, e.g., MCWHINNEY, supra note 36; Dumbauld, supra note 36; McWhinney, supra note 
84; Nadelmann (1959). 
591 See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 16, at 292 n.32 (inaccurately asserting, without citing 
authority, that “[i]n France and Germany, all opinions carry the same discursive impact because 
disagreement is not published,” without acknowledging that the German Constitutional Court had been 
publishing dissenting opinions since 1970).  
592 See, e.g., Conference: Law Via the Internet 2018: Knowledge of the Law in the Big Data Age 
(Oct. 11-12, 2018), http://lvi2018.ittig.cnr.it/. 












yet to share with one another about the inner workings of our courts and 
legal systems.   
Finally, more scholarly work needs to be done to refine the 
fundamental values that inform decisions about the structure and 
operations of global court systems.594 Much of the existing literature on 
the value of dissenting and concurring opinions enumerates their 
advantages and disadvantages,595 without much analysis or insight into the 
complex set of values and other factors that influence relevant norms and 
practices, both internal and external, that govern the practices of collegial 
courts in each jurisdiction.596 Each of those factors can be expected to have 
interactive effects.597 Finally, future research should focus on identifying 
suitable measures (both statistically valid and reliable) for each of the 
values and contextual factors that motivate relevant norms to enable 
meaningful empirical and comparative analysis.   
VI.   CONCLUSION  
Developments over the last two decades have debunked the traditional 
understanding that separate opinions are idiosyncratic of courts in nations 
following the common law tradition.598 History reflects that the judicial 
opinion-issuing practices have long since evolved, adapting to the 
increasing globalization of legal systems. And recent research confirms 
that most international and supranational tribunals, even those 
headquartered in continental Europe, expressly permit individual judges to 
issue separate opinions, although in some courts various internal norms 
and customs operate to discourage the practice.599 In addition, the majority 
of European national constitutional courts now permit individual judges to 
publish separate opinions, and judicial members of many “ordinary” 
 
 
constitutional courts runs into linguistic difficulties,” especially in studying a decision-making 
processes). 
594 See generally id. at 18-29 (comprehensively addressing internal court structure as an 
influential factor in opinion-issuing practices). 
595 E.g., POPKIN, supra note 28, at 122-26.  
596 E.g., Henderson, supra note 16, at 344 (opining that “[i]n this day and age, narrowness and 
minimalism go hand in hand with consensus, while breadth and judicial power go hand in hand with 
dissent”) 
597 See, e.g., KELEMEN, supra note 74, at 158 (noting the “interconnectedness” of relevant 
“principles and concepts, such as transparency, judicial independence, legitimacy and authority”).   
598 See RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 7, 8, 39. 
599 Id. at 15; Bricker, supra note 5, at 170; see Tbl. 3, supra. 










supreme courts may do so as well.600 Indeed, “the times they are a-
changin’.”601   
The United States Supreme Court is known globally for its justices’ 
regular practice of issuing separate opinions, and some international 
scholars hold up the Court as a shining example of the common law 
tradition of transparency.602 Yet even in the United States, few if any 
formal norms govern the Supreme Court’s opinion-issuing practices, 
which have also evolved quite significantly, if incrementally, over time. 
For example, the individual justices’ votes in a case were not published in 
the Court’s official reporter until relatively recently. And “silent 
acquiescence” in the outcome of deliberations is still possible simply by 
registering a concurrence or a dissent, unaccompanied by a written opinion 
explaining the rationale for the justice’s disagreement with the Court’s 
opinion. Without any formal constraints whatsoever, a time might come 
when a bare majority of the Court could choose secrecy over transparency 
in the blink of an eye. Yet the many United States scholars who have long 
championed the dissenting opinion, and who urge that tradition on other 
sovereigns (often without considering local values and legal traditions), 
generally overlook the absence of formal norms that protect United States 
federal courts’ judicial opinion-issuing practices against change.603  
A few scholars have advanced preliminary theories that seek to explain 
institutional variations in opinion-issuing practices, but those theories are 
narrow in scope and warrant considerably more testing and refinement. 
For one, the Judicial Trilemma theory recently posited by Dunoff and 
Pollack rests on the assumption that judicial independence, accountability, 
 
 
600 Bricker, supra note 5, at 170; see Tbls. 1A, 1B & 2, supra. 
601 With respectful apologies to Bob Dylan. BOB DYLAN, The Times They Are a-Changin,' on 
THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’ (Columbia Records 1964). Indeed, “[t]imes have changed. Many 
European judges, and most constitutional judges, have over the past twenty-five years been provided 
the opportunity to dissent from their colleagues.” Bricker, supra note 5, at 186. 
602  See, e.g., MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L'E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 5 (2004) (identifying the U.S. Supreme Court has 
having become “the symbol of modern, Common Law judging”); McWhinney, supra note 84, at 625 
(noting that “constitutional law adjudication in the United States is profoundly educational in nature . . 
. for the public at large”). But see LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M LANDES & RICHARD A POSNER, THE 
BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 1 
(2013) (“[J]udges in our system are permitted to be, and most are, quite secretive.”);  Eric J. Segall, 
Invisible Justices: How Our Highest Court Hides from the American People, 32 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
787 (2016) (contending that the Court is highly secretive and disdains transparency); cf. Nancy S. 
Marder, The Supreme Court’s Transparency: Myth or Reality?, 32 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 849, 852, 901 
(2016) (rebutting Segall’s arguments that the Court is secretive and suggesting “small steps” the Court 
could take to enhance transparency).  
603 See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 402, at 87 (“If we value judicial dissent, then it is necessary to 
know to what extent it is able to resist attack, and that requires being definite about what supports the 












and transparency (as narrowly conceptualized by the authors), are 
fundamental values shared by all international tribunals.604 Yet other 
values surely play a central role in addition to these, including optimizing 
certainty and clarity of the law,605 protecting the court’s institutional 
legitimacy,606 preserving collegiality,607 and reinforcing political loyalty to 
international judges’ appointing bodies.608 Moreover, it is unclear whether 
judicial independence, accountability, and transparency, values Dunoff 
and Pollack implicitly assume carry equal weight, are mutually exclusive 
or whether they each interact with one another in more complex ways. 
Finally, the model does not recognize the likely influence of other 
variables on judicial opinion-issuing practices, including the method of 
judicial selection,609 judicial panel size and structure,610 court leadership,611 
term lengths and limits, and individual judges’ educational and 
professional qualifications,612 among many others.   
 
 
604 See Dunoff & Pollack, supra note 75, at 233-38. However, the co-authors do not attempt to 
apply the model to any international tribunals beyond the four they selected to illustrate its predictive 
value.   
605 KELEMEN, supra note 74, at 168 (“The principle of legal certainty is a kind of dogma and a 
fundamental goal.”); id. at 169 (referring to legal certainty as “a fundamental value”); see Alder, supra 
note 38, at 242-43. Alder considers the value of legal certainty, while not absolute, as the “strongest 
argument against dissent.” Id. at 245. 
606 Kelemen, supra note 5, at 1357-58; see Alder, supra note 38, at 242 (“The appearance of 
unanimity is thought by many to buttress the authority of and confidence in the law.”). Alder observed 
that strong opposition to judicial dissents is characteristic of “settings where confidence in the political 
settlement or in the judicial process has been relatively low or uncertain.” Id. at 244; see also 
KELEMEN, supra note 74, at 15 (“[W]hen the court’s authority and legitimacy are still weak, the 
publication of seemingly unanimous opinions can serve to protect the newly established court.”).  
607 Kelemen, supra note 5, at 1364; see Alder, supra note 38, at 243. 
608 Alder, supra note 38, at 227-33 (identifying four categories of “incommensurable 
disagreement” that often arise in appellate courts in various permutations: (1) disagreements over 
ethical or political values, id. at 227-28; (2) disagreements about preferred modes of reasoning, such as 
rule-of-law based formalism on the one hand and outcome-oriented reasoning on the other, id. at 228- 
31; (3) disagreements about whether to resolve legal disputes based on abstract, a priori principles by 
applying a more concrete, pragmatic, “consequentialist” approach,” id. at 231-32; and (4) 
disagreements based on subjective differences in weighing consequences and factual inferences, id. at 
232.   
609 See Ruth Mackenzie, et al., Selecting International Judges: Principles, Process, and Politics 
(2010) (detailing judicial selection processes for ICC and ICJ judges).  
610 See KELEMEN, supra note 74, at 18 (explaining that most European constitutional courts, 
unlike the United States Supreme Court, generally decide cases not en banc, but rather in panels of 
three to five (or more) judges, similar to the practice of supreme courts in nations following the civil 
law tradition).  
611 See Bentsen, supra note 3, at 208-09 (identifying court leadership and composition as 
influential factors in the rate of dissent).  
612 E.g., id. at 209 (finding, based on empirical analysis, that appointment of judges with 
academic backgrounds to Norway Supreme Court significantly correlates with increased rates of 










A predictive model has little value unless it can be generalized beyond 
a small group of international and supranational courts. While theoretical 
models hold promise, more scholarly work is warranted to better 
conceptualize the competing “judicial values” that influence the practices 
of national and subnational multi-member courts. Scholarly research is 
also needed to identify the reasons for individual judicial choices about 
disclosing votes and publishing separate opinions.  
The remarkable contemporary global interest in the opinion-issuing 
practices of national, supranational, and international tribunals reflects our 
expanding vision of the rule of law and each sovereign’s role in that new 
world order. In our increasingly global, interconnected legal community, 
should judicial tribunals speak with one institutional voice? Or should a 
cacophony of individual judges communicate judgments, each writing 
seriatim? 613 Perhaps the right balance something in between. The 
polarized views of many scholars who advocate for and against separate 
opinions disregard legitimate differences in the underlying norms and 
values that inform judicial practices. There is no clear, “one-size-fits-all” 
answer.614 As others have concluded, much more comparative scholarly 
work remains to be done.615 But as this article demonstrates, the global 
trend is clearly in favor of “democratizing” justice616 by defrocking the 
 
 
dissent). One scholar has observed “a pattern that many Judges give more and more dissenting or 
separate judgments as their careers progress.” Shiels, supra note 74, at 19.  
613 See, e.g., L’Heureux-Dube, supra note 1, at 516 (“In this polyphonic world, it is important to 
recognize the value of all potential sources of new melodies.”); see also Flanders, supra note 44, at 
423. 
The substance of appellate judging – providing the best possible judicial responses to the 
legal problems posed by the cases and controversies that are appealed to courts of last resort – 
must never be sacrificed to appease the unslakable gods of collegiality and civility, whatever 
blandishments their professed votaries may offer to extinguish the fires of dissension. 
Id. But cf. Carpenter, supra note 35, at 291 (positing that not all dissenting opinions warrant 
publication in the court’s official reports); McIntyre, supra note 36, at 443 (explaining that dissenting 
viewpoints are inevitable, but the publication of dissenting opinions, in one respect a mechanism of 
judicial accountability, needs justification).    
614 Cf. Henderson, supra note 16, at 285 (expressing strong support for the United States 
practice of publicizing dissents, while conceding that “there is no simple answer to the question of how 
courts should decide cases or deliver opinions.”). 
615 E.g., KELEMEN, supra note 74, at 2, 7-9; McIntyre, supra note 36, at 432 (addressing the 
contemporary debate in Australia about the potential threat to judicial independence as a result of 
internal pressure from within courts to reach consensus in single judgments). 
At its heart, the controversy reflects different conceptions of how judges should undertake 
their role and about the precise objectives judges should pursue.  The issues of dissent and 
collective decision-making become a window into a deeper conflict about the nature, form 
and limits of the judicial role.  These issues are too rarely the subject of direct consideration.  
Id. (citing, as the provocateur of the debate, J.D. Heydon, Threats to Judicial Independence: The 
Enemy Within, 129 L.Q. REV. 205 (2013)); see also Alarie & Green, supra note 4, at 33-34. 
616 POPKIN, supra note 28, at 126; RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 38 (surmising that initiating 
















the process of democratization of the European Union”); see Jacobson, supra note 1, at 1632 (“Dissent 
democratizes law, throws open the doors of law, to those who are its clients.”); Nadelmann (1964), 
supra note 84, at 276 (“The right to the open dissent has been linked with the defense of democracy . . 
. .”); Kevin M. Stack, Note, The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court, 105 YALE L. J. 2235, 2246 
(1996) (asserting that publishing dissents enhances a court’s “political legitimacy . . . consisten[t] with 
democratic rule,” by demonstrating its engagement in a “deliberative process,” particularly given that 
the court “reaches its decisions in secrecy”).  
617 See Brennan, supra note 1, at 435 (“Courts derive legal principles, and have a duty to explain 
why and how a given rule has come to be. This requirement serves a function within the judicial 
process similar to that served by the electoral process with regard to the political branches of 
government.”); see also Hans Christian Andersen, Keiserens Nye Klæder (The Emperor's New 
Clothes), ANDERSEN’S FAIRY TALES, 
https://www.andersenstories.com/da/andersen_fortaellinger/kejserens_nye_klaeder.  
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